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Thinking about the future can take numerous forms, varying from planning actions to 
foreseeing possible scenarios by means of knowledge and informed guesses, or 
speculations and intuitions, or imagination and creativity. Different cognitive 
processes are needed for each of these different types of future thinking. This thesis 
encompasses a series of experiments both on healthy volunteers and on brain 
damaged patients, revolving around the issue of “Future Thinking” (FT) that is the 
cognitive ability, specifically human, of envisagin one’s own future. The concept of 
FT and the relevant literature are presented and discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
The ability to foresee has been normally assumed to rely on the reconstructive nature 
of episodic memory. This hypothesis is investigated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In these 
chapters data on young adults, who mentally pre-experienced autobiographical 
episodes, are presented to investigate which type of cue would elicit richer 
visualizations and to explore possible differences b tween temporal and a-temporal 
scene construction. The findings from these experiments on healthy volunteers call 
for a deeper understanding of the relationship betwe n past experience and FT. 
Chapter 7 discusses results revealing that aMCI patients produced fewer episodic but 
more semantic details for both past and future events, as compared to controls, 
suggesting that reminiscence and FT are the expression of the same neurocognitive 
system. However, contrary to what was generally thoug t, data on patients with 
Parkinson Disease with spared memory performance reported in Chapter 8 and 9 
show that FT is not entirely dependent on memory (and the hippocampus), rather the 
results suggest that poor performance in FT is associated with poor executive control. 
In Chapter 10 two patients affected by dense amnesia are investigated. Chapter 11 
presents a single case exhibiting florid confabulation. The results confirm that 
although amnesia is associated with poor performance on FT, memory deficits 
cannot account for the entire picture of FT deficits. Indeed, dysexecutive symptoms 




In its conclusions (Chapter 12) therefore, the thesis postulates that FT is supported by 
a wide range of cognitive abilities. In particular, executive skills, rather than episodic 






Esistono diversi modi di pensare al futuro, che comprendono la pianificazione di 
azioni, la previsione di possibili scenari utilizzando conoscenze pregresse, 
speculazioni, intuizioni, o anche immaginazione e cr atività. Per ognuna di queste 
differenti modalità sono necessari molteplici processi cognitivi. Questa tesi 
comprende una serie di esperimenti, svolti sia con persone sane che con pazienti con 
danni cerebrali, volti ad indagare l’abilità cognitiva, peculiare dell’uomo, di 
immaginare il proprio futuro. Il concetto di costruire un futuro immaginato e la 
letteratura rilevante sono presentati e discussi nei Capitoli 2 e 3.   
 
Si assume normalmente che la capacità di immaginare l p oprio futuro dipenda dalla 
natura ricostruttiva della memoria episodica. Tale ipotesi è analizzata nei Capitoli 4, 
5 e 6, che presentano dati su giovani adulti che pre-esperiscono mentalmente episodi 
autobiografici, valutano quale tipo di cue eliciti visualizzazioni più dettagliate ed 
esplorano la differenza che intercorre tra costruzioni di scene temporali e atemporali. 
I risultati di questi esperimenti su partecipanti sani indicano una meno ovvia 
relazione tra esperienze passate e costruzioni del futuro. Il Capitolo 7 discute i 
risultati che rivelano che i pazienti con aMCI producono meno dettagli episodici ma 
più dettagli semantici sia quando ricordano esperienze passate che quando 
costruiscono esperienze future, rispetto ai controlli, suggerendo che ricordare il 
passato e immaginare il futuro sono espressioni dello stesso sistema neurocognitivo. 
Tuttavia, contrariamente a quello che si pensava, i d ti raccolti su pazienti affetti dal 
morbo di Parkinson, con memoria intatta, riportati nei Capitoli 8 e 9 mostrano che la 
capacità di immaginare scenari futuri non dipende int ramente dalla memoria (e 
dall’ippocampo). I risultati suggeriscono piuttosto che difficoltà nel costruire episodi 
futuri riflettono disfunzioni esecutive. Il Capitolo 10 riporta i casi di due pazienti 
affetti da una severa amnesia e il Capitolo 11 presenta un caso singolo che genera 
floride confabulazioni. I risultati confermano che, s  è vero che la perdita di memoria 
si associa a difficoltà nella simulazione di scenari futuri, è vero anche che i deficit di 
memoria non possono spigare interamente il quadro di un’eventuale compromissione 
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dell’immaginazione del futuro. Infatti, sintomi dise ecutivi comportano marcate 
difficoltà nell’immaginare episodi futuri. 
 
Nelle conclusioni (Capitolo 12), infine, si suggerisce che l’immaginazione di episodi 
futuri sia supportata da una serie di abilità cognitive più vasta di quella che era stata 
originariamente postulata. In particolare, le funzio i esecutive, più che la memoria 










2. Predicting the future 1 (a divertissement) 
 
“There is no such thing as predicting the future!”, says Sally in Woody Allen’s You 
will meet a tall dark stranger. But people have a go at it nevertheless. Sally’s mother, 
her husband and even herself fantasize about meeting the stranger of their dreams. 
“If you can see into the future, how come you didn’t know I was gonna jump out a 
building and land on top of you?”, asks Boris to Helena (Whatever works, Woody 
Allen). “Humans have the ubiquitous capacity to imagine, plan for, and shape the 
future (even if we do frequently get it wrong)” (Suddendorf, 2006, p. 1006). And 
they do so for various reasons. Many dilemmas, more or less ordinary, can be 
approached by projecting oneself forward in time and envisaging how different 
variations of the event will turn out. Max uses a future picturesque homely setting to 
persuade his friend to leave the vessel, where he has always lived: 
 
You’ll introduce me to the mother of your children a d invite me for 
a Sunday dinner. I’ll bring the dessert and a bottle of wine and you’ll 
tell me that I shouldn’t have and you’ll show me around your house 
shaped like a ship. Your wife will be cooking a turkey and, while 
we’ll sit at the table, I’ll tell her that she is an excellent cook. She’ll 
say that you talk about me all the time. (The legend of the 1900, 
Giuseppe Tornatore) 
 
Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction begins with Pumpkin and Honey Bunny providing 
a “reasonably good script of going to a restaurant” (A ance and O’Neill, 2001, p. 
536) and scrutinising it, in the attempt to foresee probable hazards: 
 
[Restaurants] are not expecting to get robbed. [...] Same as banks, 
these places are insured. Manager [...] he’s just trying to get you out 
the door before you start plugging the diners. Waitresses? [...] no 
way they’re taking a bullet for the register. Busboys, some wetback 
                                                




getting paid $1.50 an hour, really give a fuck you’re stealing from the 
owner? Customers sitting with food in their mouths. They don’t 
know what’s going on. One minute they’re having a Denver 
omelette, next minute, someone’s sticking a gun in their face. 
 
Most people can mentally cast themselves in hypothetical scenarios and imagine 
related complex details. “Imagine there’s no countries/It isn’t hard to do” 
(“Imagine”, John Lennon). This ability, variously labelled as episodic future thinking 
(Atance and O’Neill, 2001), prospection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), proscopic 
chronesthesia (Tulving, 2002) or mental time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007), allows humans to examine the possible reactions likely to be elicited by the 
subcortical systems in certain contexts (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Towards the end 
of Clint Eastwood’s Hereafter, George, who used to work as a psychic, has an 
appointment with Marie. He is sitting at a café, sees her arriving and looking for him, 
but he hesitates for a while to stand up from the table and reach her. He imagines 
Marie and himself very close, holding and kissing each other. This scene makes 
George smile and persuades him to meet her. Recent neuroimaging studies have 
revealed the neural regions that are engaged during the construction of possible 
future events (for a review see Schacter et al., 2008). At odds with what common 
sense would suggest (“past is fact and future is fiction”, Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007, p. 302), most of the areas associated with future episodic thoughts have also 
been reported to be active when remembering past events. The most frequently 
observed among these regions are the medial prefrontal cortex, the lateral temporal 
cortex, the posterior regions of the medial and lateral parietal cortex encompassing 
the posterior cingulate and retrosplenial regions, and the medial temporal lobe 
including the hippocampus. The same regions belong t  the “default network”, a 
brain system that participates in internally focused functions, involving also 
autobiographical retrieval and imagining the future (Buckner et al., 2008). In light of 
such observations, it seems reasonable to propose that recalling past events is closely 
related to the ability of envisaging future ones. Nothing new, if we think that 




Recalling the past (remembering) occurs only with the intention of 
making it possible to foresee the future; we look about us from the 
standpoint of the present in order to determine something, or to be 
prepared for something. Empirical foreseeing is the anticipation of 
similar cases (exspectatio casuum similium) and requires no 
knowledge of causes and effects, but only the remembering of 
observed events, as they usually follow upon each other. Repeated 
experiences help to develop skill in empirical anticipation. 
(Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Immanuel Kant, p. 
77) 
 
Edmund Burke maintained that one “can never plan the future by the past” (Letter to 
a Member of the National Assembly, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke, Vol. 4, p. 55). Confucius disagreed: “study the past if you would divine the 
future”. Do we really need the past to imagine the future? The literature provides 
controversial findings. Should this be the case, amnesic patients ought to exhibit 
severe impairments in simulating their future. Indee , people with memory 
impairments, observed, among others, by Lidz (1942), Tulving (1985), and Klein et 
al. (2002), seemed almost mentally marooned in a permanent present, since the 
preceding events were “not available to meet the new” ones (Lidz, 1942, p. 595). 
H.M. became amnesic in 1953, after the bilateral resection of medial temporal lobe 
structures (Corkin, 2002). When Sue Corkin asked him in 1992, "What do you think 
you’ll do tomorrow?", he answered, "Whatever is beneficial". He had “no database to 
consult when asked what he would do the next day, week, or in years to come” (S. 
Corkin, personal communication, 01/26/11). Hassabis et al. (2007) reported the lack 
of particulars and of spatial coherence shown by focal amnesiacs when constructing 
novel scenarios. It would actually seem that “we have no grasp of the future without 
an equal and corresponding outlook over the past” (Bergson, 1913, p. 69-70). The 
surrounding past and present cast a light on the future that otherwise might be hardly 




“What did the previous day mean for him? And could he think about 
the next day? I could not understand how much he suffered for a 
similar difficulty” (The Professor’s Beloved Equation, Yoko Ogawa; 
own transl., Il Saggiatore, p. 31). 
 
Ilya Kabakov and his wife, Emilia, have wonderfully expressed the conceptual 
relationship between memories from the past, the present and the future in one of 
their oeuvres, titled “Where is our place?” (2003) (see Fig. 2.1). The installation is 
articulated in three temporal spaces: present times ar  black and white pictures 
decorating a gallery at head height; enormous legs r present visitors from a remote 
past admiring portions of impressive and oversized 19th century paintings with giant 
gold-leaf frames hovering over the contemporary pictures, which, in comparison, 
almost become insignificant. The gigantic paintings di appearing into the ceiling 
suggest an historical period different from the present. They are gargantuan because 
they tower upon the hic et nunc. The viewer becomes solely a link in a chain of the 
three dimensions. He can have a glance at his future, through trapdoors into the floor. 
But the future content is markedly small and indistinct, far too narrow to be fully 
appreciated, and can only be guessed or imagined. Similarly, the people dancing in 
the middle of Edvard Munch’s painting The Dance of Li e (1899-1900), are 
encircled by what they have been and what they will be. 
 
“Life’s more interesting phenomena - he replied - probably always 
have this Janus face towards the past and the future” (Doktor 
Faustus, Thomas Mann).  
 
It has been speculated, for instance by Endel Tulving, that “the ability to contemplate 
future scenarios was a driving force in the evolutin of episodic memory. This 
proposed selection-for-imagination might even be blamed for the inherent fallibility 





Fig. 2.1 - “Where is our place?” by Ilya and Emilia Kabakov. Venezia, Querini 




The failures of episodic memory are apparently due to a flexible and, consequently, 
fallacious mechanism that enables people to retrieve and recombine bits of 
information in order to reconstruct autobiographical past events. In the attempt to put  
together these pieces, people are likely to make mistakes. This is probably the reason 
why memory cannot be considered a faithful recreation of past episodes. In “Swann’s 
way”, Proust defined the act of remembering a “labour in vain”: “How paradoxical it 
is to seek in reality for the pictures that are stored in one’s memory”. 
 
"Then you say she’s lying, boy?”  
Atticus was on his feet, but Tom Robinson didn’t need him. 
“I don’t say she’s lyin’, Mr Gilmer, I say she’s mistaken in her mind” 




Miss Prism: Memory is the diary that we all carry about with us. 
Cecily: Yes, but it usually chronicles the things that have never 
happened, and couldn’t possibly have happened. I believe that 
memory is responsible for nearly all the three volume novels that 
Mudie sends us. 
(The importance of being Ernest, Oscar Wilde) 
There are lots of people who mistake their imaginatio  for their 
memory. 
(Quote attributed to Henry Wheeler Shaw aka Josh Billings) 
Human memory is a marvellous but fallacious instrument. The 
memories which lie within us are not carved in stone; ot only do 
they tend to become erased as the years go by, but often they change. 
(The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi, transl. by Raymond 
Rosenthal) 
 
The process, which causes such imperfections might be the same that lies behind the 
creation of novel episodes. It allows us to reshuffle details that unfolded in the past, 
although in different combinations and in different situations (Schacter and Addis, 
2007a). “The past is the melting salt which spices up the future”, croons an Italian 
singer, Claudio Baglioni, (“il passato è sale e si scioglie per dar sapore al futuro” ), 
but can also be updated to shape one’s behaviour in the present and to construct 
alternative plausible behavioural modes ready to be us d (Ingvar, 1979; Dudai, 
2009).  
 
Human behaviour is active in character, that is determined not only 
by past experiences, but also by plans and designs formulating the 
future, and [...] human brain is a remarkable apparatus which cannot 
only create these models of the future, but also subordinate its 
behaviour to them. (Luria, 1973, p. 13) 
 
“I want memory to have a prospective dimension, to inhabit the 
future tense, to bring new worlds into being” (“Reme bering the 
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future”, Malcom Bowie, in Memory: An anthology, edited by HH 
Wood and AS Byatt, 2008, p. 14).  
 
A revealing example of human behaviour that is modelle  on previous experiences 
and driven by future goals is shown by Rob Reiner i his comedy film, When Harry 
met Sally (1989). Harry decides not to take anyone t  the airport at the beginning of 
a relationship, “because eventually things move on and you don’t take someone to 
the airport and I never want anyone to say to me: ‘How come you never take me to 
the airport anymore?’”. However, the part played by episodic memory in the 
simulations of future scenarios is still debated. The amnesic patients mentioned 
above exhibited widespread lesions encroaching upon brain areas other than the 
hippocampus (Nyberg et al., 2010; for a discussion, see Squire et al., 2010), 
including regions engaged in executive functions (e.g., see Samarasekera et al., 
2007). People with a well-characterized hippocampal lesion and a subsequent deficit 
in recollecting recent personal memories, have report d to perform similarly to 
controls in future thinking tasks (Squire et al., 2010). Not all the areas activated by 
future simulations are involved in remembering past events (Addis et al., 2009). The 
activation of the hippocampus itself is not invariably required during all the steps of 
the simulating future process (Summerfield et al., 2010). Moreover, specific areas, 
as, for instance, the right frontal pole, are specifically involved in the construction of 
future events (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Summerfield et al., 2010), 
suggesting the fundamental role played by frontally based executive functions in the 
production and recombination of event-related details, even when episodic memory 
is spared. Furthermore, neuropsychological studies of patients with an impairment of 
the prefrontal cortex have shown a deficit in their subjective time, i.e., the ability of 
thinking about their “continued existence” (Szpunar, 2011, p. 410) that might 
substantially contribute to the capacity of mentally time travelling. Such observations 
provide us with clues as to the possible alternative roles played in the scene 
construction by cognitive functions other than memory. “It is accurate prediction of 
the future, more so than accurate memory of the past per se, that conveys adaptive 
advantages” (Suddendorf, 2006, p. 1007). However, predictions are likely to be 





If the sky that we look upon 
should tumble and fall 
and the mountains should crumble to the sea 
I won’t cry, I won’t cry, no I won’t shed a tear 
just as long as you stand, stand by me 
(“Stand by me”, Ben E. King) 
 
How can he be so sure? “Trying to predict the future is like trying to drive down a 
country road at night with no lights while looking out the back window” (Peter F. 
Drucker). Also Dom Cobb, in Christopher Nolan’s Inception, warns Arianna against 
using her memories to construct new scenarios: 
 
Dom: Never re-create places from your memory. Always imagine 
new places. 
Arianna: You draw from stuff you know, right? 
 
Forecastings “tend to over-represent the moments that evoke the most intense 
pleasure or pain” (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007, p. 1353) and do not take into account 
many real features, as the capacity of adaptation. At the end of Frida, a movie that 
recounts the harsh life of Frida Kahlo, compelled to undergo countless medical 
operations after a car accident, the Mexican painter realizes that “at the end of the 
day, we can endure much more than we think we can” (Frida, Julie Taymor). It is 
possible that in the future we will see “things you people wouldn’t believe” (Blade 
runner, Ridley Scott).  
 
Indeed, it has been noticed that [...] in any case, th  record of 
forecasters in the past thirty or forty years, whatever their 
professional qualification as prophets, has been so spectacularly bad 
that only governments and economic research institutes still have, or 
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pretend to have, much confidence in it. It is even possible that it has 
got worse since the Second World War. (Age of Extremes: The Short 
Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Eric J. Hobsbawm, London: Michael 
Joseph p. 5-6) 
 
People cannot use the “pensieve”, with the help of which one “siphons the excess 
thoughts from one’s mind, pours them into the basin, and examines them at one’s 
leisure” (Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire, JK Rowling).  
 
“At the end of the day, all these things were still to happen! It was 
the future - Kees Popinga’s future, which, in an evening of a 
December Wednesday, at 8 o’clock, could not yet be guessed” (The 
Man Who Watched Trains Go By, Georges Simenon, our transl., 
Adelphi, p. 12). 
 
Aiming at predicting the future, we use cognitive functions, not crystal balls. Mental 
simulations might be “the means by which the brain d scovers what it already 
knows” (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007, p. 1354). The sphere that we hold in our hand 
reflects us, like the Escher lithograph, “Hand with reflecting sphere” (1935). 
Therefore, our forecasts cannot be more precise than a sibylline statement with no 
commas (Ibis redibis non morieris in bello2). So, people can “mentally time travel” 
from past to future passing through the present (Tulving, 1985). Even the mother of 
all the muses, Mnemosyne in the Ancient Greek mythology, “has a Janus face, 
looking to both time past and time future” (Dudai and Carruthers, 2005). 
 
I’ll sing my songs in the streets 
and I’ll live my life hard-nosed 
like a homeless warrior without sword 
with my foot in the past 
                                                
2 The sibylline statement might translate as follows: He will go, will come back, will not die 
in war. In Latin the “non” could be yoked to “redibis” (i.e., He will go, will not come back, will die 
in war), or with “morieris”(i.e., He will go, will come back, will not die in war). Therefore, the Latin 
statement is ambiguous unless one puts a comma before or after the “non”.    
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and my gaze to the future 
(“A muso duro”, Pierangelo Bertoli, own transl.) 
My own future lies in my past and in my present 
(“Prendi in mano i tuoi anni”, Litfiba, own transl.) 
 
Thinking about the future can take numerous forms, varying from planning actions to 
foreseeing possible scenarios by means of knowledge and informed guesses, or 
speculations and intuitions, or imagination and creativity. Different cognitive 
processes are needed for each of these different types of future thinking. In this 
divertissement we mentioned episodic memory, on which our previsions are built; 
executive functions, which allow flexible searching side memory storages; working 
memory that provides a workspace in which to manipulate and reassemble planning 
details; semantic memory, from which we draw scripts for postulating alternative 
scenarios; and temporal orientation that is vital to order the sequence of foreseen 
events. It has been maintained that “The best way to predict the future is to invent it” 
(Alan Kay, 1971). Perhaps, instead, the best way of thinking about the future is to 
use our imagination to remodel and re-create the past. In order to plan the future, 
which is what memory is about, we need a system of representations rather than mere 
recordings of events. The price that we pay is a memory system, which is fallacious 







3.1 Mechanisms of future-oriented cognition 
 
Pietro Paladini, who has just been widowed, is suddenly to make a vital decision. 
One of his dearest friends, Jean-Claude, has been fired and Pietro is asked to take 
over his job of chairman. Pietro is to choose whether or not to become rich and 
powerful, betraying Jean-Claude. In such a situation, he finds advantageous to 
consider a future scenario, based upon what he knows, a personal past experience, 
and an event that he read.  
 
I’m now living an event similar to one that I had alre dy experienced 
in the past, and that’s the reason why I’m quiet, wi h lowered eyes, 
looking at his shoes’ “screen”, where it has started b ing projected a 
movie full of opulence and pomposity that I would have never 
thought to desire: fabulous salary, power, permanent co tract, stock 
options, private plane, works of art, vintage cars, exclusive 
apartments, chauffeur, any kind of benefits. [...] 
It’s obvious that I’ll end up refusing the offer [...], and nonetheless, 
in the meantime, I’m here, looking at a twenty-two metres boat 
slowly flashing before my eyes, with myself at the helm and Claudia 
sunbathing on deck. (Caos Calmo, novel by Sandro Veronesi, UTET: 
Torino, 2005, own transl., p. 179) 
 
Thierry, who is requiring the resolution, suggests him not to answer in that moment. 
“You’re facing a difficult situation”, he says, “that might hamper your future 
thinking”.  
 
These citations encapsulate the idea of episodic future thinking, encompassing all the 




• Episodic memory. Thierry’s offer reminds Pietro of an 
autobiographical past situation, which could have similarly changed 
the course of his life; 
• Semantic memory. Pietro remembers a Schnitzler’s3 character who in 
a few minutes has the opportunity to lose everything or to gain much 
money; 
• Executive functions. He explores different memories, looking for the 
details he is interested in, to evaluate pros and cons. Thus, he is to 
deal with planning, checking, and binding together the converging 
inputs to come to a decision; 
• Working memory. Pietro mentally works to combine thse details to 
the point of extending an unprecedented meaning to them; 
• Temporal orientation. He has to recognize the events that come up 
into his mind and to attribute a temporal order. This process avoids 
confusing past episodic with semantic memories, and with the 
hypothetical future development he is depicting at the moment. 
 
Moreover, Thierry supplies the intuition temporarily gnored by Pietro, i.e., the 
essential role likely to be played by the present situation on his resolution. 
 
Each step of episodic future thinking is likely to be affected by a distinct cortical 
brain damage. Given the complexity of the constructed experience task, Berryhill et 
al. (2010) raised the possibility of possible cognitive consequences (concerning 
future thought) of a lesion in any brain region.  
 
The present thesis aims at investigating the cognitive underpinnings of foresight, 
“because humans may need to get better at it if we are to continue to survive” 
(Suddendorf, 2006, p. 1007). Accordingly, we will first provide a critical review of 
the current knowledge regarding this fundamental mental ability. 
 
                                                
3 Arthur Schnitzler is a writer. In particular, he is the author of “Traumnovelle” and “Night 





3.2 Conceptual development     
 
The aptitude to imagine personal future episodes has always received a considerable 
amount of attention, not only from neuroscientists, but also from philosophers, 
singers, poets, painters, writers, sculptors, and movie directors, as formerly 
elucidated. However, only recently, researchers have begun to experimentally 
investigate the cognitive processes underlying this ab lity.  
 
A long standing debate in the literature concerns whether this ability should be 
considered separately from or in conjunction with memory. Moreover, when 
considered straight in conjunction with memory, different kinds of relation may be 
taken into account. 
 
Haith (1997) distinguished four relations: 
 
a) “continuation of a repeating past”, which is the simplest future-
oriented cognitive performance based upon the expectation that 
cycling events will replay, like repeating and continuing phone rings;  
b)  “projection of past trends”, anticipated by Wolff in the eighteenth 
century as the expectatio casuum similium, also quoted in Kant’s 
“Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view” (1798) (see previous 
chapter). In this case, people do not expect the same event to reply 
verbatim. But, on the basis of observed past events, they foresight 
similar facts, extrapolate a trend without distinctly knowing the link of 
causes and effects; 
c) “induction from observation”, which allows to construct future from 
analogy not only with own direct past experience, but also with 
indirect experience, i.e. experience of others or experience drawn 
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from a general knowledge of the world. “We have never died, but we 
know we will” (p. 33), consequently we can envisage that moment; 
d) “imagination and invention”. This fourth relation raises the possibility 
of release from events occurred before to us or others and from 
reiterating past trends, imagining novel episodes that have never 
happened, like a hypothetical trip on Mars.  
 
The preceding taxonomy entails the potential involvement of two memory systems: 
episodic and semantic memory. Tulving proposed the first formulation of a  
distinction between these two memory systems in 1972. This early differentiation 
was hinged on the diverse typologies and sources of to-be-remembered information. 
That is, individual experiences in the former case nd general knowledge of the 
world in the latter. These concepts have evolved an, eventually, Tulving (2002) 
argued that episodic memory bears a unique relationsh p with time, a relationship of 
which semantic memory system is devoid. Episodic memory “allows people to 
consciously re-experience past experiences” (Tulving, 2002, p. 6). Perhaps, the lack 
of such a special connection with time is the reason why the semantic memory 
system has mostly been ignored in the studies concerni g future thought. The 
literature has mainly focused on exploring the relation between thinking about the 
future and episodic memory.      
 
And in fact, Szpunar (2010) has noticed that even the heterogeneous nomenclature 
adopted to identify forethought depends on whether or not it was thought to be in 
relation with episodic memory.  
 
Some studies have highlighted a close linkage, althoug  for different roots, between 
remembering personal past and envisaging personal future. To those we shall turn 






3.3 Episodic memory and future thinking 
 
Atance and O’Neill (2001) have built their definition of episodic future thinking 
upon Tulving’s most recent conceptualisation of episod c memory. Indeed, the two 
researchers have formulated a distinction between semantic and episodic future 
thinking, which mirrors Tulving’s categorization for past memories. Whereas 
semantic future thinking concerns the projection into the future of a general 
knowledge of the world and, consequently, of reasonbly good scripts, episodic 
future thinking “refers to an ability to project the self forward in time to pre-
experience an event” (p. 537). In line with Tulving’s theory, they maintained that it is 
the episodic memory system to underlie the capacity to cast personal events into the 
future. 
 
Likewise, Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) have developed, from Tulving’s theory, 
the idea of a close linkage between the skills of mentally travelling back to the past 
and of casting own minds forward. More precisely, they have provided a key account 
for this linkage, referring to the ability to travel mentally in time as “a prime mover 
in human cognitive evolution” (p. 165). A further explanation of this evolutionary 
perspective suggests that natural selection works on what episodic memory does for 
our survival. And one of the ways it may work in this direction is to inform about 
potential future scenarios (Suddendorf, 2010). The particularity of what Suddendorf 
(2010) labels episodic foresight implies the production of novel representations 
through combinations of pieces of information.   
 
Schacter and Addis (2007a) have broadened this sugge tion. Their constructive 
simulation hypothesis has suggested that the mechanism lying behind the episodic 
memory evolved as constructive rather than reproductive to allow individual 
simulations of future episodes. This selection permits people to collect elements from 
different memories, and to combine them in an unpredict d manner to shape a unique 
scenario. Thus, the researchers have speculated on the functions of episodic memory 
thought to prepare us for the future. What they have in mind when talking about 
episodic simulation of future events is the ability of “drawing on elements of past 
29 
 
experiences in order to envisage and mentally “try out” one or more versions of what 
might happen” (Schacter et al., 2008, p. 40). According to this view, Dudai and 
Carruthers (2005) have reminded that Mnemosyne, the personification of memory in 
ancient Greek mythology, had two heads facing the opposite directions of past and 
future. Morewedge and colleagues (2005) have argued that when people simulate 
their reactions to future episodes, they spontaneously rely on memories of similar 
events which were already experienced in the past. In addition, Gilbert and Wilson 
(2007) have noticed that “we naturally imagine our next dental appointment by 
remembering our last one” (p. 352). And also in a recent review Schacter, Addis and 
Buckner (2008) have observed that a crucial functio of the brain is to use past 
experiences to anticipate future events.  
 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004; 2006) have supported the idea of an 
intimate relation between remembering the past and pre-experiencing the future. In 
two different studies, they have demonstrated that phenomenal characteristics 
associated with both past and future representations might be similarly influenced by 
the same factors (the findings of these studies will be further analysed in the 
following session). Thus, they have suggested that e abilities of travelling 
backward and forward rely on similar mechanisms.  
 
Bar (2007) has posited that episodic memories may be translated into novel 
predictions through associative activations. Thus, memories ar “the building blocks 
of predictions” (p. 280). That is, the linked stored lements activate associations 
which are relevant in a specific situation. Predictions are generated by these 
associations, which is why they so often go awry. According to the idea that 
simulations are based upon memories, inaccurate to r present the past, Gilbert and 
Wilson (2007) have suggested that simulations cannot be accurate in representing the 
future. Furthermore, such inaccuracy is exacerbated by the fact that, when 
constructing future simulations, people often use a ample of the most memorable, as 
well as unrepresentative, memories (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). This concept can be 
clearly illustrated using the example of the devastation of the Twin Towers in New 
York on September 11, 2001, the worst terrorist attack Americans ever endured: a 
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highly atypical event that, for this reason, might come very easily to mind. People 
who made their predictions and plans accordingly to such a memorable happening, 
were likely to be in danger of making mispredictions. And indeed, in the last months 
of 2001, the decrease of commercial airline passengers determined an increase in 
automobile traffic, which killed more people than the attack itself (Morewedge et al., 
2005).   
 
3.4 Similarities between past and future thought 
 
The surge of evidence, which has shed a light on the commonalities linking episodic 
memory and episodic foresight, encompasses neuropsychological and 
phenomenological studies, and brain imaging research.  
 
Parallel impairments in episodic past and future thoughts have been uncovered in 
many patients studies.  
 
The earliest observation of an amnesic patient, whoas also unable to imagine the 
future, was provided by Lidz (1942). Lidz reported on the case of O.S., a 30 years 
old man, who was admitted to the hospital seventeen days after a suicidal attempt by 
inhalation of carbon monoxide and suffered from a pure amnestic disorder. O.S. was 
tied to others for simulations and he had no sense of continuity of events. In fact, 
since he could not completely rely on his past, his future remained “hazier, more 
vague and more confused” (p. 596). 
 
However, the pioneer of the above-mentioned surge is considered Endel Tulving 
(1985), who has reported on the case of K.C. (a.k.a. N N.), aged 36, who suffered 
dense anterograde and retrograde amnesia following a closed-head injury that 
damaged several areas in the brain, including the frontal and medial lobes. His 
awareness of subjective time was also highly impaired. He seemed mentally trapped 
in a permanent present. When asked what he was going t  do the day after, K.C. 
smiled faintly, and then answered, “I don’t know”. When encouraged to describe 
how was his state of mind like while trying to think about his future, he just said, 
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“Blank, I guess”; “It’s like being in a room with nothing there and having a guy who 
tells you to go to find a chair, and there’s nothing there”; and “It’s like swimming in 
the middle of a lake. There’s nothing there to hold up or do anything with” (Tulving, 
1985, p. 4).  
 
The famous amnesic patient, H.M., interviewed about his future plans by Sue Corkin 
in 1992, provided an as brief as eloquent answer that reflected his incapability to cast 
himself even in the most immediate future (S. Corkin, personal communication, 
01/26/11; see previous chapter).   
 
Dalla Barba and his colleagues (1997) have described the case of GA, a 52-years-old 
housewife, with no history of psychiatric diseases, who developed an amnesic-
confabulatory syndrome consequent to a subarachnoid haemorrhage and ischemia. 
GA is the first case of an experimentally documented confabulation, which embraced 
the whole personal temporality (past, present and future). The impairments 
concerned her performances in episodic memory, orientation in time and place and 
personal future planning tasks. Her case was deeply investigated, with two tasks. At 
the first task, GA scored equally poorly to the episodic memory questions concerning 
her personal past and future, reporting the same percentage (60% for past and 60% 
for future) of confabulatory answers. At the second task, a future version of the 
Crovitz test, requiring a detailed account of autobiographical episodes related to a 
specific cue-word, GA confabulated when reporting a personal past event and even 
more when providing a future episode.  
 
Amnesic patient D.B., a 78 years old man, was also found to be impaired in his 
ability to think about his personal future (Klein et al., 2002). The authors 
administered a questionnaire about past and future events (i.e., What did you do 
yesterday? What are you going to do tomorrow?), in which D.B. was severely 
impaired (with respect to both past and future question ). Interestingly, his deficit for 
future thinking was constrained to his personal future and he was able to imagine 
future public events, such as political events, as well as control subjects. However, 
Rosenbaum et al. (2009) noticed that the questions p sed to allow the construction of 
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public events did not seem to promote the production of detailed narrative responses. 
For example, the question “Can you tell me what youthink might be some of the 
most important issues facing the environment over th  next ten years?” elicited the 
response “Threat that weather and rainfall patterns a e going to change because of 
industrial pollution” (Klein et al., 2002, p. 367).  
 
On the contrary, five patients with bilateral hippocampal damage, who were 
examined by Hassabis et al. (2007), were encouraged to generate “as many sensory 
and introspective details as they could” about a fictitious event, imagined from short 
verbal cues (i.e., “Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a beautiful 
tropical bay”). The authors have reported an example of an event they produced: “As 
for seeing I can’t really, apart from just sky. I can hear the sound of seagulls and of 
the sea… um… I can feel the grains of sand between my fingers… um... I can hear 
one of those ship’s hooters… um… that’s about it. Are you actually seeing this in 
your mind’s eyes? No, the only thing I can see is blue. So if you look around what 
can you see? Really all I can see is the colour of the blue skyand the white sand, the 
rest of it, the sounds and things, obviously I’m just hearing... Can you see anything 
else? No, it’s like I’m kind of floating…”. As we can read, the scenarios they 
depicted were poor in detail and lacked in spatial coherence. Consequently, their 
scores fell definitely below the range of controls.  
 
Klein’s ‘Lived Future’ Questionnaire (2002) was also administered to M.C., a young 
woman suffering from a severe impairment of episodic memory and topographical 
orientation deficits, as results of status epilepticus that could have caused an ischemia 
in both hyppocampi (Andelman et al., 2010). The other cognitive functions were 
within normal limits. ‘My memory did not return to me... I take each day one at a 
time... I don’t see past today and tomorrow... and can’t picture myself in anything 
beyond the immediate present... that’s why I don’t have any aspirations or wishes’, 
she said (p.432). This case underscores once again the critical role of the 
hippocampus in envisaging future events other than the patient’s “affective de-
compensation” (p.431), which came along with her full awareness of the severe 




Lastly, patients suffering from mild Alzheimer’s disease presented with clear 
difficulties at generating autobiographical elements related to past and future 
episodes (Addis et al., 2009). 
  
The association between episodic memory and future thinking has been highlighted 
also in clinical studies, which did not involve patients with impaired memory.  
 
Twenty-four people with depression, hospitalized after self-poisoning, provided less 
specific autobiographical past and future events, i response to cues. In addition, a 
correlational analysis has showed an association between past and future specificity 
in both suicidal and control groups (Williams et al., 1996). Furthermore, 
D’Argembeau et al. (2008) have showed schizophrenic patients’ failure in casting 
themselves into the future, suggesting a relation between this deficit and the failure 
in retrieving past memories. The patients presented pronounced difficulties in 
producing specific past and future events, if compared to controls, as well as a 
disorder of the sense of subjective time.     
 
Moreover, the activation of particular brain areas h  been showed to considerably 
overlap in backward and forward mental time travel. Okuda et al. (2003) have 
measured brain activity with Positron Emission Tomography (PET) in healthy 
participants thinking and orally reporting past expriences and future prospects in a 
naturalistic setting. Future and past thoughts share a common cerebral network, 
which encompasses the superior frontal, medial temporal and medial occipito-
parietal areas. Their findings have also showed that specific areas in the frontal pole, 
including Brodmann Area 10 (BA 10), and the medial temporal lobes were more 
activated during future thinking task. The authors have hypothesised that a greater 
amount of activation of past episodes might be necessary to gain insights into the 
future and that additional cognitive processes are required to select the information 




Addis et al. (2007) have used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to 
further investigate participants’ brain activity during past recollections and future 
reports. With this aim, they have distinguished a “construction phase” (i.e., 
generation of the event) and an “elaboration phase (i.e., production of as much detail 
as possible to describe the event). In the former phase, the findings have revealed a 
common activation of left hippocampal, and of posterior visuospatial regions, for 
both past and future events, while the right hippocampus was engaged uniquely by 
future thoughts, along with the right fronto-polar cortex (BA 10). On the contrary, a 
considerable overlap between past and future events, croaching upon left medial 
prefrontal, bilateral parahippocampal, and retrospleinal cortices, the posterior 
cingulate and the precuneus, characterized the lattr phase. This overlap has been 
attributed to the common cognitive processes that might be primarily prominent 
during the elaboration, e.g., self-reflection, contextual and episodic imagery.     
 
Likewise, Szpunar et al. (2007), using fMRI, have found that episodic memory and 
episodic foresight commonly engaged various brain regions, including the medial 
prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the medial temporal cortex and the 
occipital cortex. At odds with the semantic comparison tasks adopted in the two 
previous studies, the researchers compared the experimental performances with a 
task requiring the imagination of Bill Clinton participating in an every-day life event 
(like a barbeque), thus, with neither temporal reference nor self-projection.   
 
Studies on clinically normal people suggest further commonalities. Such similarities 
have been documented, in particular, by the phenomelogical richness reported in 
past and future events. D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden (2004) asked participants 
to describe some positive and negative events (pastand future), which occurred in 
one of two time frames, a recent and a remote one. Th ir results revealed that the 
sense of experiencing both past and future events was more strongly associated with 
positive, than with negative episodes. Furthermore, th  most recent events were 
imagined or remembered with more contextual details nd a stronger feeling of 
experiencing than the distant ones. Another research was carried out by the same 
authors (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006) and it has found that, both for past 
35 
 
and future reports, one’s ability of visual imagery correlated with the amount of 
visual and sensorial details experienced, and that the aptitude to  regulate emotions 
via suppression was associated with fewer sensorial, contextual and emotional 
details.  
 
Finally, Addis et al. (2008) have observed that younger adults produced a greater 
amount of details mainly related to the core of the ev nt (“internal”) than older adults 
for both past and future events, implying that aging might affect future thinking 
similarly to how it affects memory. These results supported once again the 
constructive simulation hypothesis. 
 
3.5 The debated role of episodic memory in episodic  
foresight 
 
Suddendorf (2010) has pointed out that basically two interpretations concerning the 
above-mentioned links have been addressed in the literature.  
 
One argues that episodic memory is a fundamental part of future thinking, as it 
provides the “raw material” (p. 100) to envisage situations likely to occur in the 
future. These are essentially the kinds of relation hat Haith (1997) has identified as 
“continuation of a repeating past” and “projection f past trends” (see above): one is 
inclined to predict a reoccurrence in the future of what happened in the past 
(verbatim or through a details recombination). The second type of relation is close to 
Tolman’s “theory of expectancy”, that illustrated how rats can flexibly recombine 
their prior experience to deal with ex novo situations. The use of memory may be 
instrumental in the development of adaptive responses that extend beyond the 
stereotyped recurrence of reinforced sequences (Tolman et al., 1946). However, there 
is another possibility, that Haith (1997) called “imagination and invention”, which 
contemplates the hypothetical trip of Mars never experienced. In this case, “episodic 
memory (together with other memory systems) may hence provide the vocabulary 
for episodic foresight. Humans can recursively combine and recombine basic 
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elements into novel scenarios and evaluate these in terms of their likelihood, 
desirability and so forth” (Suddendorf, 2010, p.101).  
 
On the other hand, episodic memory is not to be necessarily considered as a 
“building blocks of predictions” (Bar, 2007, p. 280) or a “vocabulary” of elements 
which to draw on to foresee. The other theory, which Suddendorf (2010) has referred 
to, accounts for these links in a different manner. It argues that both episodic 
memory and future thinking share the same neurocognitive resources. They can draw 
on a widespread range of specific abilities, like a particular type of consciousness 
(autonoetic consciousness; Tulving, 1985), the ability of binding details, executive 
functions, self-projection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007) and related capacities, like 
conceiving others’ viewpoint (theory of mind) and navigation (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007). That is, a number of cognitive functions other than episodic memory might 
play an integral role when constructing scenes. This latter theory accounts for a 
consistent body of research, already mentioned in Chapter 2, that we shall further 
explore next. 
 
3.6 Cognitive functions, aside from episodic memory , at work  
 
The role played by episodic memory in the construction of future prospects is still 
controversial. Recently, it has been suggested that it may not be a condicio sine qua 
non in simulations of future scenarios. Such an intuition has been corroborated by 
several criticisms to the studies mentioned above and consequent research, aimed at 
further disentangle this issue. Some of the studies m ntioned earlier, do not detail the 
lesion location of the amnesiacs (O.S. and D.B.). In other cases (K.C. and Hassabis’ 
patients) the information that has been provided inicates an extensive damage, 
including impairments encroaching upon areas beyond the hippocampus (Squire et 
al., 2010). These observations downsize the importance of episodic memory and the 
hippocampus in future imaging, rendering the hypothesis of a crucial part played by 
episodic memory in future thinking arguable. In addition, some of the latest studies, 
using fMRI, have provided no evidence of a hippocamp l involvement in subjective 
37 
 
time travel. Nyberg et al. (2010) required well-trained participants to imagine 
walking in a familiar environment in past, present a d future. Thus, they were not to 
create an episode content, but were solely to self-project in a standard situation 
recurring in different temporal frames. The task, which held constant the 
informational content, did not recruit the hippocampal region. The authors 
interpreted their findings suggesting a closer relation between the hippocampus and 
the content, rather than between the hippocampus and the “conscious temporality of 
the experience” (p. 22357). Likewise, Squire et al. (2010) reported on future thinking 
performances in five patients with a well-characterised bilateral hippocampal lesion 
and one patient with extensive medial temporal damage, presenting with a 
subsequent, respectively, moderate and marked impair ent in recent personal 
memories. The study aimed at casting a light on two of the key components of the 
past-future core network, embracing the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior regions in 
the medial and lateral parietal cortex, the lateral temporal cortex, and the medial 
temporal lobe including the hippocampus (Schacter et al., 2007). The intact ability of 
these patients in future thinking sharply contrasted with their striking impairment in 
recalling recent past episodes. Consequently, the authors have suggested that a 
selective hippocampal damage, which spares the rest of the core network proposed, 
is not sufficient to affect future imaging. Maguire and Hassabis (2011) have assumed 
that the patients could have supplied reports more semantic in nature, prompted by 
the single-word cue, likely to cause a semantic bias. However, Squire et al. (2011) 
have noticed that also one of the patients (P01) described by Hassabis et al. (2007), 
albeit the marked amnesia, was successful at constructing scenes, elicited by full 
sentence descriptors. This demonstrates that amnesia p r se does not necessarily 
affect the ability of simulating scenes.    
 
Consistently with this idea, it has been proposed a bro der theoretical interpretation 
for the data concerning the age-related reduction in specificity for episodic memories 
(Levine et al., 2002), for those showing a parallel pattern in future thinking (Addis et 
al., 2008) and for the strong correlation between hippocampal activity and the 
amount of details produced in past and future events (Addis et al., 2009). At odds 
with what Levine et al. (2002) and Addis et al. (2008) maintained (i.e., that this kind 
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of age deficit entirely reflects an impairment of the constructive episodic memory 
system underling both past and future thoughts), Gaesser et al. (2011) have 
documented that age-related decline in reporting details extended also to a condition, 
that does not require episodic memory, e.g. a picture description task. These findings 
uncovered a non-episodic source of age differences in past and future thinking tasks, 
a source which is unrelated with memory itself.  
  
3.7 Executive functioning and episodic future think ing             
 
Obviously, the ability of future thinking is related to the capacity to produce specific 
personal details, mediated by executive control. Such observations were instrumental 
in the development of other studies that have been designed to explore the possible 
causal link between executive functioning and future p ospects, in the attempt of 
gaining greater control over the simulation of scenes. This new branch of research 
takes into account that the extensive damages exhibited y the amnesic patients 
described above include also areas that play a crucial role in executive functions 
(e.g., see Samarasekera et al., 2007). The generation of detail-rich descriptions 
requires reconstructive mechanisms for the binding of information. Deficits or 
decline of these mechanisms might hamper the generation of details and, 
consequently, may account for impairments in a wide range of conditions, from 
episodic future thinking to the picture description task (Gaesser et al., 2011). 
Rosenbaum et al. (2009), for instance, view a more general construction deficit as a 
plausible, alternative root of K.C.’s impairment in future simulations. Aiming at 
testing this possibility, K.C. was required to produce fictional episodes and to 
retrieve or identify elements of semantic narratives (famous fairy tales and bible 
stories). Also in these conditions, the patient’s scores fell well below the control 
range. These results stand in stark contrast with the episodic constructive simulation 
hypothesis. If future simulations must rely on the reformulation of past personal 
memories, then K.C. should have presented with a normal recollection of semantic 
narratives, albeit his severe impaired autobiographical episodic memory. However, 
this was not the case. Indeed, even when the information that he necessitated was 




Similar results have been obtained by Addis et al. (2010), who documented an age-
related reduction in specificity also under a recombination paradigm, simply 
requiring healthy older adults to reformulate various elements into a cohesive 
episode. In line with this evidence, Addis et al. (2008) noticed a close linkage 
between tasks involving executive performances and tasks requiring episodic 
elements generation. In the study they carried out the amount of episodic details 
provided in past and future reports correlated with the Backward Digit Span task, 
which measures the executive control and engages the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Hoshi et al., 2000).  
 
Accordingly, a number of neuroimaging studies have shown a greater frontopolar 
activation, including BA 10, during future thoughts, han during past recollections 
(Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Summerfield t al., 2010). Interestingly, the 
greater was the activation of BA 10, the larger wasthe amount of elements provided 
in future constructions (Addis & Schacter, 2008).    
 
Consistently with these observations, Summerfield an  colleagues (2010) have 
showed, using fMRI, which components of the core network (Schacter et al., 2007) 
are variably engaged and disengaged during the various steps of a scene construction 
task. The participants were instructed to combine the single scene elements they were 
provided with in a cohesive scenario. The details were presented one at a time with 
no context. fMRI documented a significant activation f the hippocampus and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during the presentation of the first element. However, 
the introduction of the second element did not recruit the hippocampus, but required 
an increasing activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, perhaps to maintain two 
elements in working memory. The addition of the third element up-regulated several 
regions (i.e., the medial parietal cortex), down-regulated in both the previous phases, 
and increased the activation of the hippocampus. Thus, the hippocampus might not 
be invariably required in a construction scene process. On the contrary, frontally 
based executive functions are likely to be an integral part of the episodic elements 







When addressing the idea of prospection, some authors stressed the importance of a 
specific frontally-based function, of which future thinking is considered a 
“prototypical example” (Buckner and Carroll, 2007, p. 50): self-projection. Self-
projection is a striking feature of our cognitive system that allows us to shift personal 
perspectives from the immediate environment to alternative situations. Thus, this 
ability is considered crucial when we conceive another individual’s viewpoints 
(theory of mind) and imagine ourselves in episodes b fore they occur. The brain 
network engaged in self-projection embraces frontal lobes and medial temporal-
parietal lobes, which are also up-regulated in envisaging the future, episodic 
remembering, theory of mind and navigation (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). Therefore, 
Buckner and Carroll (2007) considered these abilities as single components of a 
“larger class of functions” (p. 55). By this view, their hypothesis is that self-
projection relies upon memory system, since past personal details serve as the 
foundation to guide possible future simulations. Accordingly, self-projection itself is 
to be viewed as a crucial part of episodic remembering and imagining. They 
suspected, in line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, that “the 
adaptive value of episodic memory is not solely in its ability to afford mental 
reconstruction of the past but rather in its contribution to build mental models – 
simulations – of what might happen next or other pers ctives on the immediate 
environment, such as what others are thinking” (p. 55). However, some answers 
provided by K.C. stand in stark contrast with what they maintained. When asked, in 
more than one occasion, to describe what he felt when trying to imagine a future 
scenario, the patient, as previously mentioned, claimed, “It’s like being in a room 
with nothing there and having a guy tell you go to find a chair, and there’s nothing 
there” or “it’s like swimming in the middle of a lake. There’s nothing there to hold 
up or do anything with” (Tulving, 1985, p. 4). These entences uncovered his ability 
to project himself in different situations. He managed to imagine swimming in the 
middle of a lake, while being interviewed by the exp rimenter. Although he did not 
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provide much detail, he was able to “shift perspectiv  from the immediate present to 
alternative perspectives” (Buckner & Carroll, 2007, p. 49). And, indeed, many years 
later, Rosenbaum and his colleagues (2007) documented that K.C. preserved his 
ability to infer other people’s thought, presenting with no difficulties in tasks 
assessing theory of mind (strictly related to self-projection). Therefore, it may be 
argued that theory of mind’s abilities, which are related to self-projection, can be 
uncoupled from severe impairment of episodic memory and autonoetic 
consciousness (Rosenbaum et al., 2007).  
 
3.9 Autonoetic consciousness 
 
Autonoetic (derived from the ancient Greek words αὐτός, which means “own self”, 
and νοέω, which means “I think”) consciousness gives a crucial ontribution in the 
discussion of episodic future thinking and might be closely related to the capacity of 
projecting themselves into the future. This self-awareness allows us to recognise an 
event, which comes into our mind, as a memory, for instance, avoiding to confuse it 
with a dream or a simple thought. We make use of this ability whenever 
remembering past experiences or envisaging novel scnarios. When a person 
remembers an event from his own past, this kind of consciousness confers the 
awareness that the event is actually a veridical part of his personal past experience 
(Tulving, 1985). Thanks to autonoetic consciousness, individuals can be aware of 
their subjective experience throughout time, by perceiving the present situation not 
solely as a continuation of their past but also as a prelude to their future. As the 
narrative mode of the “stream of consciousness” that w s used by Joyce, the 
awareness of subjective time confers us the cognizance of a unique sense of time, 
which extends from the past to the future, passing through the present moment 
(Wheeler et al., 1997). “If we could somehow shed all th t we had learned about the 
temporal structure of the world, what would our exprience be like? Perhaps we 
would inhabit a dreamlike region, devoid of causal connections, of a past, present, 
and future, of a sense of place in time” (Friedman, 1990, p. 85). K.C.’s awareness of 
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subjective time was highly impaired and also GA’s temporal consciousness was still 
working but not in the proper way (Dalla Barba et al., 1997). 
The concept of autonoetic consciousness is closely related to that of chronestesia. 
The distinction between the two notions lies in their emphasis. The concept of 
“autonoetic consciousness” stresses awareness of one’s self existence in subjective 
time. The concept of “chronoestesia” stresses awareness of the subjective time in 
which one’s self existence unfolds (Szpunar, 2011). A similar concept has been 
formulated by Dalla Barba et al. (1997) and has been labelled as “temporal 
consciousness”. Temporal consciousness usually interacts with less stable, and thus 
more vulnerable, modifications in the long-term storage system. This work allows 
quick and steady updates in present orientation and in future planning. For instance, 
GA’s temporal awareness was able to use only more stable modifications of the long-
term storage system. The result was that the patient remembered “another” past and 
planned “another” future. She mistakenly involved her abits and personal semantic 
information in a personal temporal workspace. Her verbal statements were 
unintentionally incongruous to her history, her background and present situation. She 
was living one and half hours from the hospital and since her disease she never 
cooked. Nonetheless, when asked, “What are you going t  do in a few minutes?”, she 
did not hesitate to answer, “I will go home to cook the supper”.  
 
Damage to the prefrontal cortex may crucially compromise the capacity of travelling 
backward or forward in time, as consistently demonstrated in neuropsychological 









3.10 Exploring future prospects in healthy people a nd groups 
of patients 
 
The present work stems from the interest to analyse in d pth the intriguing ability of 
future thinking in healthy participants and people with different kinds of brain 
damage.  
 
It begins with three chapters investigating normal people.  
In Chapter 4 future prospects are elicited with different cues in the attempt of 
evaluating the characteristics of the prompts that we will then adopt in further 
experiments, especially with patients. In particular, in this study we are interested in 
understanding which type of cue makes the future task more challenging, which one 
encourages the production of more detailed descriptions and which cue might 
enhance the dependence on semantic memory.  
 
In Chapter 5 we aim at ascertaining whether or not the simulations of the future 
might be based on reproductions of events that havealready occurred. Participants in 
our future tasks are always instructed not to use their autobiographical memories or 
any part of them to envisage their future. Nonetheless, we suspect that, on some 
occasion, it is inevitable that participants might evoke events already experienced 
rather than constructing truly novel events. Two experiments are reported in Chapter 
5, which probe this possibility empirically. In both of them, young adults are 
required to mentally re-experience and pre-experience temporally close and distant 
autobiographical episodes and to perform a delayed task, scored as remember-know 
judgments on new, old-remember, and old-imagine words.  
 
Two further experiments, reported in Chapter 6, aim at investigating the 
contributions of familiarity of setting, self-relevance and self-projection in time to 
future thinking. The role of familiarity of setting is explored in the first experiment, 
by contrasting future thoughts with autobiographical future episodes supposed to 
occur in unfamiliar settings. The role of self-relevance is assessed in the second 
experiment, by comparing future thoughts to future ev nts involving familiar others. 
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The role of self-projection in time is evaluated, in both experiments, by comparing 
episodic future thoughts with autobiographical events that are timeless in nature. 
 
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the ass ssment of different populations 
of patients performing future thinking tasks.  
 
The goal in Chapter 7 is to investigate whether amnesic Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(aMCI) affects episodic future thinking. Amnestic MCI is a high-risk factor for 
Alzheimer’s disease and is characterized by a selective impairment of episodic 
memory, likely reflecting hippocampal malfunctioning. These patients present with a 
reduction of episodic specificity for past events. We are interested in observing 
whether such reduction extends also to future prospect . To this end, we assess 
fourteen aMCI patients and their respective controls. 
 
In Chapter 8 we investigate whether the performance of people with Parkinson’s 
disease (PD) on future simulation tasks is dependent also on executive control rather 
than solely on memory. Thus, we study patients withou  memory problems, to 
ascertain whether they might still present with difficulties future thinking. Should 
this be the case, we will explore the characteristics of those who failed in this task. 
Thirty-one PD patients and their matched controls are asked to imagine plausible 
future scenarios. 
 
In Chapter 9 we discuss the hypothesis that patients presenting with  
impairments out with the domain of memory, such as executive dysfuctions, might 
perform poorly not only on a future task, but also when describing current settings 
while physically present in them. We investigate this ypothesis by assessing 
fourteen PD patients and matched controls. The patients were recruited from the 
sample reported in Chapter 8.  
 
Chapter 10 stems from a debate concerning the use of two particular types of cue in 
testing amnesic patients (see Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; Squire et al., 2011).  Here 
we further investigate the amount of details prompted by two types of cue (namely a 
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short sentence descriptor, Hassabis-like vs. a single word cue, Squire-like) in future 
descriptions in two cases of patients with amnesia, G.C. and M.D. The main question 
addressed in this study is which cue encourages a richer visualization avoiding 
semantic biases. 
 
Chapter 11 reports on a single case, patient T.H., who confabulates when 
remembering past personal episodes. We aim at assessing whether or not 
confabulations regarding the past might extend alsoto the future and to a scene 
construction condition.  
 
We finally discuss the findings reported in this disertation taken together in Chapter 
12.  









The present study sprang from the attempt of understanding the properties of the 
different cues prompting future constructions. Heterog neous cues have been used in 
the various studies of future thinking. Several authors have acknowledged that the 
type of cue used is a crucial factor to be taken into account when interpreting the 
results (Race et al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011; Maguire & Hassabis, 2011). Indeed, 
the difference in cues has been considered the reason for having obtained different 
outcomes, hence leading to different conclusions (e.g., Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; 
Hurley et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the issue of the importance of cue has never been 
addressed directly in studies exploring the ability of foreseeing. Knowing the 
properties of particular kinds of cue might allow to eschew biases or to recognize and 
interpret them in the appropriate way should they occur. Some authors have used 
single cue-words (i.e., “coffee”, Kwan et al., 2010; Squire et al., 2010), some others 
preferred short verbal sentences (i.e., “Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach 
in a beautiful tropical bay”, Hassabis et al., 2007; or “Imagine catching your 
grandchild getting into trouble twenty years from now”, Race et al., 2011). In the 
former case, the cue is generic and usually participants are told that the cue is just a 
prompt to imagine a particular scenario, which, therefore, is not framed by the cue. 
In the latter cases the cues are more specific and provide a setting (as in Hassabis et 
al.) or a template (as in Race et al.’s). When Hassabi  et al. (2007) investigated the 
ability of constructing fictitious scenarios in hippocampal amnesiacs, they stated that 
they adopted the specific short sentence descriptor (i.e., “Imagine you are lying on a 
white sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay”) to increase the probability that their 
patients relied on generic memory representations thus reducing the effect of 
retrieving from episodic memory. However, whether or n t a specific cue allows one 
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to access to more “semanticized” memories remains matter of debate (see Maguire & 
Hassabis, 2011 and Squire et al., 2011).    
 
Kwan et al. (2010) have reported that the mother of H.C., a patient with 
developmental amnesia, resulting from a bilateral hippocampal atrophy, considered 
many of her daughter’s past memories (elicited in their study by means of  the single 
cue word) as “stories that had been retold over the years and may have been 
‘semanticized’ to some extent” (p. 3184). To avoid this bias, i.e., to minimize the 
description of stories frequently retrieved or retold, Race et al. (2011) adopted a more 
specific short descriptor cue. Maguire and Hassabis (2011) have ascribed to Squire et 
al.’s (2010) study a semantic bias related to the use of the single-word cues. Maguire 
and Hassabis (2011) have noted that the single-word cues could have elicited 
descriptions based on semantics. This objection seem  to contrast with what they 
themselves had stated in their previous study, where they said to have used short 
sentences descriptor with the aim of enhancing the dependence on semantics 
(Hassabis et al., 2007).  
 
The debate acquired particular relevance since the same patient, H.C., was found to 
be impaired at imagining future thinking when the descriptions were prompted with a 
single-word cue (Kwan et al., 2010) and unimpaired when prompted with short 
descriptions (Hurley et al., 2011). A possible argument that was suggested to explain 
this difference was that a specific cue (short-descriptor) might somehow help patients 
in generating specific scenarios (Hurley et al., 2011). However, this was not true for 
Hassabis et al.’s (2007) patients, who were found to be impaired although they were 
tested with short sentences as cues. In addition, Squire et al. (2010) reported on 
hippocampal patients who exhibited a preserved ability of constructing future 
experiences  in response to  single-word cues.   
 
Digging into the debate regarding the different cues uncovers a number of 
inconsistencies leaving open the question as to which type of cue might facilitate the 




We aimed at partially disentangling this issue, by comparing two different kinds of 
cue, i.e., a generic cue, i.e. common objects (e.g., table, apple), and a cue that 
characterized a specific setting (e.g., market, kitchen). Both cues were presented as 
single words, to minimize the differences between the procedures. The prompts did 
not differ in length, but in the level of specificity. According to Hassabis et al. (2007) 
and Hurley et al. (2011), patients with brain injuries should find it less challenging to 
perform a future task in response to a setting-cue (“commonplace, everyday 
scenarios were specifically selected to increase the dependence of constructions on 
generalized semantic memory representations formed from numerous prior 
experiences, and thus minimize any possible contribution of recent or even remote 
episodic memories” Hassabis et al., 2007, p. 1729), given that, in this way, they are 
prone to generate more semantic descriptions (i.e., with a greater amount of external 
details) On the contrary, Maguire and Hassabis (2011) and Race et al. (2011) 
maintained that an object-cue is more likely to elicit a semantic bias, than a setting-
cue. Indeed, Race et al. (2011) stated that they have used a cue representing a context 
to discourage participants from reporting frequently recalled and retold event 
information and Maguire and Hassabis (2011) argued that “participants did not have 
vivid and coherent scenarios in mind but may, instead, have supplied descriptions 
that were more semantic in nature, and recall from se antic memory is spared in 
patients with damage to the hippocampus. This semantic bias is likely caused by the 
single word cues used by Squire et al. compared with the full sentence descriptors 
used in other studies, which specifically encourage rich visualization”. We aim at 
contrasting these two hypotheses.  
 
In particular, our goal is to compare the future events elicited using two different 
types of single word cue: a cue defining an object (i.e., object-cue) versus a cue 
defining a setting (i.e., setting-cue). We will compare the future events on the basis 
of a priori parameters: the richness of internal details, the richness of external details, 
the perceived phenomenological characteristics, and the time of response needed to 
construct the events. In line with Conway (2001), our hypothesis is that participants 
will produce more internal and less external details in response to the setting-cues 
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than in response to the object-cues, and that they will take longer to generate an 




4.2.1 Participants  
 
Forty young adults (20 males and 20 females) participated in this experiment as 
volunteers. The average age and education was 29.7 (+8. ) and 15.8 (+3.25) years, 
respectively. None of the participants had any history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders.  
 
4.2.2 Materials and experimental procedures 
 
The experiment was carried out in one session. Participants were required to 
remember and imagine autobiographical episodes in response to eight cue-words. 
Four of these cue-words were objects (e.g., table, apple) and four of them were 
settings (e.g., church, market). Participants were instructed to retrieve or imagine 
specific events (which had to take place at a specific time and in a specific place), 
that had happened to them in the past or that might happen to them in the future, 
related to a specific cue-word. When asked to imagine future events, they were 
instructed to avoid retrieving memories of past events or parts of them, but rather to 
imagine events that could happen to them in the future given their current plans and 
goals. They were given the following example: “For instance, if I ask you to imagine 
any event that might happen to you during the next two years, which involves the 
word table, you should try to imagine a particular conversation, a particular meal or a 
particular moment occurring while sitting at a table, that could last from a few 




Each trial started with a slide presented on a computer screen, and with the task 
instructions concerning the temporal direction (remember or imagine) and the cue 
word. An example of the instruction given to the participants in the object-cue 
condition was “Imagine an episode that might happen to you in the next years which 
might involve an apple” (for the future task) and “Remember an episode that 
happened to you in the past which have involved an apple” (for the past task). In the 
setting-cue condition participants were prompted as following “Imagine an episode 
that might happen to you in the next years at a market” (for the future task) and 
“Remember an episode that happened to you in past at  market” (for the past task). 
There was no time limit for imagining or retrieving the event. Participants were 
solely required to say “STOP” when they had retrieved or imagined the event. A 
stopwatch was used to register each participant’s time of response.  
 
Once they stated that they had remembered/imagined the event, they were asked to 
describe it in as much detail as possible, and asked to experience it as vividly as 
possible, including aspects such as  setting, objects or people present, what had 
happened, as well as any emotions, colours, smells, tastes, or sounds which was 
elicited.  
 
Recollections and simulations were digitally recorded to enable later transcriptions 
and subsequent scoring of the participants’ responses. After the transcription, a 
trained rater systematically parsed the details generated in the past and future events 
using the standardized scoring procedure developed by Levine et al. (2002). Thus, 
first she segmented the main event (i.e., the most talked about, with a brief 
timeframe) into details and then distinguished betwe n (a) internal details (i.e., 
episodic information pertaining to the main event, specific to time and place) and (b) 
external details (general knowledge related to the event). Internal details were further 
categorized into: (a) event (happenings, individuals present, physical/emotional 
actions and reactions, weather), (b) place (information about the environment where 
the event occurred), (c) time (date, season, month, day of the week, time of day), (d) 
perceptual (sensory information, body position) and (e) emotion (emotional state, 
thoughts). External details were further categorized into: (a) external event (specific 
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details from other incidents, from all of the above categories, external to the main 
event), (b) semantic (general knowledge or facts, ongoing events, extended states of 
being), (c) repetition (unsolicited repetition of details), and (d) other, such as 
metacognitive statements, or editorializing. Furthermore, a second rater, trained for 
this purpose, was asked to score 20 protocols.  
 
Following the description of each event, the participants were asked to rate the 
phenomenological characteristics of the mental representation they had just formed 
on a 7-point scale, using a modified version of theMCQ questionnaire (see 
D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). The modified version of the MCQ 




4.3.1 Ratings of phenomenological characteristics 
 
The ratings of visual details, sounds, smells, tastes were averaged, for each 
participant, to form a general “sensorial details index”. Likewise, the ratings of 
clarity of location, clarity of spatial arrangement of objects and people were averaged 
into a “clarity of location index” (D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). 
Furthermore, the scoring included a “temporal index” (indicating the temporal details 
included in each representation), a “structural index” (indicating how clear 
participants considered their representations), and  “index of intensity” (which 
indicated how strong was the feeling of re-experiencing or pre-experiencing the 












Index Past Future 
Object-cue Setting-cue Object-cue Setting-cue 
Sensorial 4.27 (+1.1) 4.50(+1.2) 4.34(+1.2) 4.26(+1.3) 
Location 5.48(+0.9) 5.34(+1.1) 4.86(+1.4)* 4.35(+1.4) 
Temporal 5.39(+1.3) 5.24(+1.5) 4.19(+1.7) 4.50(+1.9) 
Structural 5.46(+1.1) 5.85(+0.8) 5.05(+1.5) 5.09(+1.4) 
Intensity 5.06(+1.3) 5.35(+1.1) 5.25(+1.2) 5.06(+1.3) 
    
Table 4.1 - Mean ratings (+ standard errors) as a function of temporal direction 
of the event (past vs. future) and of typology of cue (object vs. setting). 
*  Future episodes were related to a higher clarity of location index when the 
prompt was an object, rather than a setting, t(39) = 2.36, p = 0.02.  
 
Separate 2 (temporal direction: past vs. future) x 2 (type of cue: object vs. setting) 
analyses of variance were carried out for each phenom al characteristic. The results 
showed no difference between past and future events elicited with object-cues or 
with setting-cues, as regard to the sensorial details index.  
 
Two main effects were observed for the clarity of location index: 
• temporal direction, F(1, 38) = 21.15, p < 0.001, indicating that overall 
participants rated past events as spatially clearer (M = 5.41; SD = 
1.06) than future events (M = 4.61; SD = 1.42); 
• type of cue, F (1,38) = 4.84, p = 0.03 (with Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons), indicating that overall spatial arrangement and 
clarity of location were better defined in events prompted by object-
cues (M = 5.17; SD = 0.31) than in those prompted by setting-cues (M 
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= 4.85; SD = 0.17).  This difference was particularly relevant for 
future episodes. Post-hoc t-tests revealed no difference between the 
clarity of location index in past episodes prompted either with a 
setting or with an object cue. On the contrary, future episodes were 
related to a higher clarity of location index when the prompt was an 
object (M = 4.85; SD = 1.42), rather than a setting (M = 4.35; SD = 
1.38), t(39) = 2.36, p = 0.02.  
 
Overall, the temporal connotation appeared clearer to participants for past episodes 
(M = 5.31; SD = 0.14) than for future episodes (M = 4.34; SD = 0.14), F(1,38) = 
24.34, p < 0.001. No differences were observed on the basis of the different types of 
cue.  
 
The same pattern was observed for the structural index, whereby, despite the lack of 
differences between the cue type, participants rated past events (M = 5.66; SD = 
0.22) as being better than future events (M = 5.06; SD = 0.02), F (1,38) = 10.21, p < 
0.005.  
 
No differences were found concerning the index of intensity.  
 















Past Mean Future 
Mean  
Significance of the 
differences between Past 
and 
Future Means 
Sensorial 4.38(+1.6) 4.3(+1.8) n.s. 
Location 5.41(+1.06) 4.61(+1.42) F(1, 38) = 21.15, p < 0.001 
Temporal 5.31(+0.14) 4.34(+0.14) F(1,38) = 24.34, p < 0.001 
Structural 5.66(+0.22) 5.06(+0.02) F (1,38) = 10.21, p < 0.005 
Intensity 5.2(+1.1) 5.15(+1.1) n.s. 
 
Table 4.2 - Mean ratings (+ standard errors) as a function of temporal direction 








Significance of the differences 
between Object- and 
Setting-cue 
Sensorial 4.3(+1.1) 4.3(+1.1) n.s. 
Location 5.1(+0.3) 4.8(+0.1) F (1,38) = 4.84, p = 0.03 
Temporal 4.7(+0.2) 4.8(+0.2) n.s. 
Structural 5.2(+0.1) 5.4(+0.1) n.s. 
Intensity 5.1(+1.1) 5.2(+1.1) n.s. 
 
Table 4.3 - Mean ratings (+ standard errors) as a function of typology of cue 






4.3.2 Scoring of internal and external details 
 
The inter-rater reliability (r) between the two raters who scored the descriptions, 
calculated on a subset of 20 randomly selected protocols, was .94. 
An overall ANOVA 2 (temporal direction: past vs. future) x 2 (detail: internal vs. 
external) x 2 (type of cue: object vs. setting) indicated the main effects of temporal 
direction (F (1,38) = 16.65, p < 0.001), details (F (1, 38) = 259.57, p < 0.001), and 
cue type (F (1, 38) = 5.27, p < 0.05). Furthermore, two interactions were significant, 
i.e., the interaction between details and cue type, F (1,38) = 23.29, p < 0.001, and the 
interaction between temporal direction and details, F (1,38) = 10.62, p < 0.005.  
 
The three main effects showed that overall  
• more details were generated in past events (M = 7.7; SD = 3.6) 
than in future events (M = 6.4; SD = 2.4); 
• participants produced more internal (M = 12.6; SD = 4.9) than 
external (M = 1.5; SD = 1.2) details;  
• more details were generated in response to setting-cue (M = 7.3; 
SD = 3.3) than to object cue (M = 6.8; SD = 2.7). 
 
Post-hoc t-tests were carried out to further analyse the two interactions (i.e., detail x 
type of Cue and temporal direction x detail). The t-t sts showed that the amount of 
internal details generated was greater in response to a setting-cue (M = 13.35; SD = 
5.7) than in response to an object-cue (M = 11.87; SD = 4.5), t(39) = -3-65, p < 
0.005. Furthermore, less external details were produce  when the prompt was a 
setting-cue (M = 1.34; SD = 1.2) compared to  an object-cue (M = 1.75; SD = 1.5), 
t(39) = 2.89, p < 0.01 (see Figure 4.1) (see Table 4.4). For what concerns the 
interaction between temporal direction and details, the t-tests suggested that a greater 
amount of internal details were generated in past events (M = 13.8; SD = 6.3) than in 
future events (M = 11.42; SD = 4.18), t(39) = 3.75, p < 0.005. No differences were 








Table 4.4 -  Mean number (
details prompted with object vs. setting
* The mean of internal 
than that of internal details prompted with the object cue and the mean of 
external details prompted with the object cue is significantly higher than that of 
external details prompted with the setting cue.
 
  
Figure 4.1 - Mean number of internal and external details prompted with object 
vs. setting-cues. Error bars indicate standard deviations.
 
Two separate 2 (detail: internal vs. external) x 2 (type of cue: setting vs. object) 






+ standard deviations) of internal and external 
-cues.  
details elicited with the setting cue is significantly higher
  
 










The 2 (detail: internal vs. external) x 2 (type of cue: setting vs. object) ANOVA 
conducted in the past condition showed a significant detail x type of cue interaction, 
F(1,38) = 7.83, p < 0.01. Post-hoc tests showed no significant difference in the 
amount of external details produced with the setting cue or with the object-cue. On 
the contrary, the number of internal details produced in response to setting cues was 
significantly greater (M = 14.76, SD = 8.27) than the number of internal details 
produced in response to object cues (M = 12.84; SD = 5.15), t(39) = -2.27, p < 0.05.   
 
The separate 2 (detail: internal vs. external) x 2 (type of cue: setting vs. object) 
ANOVA conducted solely in the future condition revealed a significant detail x type 
of cue interaction, F(1,38) = 4.27, p < 0.05. Post-hoc t-tests showed no significant 
differences in the number of internal details generated with the two different types of 
cue. However, more external details were generated in response to object cues (M = 
1.69; SD = 1.56) than in response to setting cues (M = 1.28; SD = 1.18), t(39) = 2.28, 
p < 0.05.  
 
Finally, we analysed the time of response (in seconds) that elapsed between the 
presentation of the cue-word and the moment when th participant started reporting 
his description. An ANOVA 2 (past vs. future) x 2 (object-cue vs. setting-cue) 
revealed a main effect of the type of cue, F(1,38) = 4.93, p < 0.05, indicating that 
participants took longer to retrieve or construct past and future episodes when the cue 
was an object (Msec = 20.57; SDsec = 18.51) than when the cue was a setting (Msec = 
15.73; SDsec = 10.71) (see Figure 4.2). Post-hoc t-tests reveald no significant 
difference in time of response of past recollections elicited with setting or object 
cues. The difference was, instead, significant as regard to the future episodes. 
Participants took longer to imagine future events when prompted by an object cue (M 





Figure 4.2 - Mean of time of responses expressed in seconds. Error bars indicate 
standard deviations.
 
4.4 Discussion  
 
The findings that have been 
more details in response to the setting
particular, more internal details and less external details were generated when the 
prompt was a setting rather
took longer to generate an event elicited with an object
However, the perceived 
people and objects and the cl
object-cues than in those prompted by setting
 
reported in this chapter reveal that participants generated 
-cues than in response to the object
 than when it was an object. Furthermore, participants 
-cue than with a setting
clarity of location index, given by the spatial arrangement of 








In particular, future events elicited with object-cues were richer in semantic 
(external) details, required more time to be constructed, and were related to a 
stronger clarity of location index, if compared to th se elicited by setting-cues.   
 
The present study adds a valuable contribution to the recent debate regarding the use 
of the cue in future thinking literature. Indeed, it shows, first, that the generation of 
future reports as that of past recollections might depend on the type of cue used, and 
that a more specific cue, representing in our case a tting, might more easily elicit 
past and future constructions with more episodic-related and less semantic details. At 
odds with what Hassabis et al. (2007) suggested, our res lts imply that a setting-cue 
might increase the dependence on less semantic memories.    
 
The specificity of the cue is a matter of particular interest considering that, according 
to Conway (2001), “autobiographical memory knowledg base is highly sensitive to 
cues” (p. 1377). The cue-driven retrieval process (i.e., the process of retrieving 
memories when there is a voluntary intention of doing so) usually starts from a 
search of episodes at a general level. Most of the cues activate different general 
events or lifetime periods. For this reason, the activ tion is often weak and, 
consequently, it fades rapidly. “Direct access only occurs when a cue maps on to and, 
consequently, highly activates episodic memory (either a single or set of episodic 
memories) and activation spreads from here to a single general event and to an 
associated lifetime period” (Conway, 2001, p. 1378). However, as the author has 
noted, this occurrence is atypical, given that it is rare that a cue exactly matches the 
content of an episodic memory. Therefore, an intentional retrieval mechanism 
usually involves the elaboration of the cue, the memory search and the evaluation of 
the output obtained. When the outputs are not satisfying, they are further explored 
and another memory search initiates. Thus, the more general the cue, the more 
complex the activation of a specific episodic memory. When a general prompt is 
presented by the experimenter, the activation of a specific memory takes longer, as it 
requires a number of steps. Conway (2001) considered th  case in which the cue-
word chair is provided to the participant in the attempt of prompting the retrieval of 
an episodic past episode. The first step is to contextualize the object, putting it in an 
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environmental reference frame. Thus, for instance, th  participant thinks of the chair 
he has got in the kitchen at home. Then, he will try to further elaborate on the cue, 
asking himself where he bought that chair, for example, trying to remember an 
episode in which this object appeared. The derived nformation produced a number 
of further searches more and more specific which finally allow the person to access 
the specific episodic memories and the related sensory-perceptual details. 
 
Our findings support Conway’s model, which suggests that generic memories are 
more likely to be activated by a generic word, like chair. In line with that model, the 
activation of generic memories is the first step of the retrieving process, in light of a 
hierarchical organization of autobiographical memory. A healthy person would find 
it easier to access specific memories with the aid of a specific prompt, because this 
would bypass the process of further elaborations of the cue in the attempt of 
contextualizing it. Therefore, according to this view, people are more likely to report 
generic memories in response to a general cue (e.g., a single word cue indicating an 
object) rather than to a more contextualized cue (e.g., a short description of a setting, 
or a single word cue representing a setting). Similarly, they would find it easier to 
construct “semanticized” future episodes (poor in event-related details) in response 
to a generic cue word rather than in response to a m re specific cue.  
 
The perceived clarity of location index was higher in episodes elicited by object-cues 
than in those prompted by setting-cues. This finding might be due to the fact that the 
process of constructing events prompted with an object-cue took longer than that 
required when the prompt was a setting-cue. When th cue was an object, in fact, 
participants had to search the details needed to set a cenario and recombine them. 
Thus, they had more time to mentally experience the future event and to organize the 
setting where the scenario would take place. This process might have increased the 
perceived clarity of the spatial arrangement of peopl  and objects present and the 
clarity of location.  
 
The longer time of response that we have found when t  prompt was an object-cue 
rather than a setting-cue suggests that greater cognitive demands might be associated 
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to the former cue rather than to the latter one. Therefore, our results corroborate a 
number of previous  observations (Race et al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011; and 
Maguire and Hassabis, 2011) and stand in striking contrast with what Hassabis et al. 
(2007) stated. In line with Hurley et al. (2011), we suggest that an object-cue might 
be more challenging than a setting-cue, because it places a greater demand on 
strategic searching rather than on the event construction. And indeed, Hurley et al.’s 
patient (H.C.) was unimpaired at the construction of n vel scenarios prompted by 
short verbal descriptions of settings, whereas she was impaired in a future task 
prompted by object cues (Kwan et al., 2010).  
 
Some researchers (e.g., Race et al., 2011) preferred to use a very specific cue to 
decrease the probability that their patients rely on generic autobiographical 
knowledge when constructing future experiences. In light of the current findings, we 
opted instead to use in our experiments  more generic cues (the object-cues), which 
load on both strategic searching and event construction, making the task more 
challenging, and, thus, more sensitive to detect  impa rments at each single step of 
episodic future thinking. Moreover, our findings reveal that object-cues might be 
associated to a stronger feeling of perceived clarity of location, which measures the 
spatial coherence and vividness of the constricted scenario. The strength of such 
feeling and the number of internal details present in the future episodes testified the 
contiguousness and the consistency of each future description. That is, although 
reports prompted by object cues might rely more on semantics, as Maguire and 
Hassabis (2011) suggested, this does not imply that they are less vivid and less 
coherent than those elicited by setting-cues, at odds with what Maguire and Hassabis 
themselves argued. However, it is worth specifying that we did not use a short verbal 
description in the present experiment. Our aim was indeed to follow two similar 
procedures and not to introduce other variables likely to add confusion. Therefore, 
the setting-cue that we used was only partly comparable to the short-sentence 
descriptor adopted by Hassabis et al. (2007). Both of them represent a setting, but 
Hassabis et al.’s cue was more detailed and did not possess any temporal indication 
(“ Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a be utiful tropical bay”); ours 
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5. The role of past in the simulation of 




As we have seen in the introduction, many investigators have begun to approach 
episodic memory in a broader context that considers not only the ability of 
individuals to re-experience past events but also the capacity to envision oneself in a 
specific future scenario (Schacter & Addis, 2007a; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
The role that episodic memory plays in simulating personal future events has been 
formally stated in the aforementioned constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007a), which suggests that reminiscence and future thinking are 
the expression of the same neurocognitive system. This hypothesis states that the 
constructive nature of episodic memory allows one to draw on the past and to 
flexibly extract and recombine elements of previous experiences. The constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis has received general support from evidence of 
cognitive and neural overlap between past and future events. For instance, it has been 
shown that the phenomenal characteristics associated wi h projecting oneself into the 
past and into the future are influenced by such factors as the temporal distance from 
the present (D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; see also Addis et al., 2008; 
D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2006; Spreng & Levine, 2006). Three 
neuroimaging studies have highlighted a common neural network, including bilateral 
frontopolar and medial temporal regions, when remembering past and imagining 
future events (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007). This 
common network of regions showed greater activation when participants envisioned 
their personal future or recollected their past as compared with control tasks, such as 
                                                
4 Gamboz N, Brandimonte MA, de Vito S (2010). “The role of past in the simulation of 
autobiographical future episodes”, Experimental Psychology, 6: 1-10. 
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imagining another person participating in specific events (Szpunar et al., 2007). 
These results indicate that these brain areas are pref rentially engaged in self-
referential mental activity. Not surprisingly, this network is remarkably similar to the 
network consistently involved in the retrieval of episodic memories of past 
autobiographical events (Maguire, 2001). 
 
Most recently, this network of regions has been suggested to belong to an 
anatomically defined brain system (default network) that is activated when 
individuals engage in internally focused tasks including autobiographical memory 
retrieval, envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others (Buckner 
et al., 2008). The idea that thinking of the future is closely related to retrospective 
memory is also strengthened by evidence indicating that amnesic patients are highly 
impaired on both retrieving past and imagining future autobiographical events 
(Hassabis et al., 2007; Klein & Loftus, 2002; Tulving, 1985).  
 
Taken together, these results are generally consiste t with the view that reminiscence 
and future thinking are closely related activities and involve similar processes. 
However, we believe that there is an important question that should be addressed 
before any further theorizing on the common neurocognitive substrate of thinking 
about the past and of thinking about the future. That is, is it possible to spot a 
boundary between past and future thinking? We reasoned that, although both 
processes draw on elements of previous experiences, as tated by the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis, envisioning future scenarios is unquestionably 
cognitively more demanding than recollecting past experiences. Namely, mentally 
travelling forth to the future, more than travelling back to the past, involves both the 
retrieval of elements of past experiences and the construction of new representations 
of what might plausibly occur in the future. Accordingly, it has been observed that 
the ability of future thinking necessitates a greater neural activity (Okuda et al., 2003; 
Addis et al., 2007). Specific frontal polar regions are more active when thinking and 
verbally describing future prospects, than when thiking and reporting past events. 
Furthermore, infinite elements within the autobiographical episodic memory might 
be taken into account with the aim of contrasting a future simulation. Thus, future 
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thinking might be considered more effortful than remembering (Anderson et al., in 
press).  
 
It seems, therefore, legitimate to wonder whether individuals who are engaged in 
imagining future events actually produce novel scenarios or whether they rather rely, 
more or less deliberately, on some alternative strategies. As a matter of fact, earlier 
studies concerned with episodic future thinking failed to acknowledge that people 
can employ different strategies to comply with the requirements of envisioning 
personal future experiences. Furthermore, participants were explicitly asked to 
imagine novel (i.e., not previously experienced) future events in some previous 
studies (e.g., Addis et al., 2007, 2008), whereas this request was not specified in 
other studies (e.g., D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; Szpunar et al., 2007).  
 
In the present study we aimed at assessing whether or not participants, who engage in 
episodic future thinking, are likely to retrieve, at least occasionally, events that have 
already taken place and adjust them to fit in with the test requirements. We believe 
that this may represent a suitable strategy, easy to implement in those cases in which 
envisioning future episodes does not appear easily chievable, as when participants 
are experimentally cued to imagine future events with a single word, maybe under 
time pressure (e.g., Addis et al., 2007, 2008). By addressing this issue we do not 
question human’s ability to simulate future events, but we rather advocate the 
necessity to disentangle the construction of truly novel scenarios from the 
reproduction of real, though impoverished, past events when measuring future 
thinking.  
 
To this end, in the present study, participants were r quired to mentally re-experience 
and pre-experience temporally close and distant autobiographical episodes and rated 
their phenomenal characteristics. In particular, we addressed the issue as to whether 
participants’ future representations were really new events in two ways.  
 
First, we explicitly asked participants to indicate the novelty of a future event by 
rating how often they experienced in the past the same or a very similar event. This is 
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the most straightforward way to explore whether participants’ future representations 
resemble memories of events that had already taken place, rather than being true 
simulations of novel events. However, one important consideration is in order. The 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter et al., 2007) states that 
imagination of future scenarios is formed by retrieving and flexibly recombining 
elements of previous experiences in novel ways to create new and plausible 
representations. This process plausibly leads participants to think about events that 
are similar to previous experiences even when asked to think about events that have 
never happened before. It follows that, even when participants rate an imagined 
event as occurred very often, there is no direct evidence that indicates that 
participants simply remembered a past event and “tweaked” it. That is, an event can 
be very similar to past experiences but might still revolve around a totally novel 
scenario. However, when participants rate an imagined event as never occurred 
before, this provides an unquestionable evidence of the novelty of that event. It is the 
comparison between past events and imagined events rated as never occurred before 
and between past events and imagined events rated as occurred very often that can 
shed some light on the main issue of whether there are significant differences 
between past and future thought.  
 
Second, participants performed a delayed recognition task on new, old-remember, 
and old-imagine words which also included remember-know judgments. This 
delayed recognition task was included to ascertain how successfully participants 
could discriminate between what they experienced in the past and what they 
imagined could happen in the future. The worse the discrimination, the more likely 
that participants reproduced past experiences as new episodes, somewhat 
impoverished or distorted in their phenomenal qualities. Accordingly, we predicted 
that participants should falsely attribute old-imagine words to remembered episodes. 
 
Our goal, in the present study, is to assess whether or not participants, when asked to 
perform future thinking tasks, are likely to retrieve events that have already occurred. 
Our hypothesis is that, at least occasionally, participants engaging in episodic future 
thinking, might retrieve past events instead of constructing new future events, and 
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alter them to comply with the  requirements of the question. This might be an 
effective strategy to avoid the difficulties associated with the creation of a future 
scenario.  
 






Twenty-eight young adults from Suor Orsola Benincasa University participated in 
this experiment as volunteers. The average age and education were 25.0 (SD = 4.0) 
and 15.6 (SD = 1.8) years, respectively. All participants had no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
 
5.2.1.2 Materials and procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted in two sessions. During the first session, participants 
mentally re-experienced and pre-experienced two temporally close (few weeks) and 
two temporally distant (few years) autobiographical episodes in response to eight cue 
words. The procedure was adapted from D’Argembeau and v n der Linden (2004) 
and from Addis et al. (2007). Participants were encouraged to retrieve and imagine 
temporally and contextually specific events. Future ev nts had also to be plausible, 
given the participant’s plans, and novel, that is, not previously experienced by the 
participant. Sixteen words were selected from the Burani et al. (2001) Italian norms 
and were assigned to two sets of eight words each, matched for words’ familiarity, 




Fourteen participants saw one set of cue words, while t e other fourteen participants 
saw the other set of cue words. Within each set, th cue words were cycled through 
conditions obtained by combining temporal direction (remember or imagine) and 
temporal distance (few weeks or few years). Each participant was then assigned to a 
counterbalanced version of the task with the constraint that half participants 
performed the past task first, followed by the future task, and the other half received 
the opposite sequence. Any one trial started with a cueing slide presented on the 
computer screen providing task instructions concerning the temporal direction 
(remember or imagine), the temporal distance (few weeks or few years), and the cue 
word.  
 
Once an event had been retrieved or imagined (there was no time limit for retrieving 
and imagining an event), participants were given 60 s to retrieve or imagine as many 
details as possible. Then, participants rated, on 7-point scales, the phenomenal 
characteristics of each event using a modified version of the MCQ questionnaire (see 
D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). More relevant for the purpose of the present 
research, we also included a question asking participants to indicate the novelty of a 
future event by rating how often they experienced in the past the same or a very 
similar event. This question was aimed at assessing the participant’s tendency to 
retrieve an event that had already taken place and adjust it to fit in with the test 
requirements, rather than imagining truly novel scenarios. We included three further 
questions investigating how rich the representation of a specific future episode was 
with respect to familiar objects, places, and peopl. We do not expect that people 
imagine new elements – at least when they are explicitly required to think about 
plausible events, as in our experiments (but see Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) - but 
we rather expect that imagined future events will differ with respect to the number of 
familiar elements included in them. It is likely tha  the lower the novelty (high rating 
on frequency of occurrence), the more likely future events are rated as rich of 
familiar elements. 
 
At the end of the first session, which lasted approximately 90 min, participants were 
asked to come back to the Laboratory a week later. All participants agreed to do so. 
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Therefore, in the second session, an unexpected recognition task (created ad hoc for 
each participant) was administered. The test consisted of 12 old-remember and 12 
old-imagine words and 28 distractor items presented in a random order. Old-
remember and old-imagine words were the four cue words plus eight words selected, 
for each participant, from the responses he/she provided when describing the four 
past and the four future episodes generated in response to the cue words. More 
precisely, two naïve students, unaware of the purpose of the study, listened to the 
recordings of each past and future event described by each participant and selected 
the five words they evaluated as the most representative of each specific event. Then, 
for each event, the experimenter selected the two words that both naïve students had 
evaluated as the most representative. The 28 distractor items, equivalent for each 
participants, were selected from the Burani et al. (2001) Italian norms and matched 
the 8 cue words for words’ familiarity, frequency, imageability, and concreteness. In 
the recognition task, each word was presented on the computer screen and the 
participant was asked to make one of three possible judgments, that is, old-
remember, old-imagine, or new.  
 
Participants were instructed:  
 
(a) to give an old-remember response, when they recognized a word 
as one of the cues used to prompt recollection of a past event or as 
a word they produced when describing a past event; 
(b) to give an old-imagine response, when they recognized a word as 
one of the cues used to prompt imagination of a future event or as 
a word they produced when describing a future event; and  
(c) to give a new response, when they recognized a wordas unrelated 
to the previous task. 
 
We have also investigated the subjective experience of recognition by asking 
participants to assign (by key press) their old-remember and old-imagine responses 
as either Remember (R), Know, (K) or Guess (G) respon es. The G response was 
added in order to prevent participants from using the K option in case of uncertainty 
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(Gardiner et al., 1996). Namely, participants were instructed to make an R response 
if they retrieved specific information relating the it m to a previously retrieved or 
imagined event, a K response if they recognized the item on the basis of familiarity 
without recollection, and a G response if they were uncertain about whether or not 




5.2.2.1 Ratings of phenomenal characteristics 
 
For both past and future events, the ratings of the two near and the two distant events 





















 Past Events Future Events 
Near Distant Near Distant 
Sensorial details 4.4 (.19) 4.5 (0.20) 4.1 (.23) 4.0 (.21) 
Structure 4.9 (.26) 4.5 (.24) 4.1 (.26) 4.4 (.30) 
Clarity of location 5.6 (.19) 5.2 (.26) 4.8 (.28) 4.3 (.31) 
Temporal 
information 
5.2 (.28) 4.9 (.32) 3.3 (.38) 3.4 (.39) 
Valence 4.9 (.28) 4.6 (.29) 5.1 (.30) 5.5 (.25) 
Intensity 4.7 (.30) 4.7 (.34) 5.1 (.25) 5.3 (.26) 
Visual perspective 1.9 (.06) 1.9 (.05) 1.9 (.04) 1.9 (.06) 
Richness 
(of familiar objects, 
people and places) 
/ / 4.8 (.21) 4.1 (.29) 
Frequency of 
occurrence (novelty) 
/ / 3.4 (.51) 3.1 (.33) 
 
Table 5.1 - Mean ratings (and standard errors) as afunction of event type (past 
and future) and temporal distance (near and distant) for Experiment 1. Note. 
Structure = My memory for this (the image of this future) event is: 1 = sketchy/7 
= very detailed. Novelty decreases proportionately as frequency of occurrence 
increases, that is, the lower the rating, the higher the novelty. 
 
In addition, the ratings for visual details, sound, smell, taste, and tactile details were 
averaged, for each participant, into a general sensorial details index. Similarly, the 
ratings for clarity of location, clarity of spatial rrangement of objects, and clarity of 
spatial arrangement of people were grouped into a single clarity of location index 
(D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). Finally, the ratings for richness of 
representations of future events with respect to famili r objects, places, and people 





Ratings Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Near Distant Near Distant 
1 32.1 39.3 20.0 36.7 
2 7.1 10.7 10.0 13.3 
3 3.6 7.1 3.3 16.7 
4 8.9 12.5 23.0 36.7 
5 12.5 12.5 13.3 6.7 
6 14.3 5.4 13.3 10.0 
7 21.4 12.5 16.7 10.0 
 
Table 5.2 - Frequency distribution of ratings concerning the novelty of future 
scenarios as a function of temporal distance (near and distant) for Experiments 
1 and 2. Note. The numbers indicate the percentage of events that received 
ratings from 1 to 7 (out of 56 near events and 56 distant events in Experiment 1 
and of 30 near events and 30 distant events in Experiment 2). 
 
Separate 2 (event type: past vs. future) x 2 (temporal distance: near vs. distant) 
analyses of variance were carried out for each phenom al characteristic. Results 
indicated that memories for past events contained more sensorial details than 
representations of future events, F(1, 27) = 6.88, p <  0.01, and were richer in internal 
details than representations of future events, F(1,27) = 5.47, p < 0.02. As regards 
clarity of location, memories for past events were more clearly represented than 
representations of future events, F(1, 27) = 18.59, p < 0.0001, and both past and 
future near events were more clearly represented than distant events, F(1, 27) = 9.05, 
p < 0.01. Concerning temporal information, memories for past events were also 




With respect to the richness of future representations, results showed that near future 
events were rated as more rich of familiar elements (objects, places, and people) than 
distant future events, t(27) = 2.63, p < 0.01, that is, the novelty was significantly 
higher for distant future events than for near future events, t(27) = 2.15, p < 0.05, 
that is, envisaged distant future events were rated s less frequently experienced 
before. The remaining rating scales did not differ b tween past and future events or 
between near and distant events.  
 
With respect to the novelty of future representations, we hypothesized that, to the 
extent that participants envisage truly novel scenarios, the novelty of their 
representations should be rated as high, that is, envisaged future events should be 
rated as never happened before. The inspection of frequency distribution of ratings 
(Table 5.2), however, suggests that this was not always the case. In fact, less than 
40% of near and distant future events were rated as novel.  
 
Next, we assessed to what extent past events differed rom both future events rated as 
high in novelty and future event rated as low in novelty, with respect to their 
phenomenal characteristics. To this aim, from the original sample of 112 events (56 
near and 56 distant) we selected only those events tha  had been assigned either a 
rating of 1 (never happened; 18 near and 22 distant events) or a rating of 7 (happened 
very often; 12 near and 7 distant events). When more highly novel events (either near 
or distant) belonged to the same participant, their ratings for each phenomenal 
characteristic were averaged into a single value. The same procedure was used for 
future events rated as low in novelty. In so doing, two samples of 19 and 11 
participants, respectively, were obtained, who produce  future events that were rated 
as high and low in novelty. In order to compare the p nomenal characteristics of 
past and future events that were high and low in novelty, for each participant in each 
group the ratings of the two near and the two distant p st events were averaged into a 
single value for each phenomenal characteristic. 
 
The results of repeated measure t tests indicated that highly novel future events were 
less clearly represented than the correspondent past events, with respect to location, 
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t(18) = 2.83, p < 0.01, and temporal information, t(18) = 3.22, p < 0.005. No such 
difference emerged between past and future events which were rated as low in 
novelty. 
  
5.2.2.2 Recognition memory 
 
Mean proportion of participants’ responses (old-remember, old-imagine, and new) 
per word type are presented in Table 5.3. To examine participants’ ability to 
discriminate between old and new items, a recognition index was calculated 
separately for old-remember and old-imagine items using the [P(old response) - 
P(false alarm)] formula. These measures were based on all correct “old” responses 
irrespective of whether these were associated with accurate source attribution. 
Results of repeated measure t tests indicated that the discrimination accuracy for old-
imagine items was marginally higher than the discrimination accuracy for old-


















 Participants’ responses  





Experiment 1  
Old-remember .77(.04) .07(.03) .18(.03) .74(.03) .87(.06) 
Old-imagine .18(.04) .71(.05) .11(.02) .80(.02) .57(.09) 
New .05(.01) .03(.01) .91(.01)   
 
Experiment 2  
Old-remember .78(.04) .04(.02) .18(.03) .75(.03) .90(.04) 
Old-imagine .18(.04) .65(.05) .11(.03) .76(.03) .56(.11) 
New .02(.01) .05(.01) .91(.02)   
 
Table 5.3 - Recognition memory as a function of word type (old-remember, old-
imagine, and new) and source attribution for Experiments 1 and 2. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
To analyze participants’ ability to identify the correct source of recognized items, a 
source-monitoring index (Johansson et al., 2002) was calculated separately for old-
remember and old-imagine items using the following formula: [P(correct source 
attribution) - P(wrong source attribution)]/[P(correct source attribution) + P(wrong 
source attribution)]. Results of a Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test indicated that old-
remember items were attributed to their correct source at a higher rate than old-





Item type Remember Know 
 
Experiment 1  
Correct source attribution   
Old-remember (254) .90 .10 
Old-imagine (238) .89 .11 
Incorrect source attribution   
Old-remember (23) .83 .17 
Old-imagine (62) .79 .21 
 
Experiment 2  
Correct source attribution   
Old-remember (141) .94 .06 
Old-imagine (117) .99 .01 
Incorrect source attribution   
Old-remember (7) 1.0 .00 
Old-imagine (32) .97 .03 
 
Table 5.4 - Mean proportion of Remember and Know responses as a function of 
word type (old-remember, old-imagine, and new) and source attribution 
(correct and incorrect) for Experiments 1 and 2. Note. Parentheses indicate the 
total number of participants’ old responses (out of 336 in Experiment 1 and out 
of 180 in Experiment 2); incorrect source attribution = old-remember and old-
imagine items attributed to the wrong source (i.e., old-remember items 




With respect to the subjective experience of recognition (see Table 5.4), more R 
responses than K responses were assigned to both correctly recognized old-
remember (R = 0.90, K = 0.10) and old-imagine items (R = 0.89, K = 0.11). None of 
the participants provided a G response. Most important, more R responses than K 
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responses were also assigned to old-remember (R = 0.83, K = 0.17) and old-imagine 
items (R = 0.79, K = 0.21) attributed to the wrong source, suggesting that the 




Our goal in this experiment was to explore whether participants’ future 
representations may sometimes reproduce memories of vents that had already taken 
place, rather than being true simulations of novel e nts. As regards the phenomenal 
characteristics associated with mental time travel, overall, our results have replicated 
previous findings (e.g., Addis et al., 2008; D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004, 
2006), indicating that real events contained more ph nomenal details than imagined 
events, in line with the reality monitoring framework (e.g., Johnson et al., 1988). In 
addition, our findings that near future events were rat d as richer of familiar objects, 
places, and people than distant future events fit well ith the temporal construal 
theory of Trope and Liberman (2003), which suggests that representations of distant 
future events are more abstract and decontextualized than representations of near 
future events. Most important for the purpose of the present research, the results 
concerning the novelty of episodic future events indicated that some future events 
that have been evoked by participants were rated as having had already occurred or 
very similar to past events. It is interesting to note that the rating of frequency of 
occurrence (the higher the rate the lesser the novelty) of distant future events was 
significantly smaller than the rating of frequency of occurrence of near future events. 
To date, future events with a low novelty were indistinguishable from past events 
with respect to their phenomenal characteristics.  
 
 
Results from the delayed recognition task have alsoprovided important information 
on future events evoked by participants. We assumed that, the more past experiences 
are reproduced as new episodes, the harder it should be to correctly discriminate 
between past and future events. Discrimination accur cy for old-remember and old-
imagine items was very high and almost equivalent. However, in line with our 
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hypothesis, participants falsely attributed old-imagine words to remembered episodes 
at a higher rate than the opposite (though the proporti n of incorrect source 
attribution was quite low). Furthermore, both correct and incorrect source 
attributions were based on conscious recollection, as indicated by the larger 
proportion of R responses than K responses associated to both correctly recognized 
old-remember and old-imagine items and to old-remember and old-imagine items 
attributed to the wrong source. 
 
The results of Experiment 1 therefore indicate that, on some occasions, participants 
reproduce events already occurred in the past or very similar to past events, rather 
than envisioning truly novel events. However, the results of the recognition task 
should be taken with caution because the words, selected ad hoc for each participant, 
may have contained idiosyncratic references that could have reminded a person of 
one of the several events he/she experienced in the past associated with that word. 
Namely, participants may have mistaken more frequently the source for old-imagine 
than for old-remember words because, in their life,th y accumulated many different 
experiences associated with a particular word. It appe rs therefore essential to 
replicate Experiment 1 by checking whether participants’ responses in the 
recognition task correspond to the original events reported during the first part of the 
task. 
 






Fifteen young adults from the Suor Orsola Benincasa University participated in this 
experiment as volunteers. The average age and the average education were 27.5 (SD 
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= 5.1) and 14.4 (SD = 3.0) years, respectively. All participants had no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
 
5.3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted in two sessions, lasting approximately 90 min each. 
The first session was the same as in Experiment 1. In the second session, a week 
later, participants performed the unexpected recogniti n task, which was the same as 
in Experiment 1 except for the inclusion of the requ st to indicate, after each old 
response, the event related to the item recognized as either old-remember or old-
imagine. More precisely, after classifying their old-remember and old-imagine 
responses as either Remember (R), Know, (K) or Guess (G) responses, participants 
were instructed to shortly describe the event, either remembered or imagined during 
the first part of the experiment, that was related o that particular item that was 
recognized as old. This debriefing procedure was included to check whether 
participants’ responses in the recognition task overlapped the original events reported 
during the first part of the task. 
 
5.3.2 Results and discussion 
 
5.3.2.1 Ratings of phenomenal characteristics 
 
The analyses of the ratings for the phenomenal chara teristics were the same as in 
Experiment 1. The mean ratings are presented in Table 5.5. As in Experiment 1, and 
in line with earlier studies (e.g., D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004, 2006), 
results indicated that, overall, past events contained more phenomenal details than 
imagined events. In particular, as regards the clarity of location, memories for past 
events were more clearly represented than representations of future events, F(1, 14) = 
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32.3, p < 0.0001, and both past and future near events were mo clearly represented 
than distant events, F(1, 14) = 6.85, p < 0.05.  
 
 Past Events Future Events 
Near Distant Near Distant 
Sensorial details 4.5(.24) 4.1 (.22) 4.2 (.28) 4.0 (.20) 
Structure 4.7 (.40) 4.7 (.21) 3.9 (.49) 3.8 (.38) 
Clarity of location 5.7 (.26) 5.2 (.24) 4.6 (.29) 3.9 (.32) 
Temporal 
information 
4.7 (.51) 4.5 (.32) 3.3 (.34) 2.5 (.37) 
Valence 4.8 (.35) 4.4 (.38) 5.03 (.31) 4.8 (.37) 
Intensity 4.9 (.25) 4.9 (.34) 4.9 (.41) 5.7 (.26) 
Visual perspective 1.8 (.08) 1.7 (.09) 1.7 (.08) 1.7 (.09) 
Richness   
(of familiar objects, 
people and places) 






4.1 (.49) 2.9 (.46) 
 
Table 5.5 - Mean ratings (and standard errors) as afunction of event type (past 
and future) and temporal distance (near and distant) for Experiment 2. Note. 
Structure = My memory for this (the image of this future) event is: 1 = sketchy/7 
= very detailed. Novelty decreases proportionately as frequency of occurrence 




Concerning temporal information, memories for past events were also clearer than 
representations of future events, F(1, 14) = 14.18, p <0 .01. Experiment 2 replicated 
results of Experiment 1 in that the rating of richness of familiar objects, places, and 
people for near future events was significantly higher than the rating of richness for 
distant future events, t(14) = 2.67, p < 0.02. 
 
The novelty of distant future events was marginally higher than the novelty of near 
future events, t(14) = 1.94, p = 0.054 (i.e., envisaged distant future events were rated 
as less frequently experienced before). The remaining rating scales did not differ 
between past and future events or between near and distant events. The inspection of 
Table 2.2 illustrating future events’ frequency of occurrence reveals that, as in 
Experiment 1, participants imagined novel scenarios (20% and 36.7% of near and 
distant future events, respectively, were rated as novel), but they also produced 
representations of events that were rated as already occurred. As in Experiment 1, we 
compared the phenomenal characteristics of past and future events which were rated 
as high or low in novelty. Two samples of, respectively, 11 and 5 participants were 
obtained, who produced future events that were rated s high (6 near and 11 distant 
events) or low (5 near and 3 distant events) in novelty. In line with results of 
Experiment 1, highly novel future events contained less sensorial details, t(10) = 4.3, 
p < 0.001, were less complex, t(10) = 3.1, p < 0.01, and less clearly represented with 
respect to both location, t(10) = 5.0, p < 0.001, and temporal information, t(10) = 
3.1, p < 0.001, than past events. As in Experiment 1, no such difference emerged 
between past and future events which were rated as low in novelty. 
 
5.3.2.2 Recognition memory 
 
Mean proportions of participants’ responses (old-remember, old-imagine, and new) 
are presented in Table 5.3 as a function of word type. Results from the delayed 
recognition task in Experiment 2 replicated results of Experiment 1, indicating that, 
although the overall discrimination accuracy for old-remember and old-imagine 
items was very high and equivalent, participants fal ely attributed old-imagine words 
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to remembered episodes at a higher rate than the other way round, T = 96.5, p < 
0.001 (see Table 5.3). With respect to the subjectiv  experience of recognition (see 
Table 5.4), as in Experiment 1, more R responses than K responses were assigned to 
both correctly recognized old-remember (R = 0.94, K = 0.06) and old-imagine items 
(R = 0.99, K = 0.01). 
 
Item type Same Different 
 
Correct source attribution   
Old-remember (141) .99 .01 
Old-imagine (117) 1.0 .00 
 
Incorrect source attribution   
Old-remember (7) .14 .86 
Old-imagine (32) 1.0 .00 
 
Table 5.6 - Mean proportion of correct (same) and incorrect (different) matches 
between the events recognized as old and the original events described during 
the first part of the experiment, as a function of word type (old-remember and 
oldimagine) and source attribution (correct and incorrect) for Experiment 2. 
Note. Parentheses indicate the total number of participants’ old responses (max 
180); incorrect source attribution = old-remember and old-imagine items 
attributed to the wrong source (i.e., old-remember items recognized as old-





Furthermore, more R responses than K responses werealso assigned to old-
remember (R = 1.0, K = 0.00) and to old-imagine items (R = 0.97, K = 0.03) 
attributed to the wrong source. 
 
Finally, and most important, in Experiment 2 we compared participants’ responses to 
the recognition task with the events remembered and imagined in the first part of the 
experiment. As it is illustrated in Table 5.6, in the presence of correct source 
attributions, the events described by the participants during the recognition task 
overlap those remembered and imagined during the first part of the experiment. 
 
However, the most interesting result refers to those cases of incorrect source 
attributions. In fact, for the few cases in which an old-remember item was 
erroneously recognized as an old-imagine item, participants described an episode that 
was remarkably different from that reported in the first part of the experiment. To the 
opposite, when an old-imagine item was erroneously recognized as an old-remember 
item, participants described the same episode as reported in the first part of the 
experiment, with the difference that, now, they reported the episode as being really 
occurred in the past. 
 
5.4 General discussion 
 
In real life, projecting oneself forward in time to pre-experience an event is generally 
motivated by personal goals. In experimental settings, however, self-projection into 
the future may appear much more difficult and may consequently lead the participant 
to rely, more or less deliberately, on some alternative strategies. On the basis of this 
considerations, in this chapter we aimed to assess whether participants, who engage 
in episodic future thinking, produce genuine new scenarios or they rather might 
retrieve, at least occasionally, events that have already taken place and adjust them to 
fit in with the test requirements. We believe it is an important issue to ascertain how 
people comply with the task requirements of envisioning personal future experiences 
if we wish to fully understand the mechanisms underlying this important function of 
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everyday life. In the two experiments reported here, th  analyses of the ratings 
indicated that the future events evoked by a number of participants were rated as 
being already occurred in the past or very similar to past events.  
 
Notably, in both experiments, future events that were rated as low in novelty were 
indistinguishable from past events with respect to heir phenomenal characteristics. 
To directly compare highly novel future events and future event rated as low in 
novelty with respect to their phenomenal characteristics, we run an additional 
analysis by collapsing results from Experiments 1 and 2. More precisely, we selected 
those participants who rated at least one future event as never occurred and at least 
one future event as occurred very often (six participants in Experiment 1 and three 
participants in Experiment 2). When more events (either near or distant) high or low 
in novelty belonged to the same participant, their ratings for each phenomenal 
characteristic were averaged into a single value. 
 
In comparison to future events rated as low in novelty, highly novel future events 
contained less sensorial details, t(8) = -2.9, p < 0.05, were less clear with respect to 
temporal information, t(8) = -3.8, p < 0.001, and were less rich of familiar objects, 
places, and people, t(8) = -5.0, p < 0.001, (for similar results see Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008). 
 
An important result of this study concerns the extent o which participants reproduce 
specific memories when simulating future events. Specifically, the data suggest that 
participants were more likely to be relying upon personal memories when simulating 
near future events than distant future events. As such, it is interesting to see that near 
future events were rated as more vivid and less novel than distant future events.  
 
These findings stimulate further hypotheses that go beyond the idea that people may 
occasionally adopt alternative strategies to comply with instructions. They, indeed, 
suggest that the tendency to remain ‘‘stuck’’ in real pisodes that occurred in the past 
may be a general heuristic that stems from the relationship between direct experience 
and knowledge about an event, rather than a by-product of the procedure. Typically, 
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people expect near future events to resemble what they are currently experiencing, 
while distant future situations are much more amenable to transformations (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003). Therefore, it seems plausible thatwhen we think of near future 
episodes, we not only engage in concrete processing or entation, which, in turn, leads 
us to construct more detailed representations, as sugge ted by the temporal construal 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), but we may even envisage future scenarios that 
reproduce what we have already experienced. This hypot esis is strengthened by our 
results showing that, in both experiments, near future events were rated as more rich 
of familiar objects, places, and people than distant future events. On the other hand, 
when we imagine distant future events, we are more prone to approach the task with 
an abstract processing orientation and we are more likely to disengage from direct 
experience. It is relevant to note that the rating of frequency of occurrence and the 
rating of richness of familiar elements (collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2 and 
averaged across near and distant events) significantly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 
0.40, p < 0.01). This result supports our hypothesis that the lower the novelty, the 
more likely that future events are rich of familiar elements. 
 
These findings highlight an important caveat: when investigating episodic future 
thinking, it seems most appropriate to test participants on distant future events rather 
than on near ones, to make it less likely that people reproduce past personal 
memories.  
 
With respect to the delayed recognition tasks we found that, although overall correct 
recognition rates were – not surprisingly – quite high, participants falsely attributed 
old-imagine words to remembered episodes at a higher rat  than the other way round, 
both in Experiments 1 and 2, in line with predictions. The incorrect source 
attributions were based on conscious recollection, as indicated by the larger 
proportion of R responses than K responses.  
 
Additionally, in Experiment 2, in which participants were invited to shortly describe 
each event associated to the items they had recognized as old, when an old-imagine 
item was erroneously recognized as an old-remember item, most participants 
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described the same episode as reported in the first pa t of the experiment, with the 
difference that, now, they reported the episode as re lly occurred in the past. 
 
Overall, results concerning recognition memory are largely in line with our 
predictions. It is, however, important to acknowledg  that our results may be 
accounted for by addressing issues different from source attribution errors. For 
instance, test items were not fully under experimenter control. Only the four cue 
words could be counterbalanced, but the other eight test words in each condition 
were derived from subjects’ study responses and could not be counterbalanced. One 
might, therefore, raise the concern that the differences between the old-remember 
and old-imagine items were, at least partially, dueto item differences. However, the 
analyses of recognition memory for the cue words only (collapsing results from 
Experiments 1 and 2) revealed a pattern of results equivalent to the main pattern of 
results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Another concern refers to the fact that imagining a event negatively affects one’s 
ability to discriminate between recently performed and planned actions (e.g., Goff & 
Roediger, 1998; Mammarella, 2007; Thomaset al., 2003) and there is evidence that 
imagination might induce people to falsely remember childhood memories that never 
happened (e.g., Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). One might therefore object that, in the 
present research, participants may have sometimes confused future events with 
experienced events due to imagination inflation. Two important considerations are, 
however, in order. Confusions between recently imagned and experienced episodes 
emerge only when events consist of simple, discrete ac ions such as flip the coin, 
open the book, polish the spoon (e.g., McDaniel et al., 2008), which lack all those 
phenomenal, spatial, temporal, and emotional details hat characterize more complex 
autobiographical events, such as those investigated in the present research. As long 
as false childhood memories are concerned, the probability of falsely remembering 
childhood memories that have never happened seems to be strictly related to the 
pressure at imagining such events. Multiple imaginatio  trials, combined with other 
suggestive procedures (e.g., Hyman & Pentland, 1996), are indispensable elements in 
order to increase the likelihood that people falsely r member childhood memories. In 
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our paradigm, participants imagined only once future events and their recognition 
memory was tested relatively soon, afterwards. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
participants’ larger difficulty to attribute the correct source to old-imagine items was 
determined by the experimental procedure adopted in this study. Nevertheless, the 
possibility remains that at least some envisioned future events reflected situations 
which participants thought of quite often (e.g., when envisioned future events 
incorporate wishes and goals).  
 
In conclusion, we believe that these new findings may have implications for the 
theory of episodic future thinking. Although these results are not at odds with what 
the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis maintains, they suggest that 
intending at investigating future thinking, in the n xt chapters, we should always take 
into account that participants may occasionally rel, more or less deliberately, on 
some alternative strategies, when invited to project themselves into their personal 
future and that it may be misleading to assume that p rticipants’ future 
representations are always truly novel events without first obtaining relevant 




6. What does differentiate episodic future 




Episodic Future Thinking (EFT) refers  to our ability to pre-experience the future by 
simulating it in our minds. Until recently, most ofthe research on EFT focused on 
better characterizing the similarities and the differences between EFT and memory. 
Converging evidence from cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies 
indicate that these two processes rely indeed on common psychological and neural 
processes (for reviews, see Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; Szpunar, 2011). Yet, there has been little 
consideration of what makes EFT a distinct process that differentiates it from the 
related concept of complex scene imagery. Both tasks involve, indeed,  the process 
of “scene construction” which refers to the generation, maintenance and visualization 
of a complex spatial setting in which an event (real or imaginary) can be mentally 
experienced (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Note that tis kind of complex "scene" 
imagery differs markedly from "object" imagery (e.g., for faces or single objects) in 
that it requires the binding of disparate (possibly multimodal) elements of a scene 
into a coherent whole (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). Hassabis and Maguire 
(2007) hypothesized that scene construction is a core process that underlies a host of 
cognitive functions that crucially rely on constructing, maintaining and visualizing 
complex scenes such as, for example, autobiographicl memory, EFT, imagination, 
spatial navigation, and that this can account for a large proportion of the overlapping 
network found in neuroimaging studies of these functio s.  
 
Given that EFT and autobiographical memory are tightly intertwined, our quest for 
the key aspects differentiating EFT from complex scene imagery should start from 
                                                
5 de Vito S, Gamboz N, Brandimonte MA. What does differentiate episodic future thinking 
from complex scene imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, i  press. 
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considering what differentiates a retrieved autobiographical event (i.e., remembering 
my last summer barbecue on a Greek beach) from an im gined complex scene (i.e., 
imagining to walk in a tropical jungle).  
 
Almost all would agree that is it the subjective sense of time, the connection to the 
self, the feelings of familiarity and a special kind of consciousness, termed  
autonoetic consciousness, that enables one to be aware of the self in subjective time 
(Tulving, 2002). These elements may be present in imag ned fictitious experiences 
either to a much lesser extent or not at all (Hassabi  et al., 2007). Similarities and 
differences between complex scene imagery and autobiographical memory are well 
documented in the neuroimaging study of Hassabis et al. (2007). These authors 
showed that a distributed brain network involving the hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortices, posterior parietal cortices, and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, was recruited during both autobiographical memory 
recall and recall of previously constructed fictitious experiences that were well-
matched for difficulty, age, detail and vividness. These specific conditions have been 
investigated because the comparison between them allowed to partial out the effects 
of scene construction, and to ask which brain regions underpin the special properties 
of autobiographical memory. Activation of specific brain areas, i.e., the posterior 
cingulate cortex, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, and precuneus, was indeed 
observed only during episodic memory recall, suggesting that these regions may 
support functions most likely reflecting self-projection in time, self-relevance and 
sense of familiarity that are specific to autobiographical memory over and above 
scene construction (Tulving, 2002).  
 
As noted by Hassabis et al. (2007), the pattern of activation specific to 
autobiographical memory resembles the network found to support EFT (e.g., Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007). One may therefore argue that recalling past experiences 
and thinking about plausible, autobiographical future events share the same key, 
defining processes. Indeed, when individuals remember past or simulate future 
events, they imaginatively place themselves into specific settings that are temporal in 
nature (settings that pertain to their past and to their future). Furthermore, when 
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envisioning events that will occur in the future, esp cially in the near future, 
individuals imagine themselves in the context of familiar settings (see Chapter 5). 
This is not to say that familiarity of setting is a defining feature of EFT, as it is for 
autobiographical memory. We can indeed pre-experience an event expected to occur 
somewhere we have never been before and, still, scene onstruction is surely not 
restricted to events represented in unfamiliar settings. However, empirical evidence 
indicates that familiarity of setting is indeed an important modulator of the 
characteristics of EFT (e.g., Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). 
 
The specific contribution of self-projection in time and self-relevance over and above 
the role of scene construction in EFT is currently rather speculative. For instance, 
does mentally projecting an imaginary event into the future make it any different 
from imagining it in the present (e.g., “Imagine to walk in a sunny garden next year” 
vs. “Imagine to walk in a sunny garden”)? Similarly, is there any difference between 
imagining oneself doing an activity and imagining familiar others doing the same 
activity (e.g., “Imagine to walk on the beach next year” vs. “Imagine Silvio 
Berlusconi walking on the beach next year”)? So far, only few studies have provided 
initial insights into this issue. With respect to the role of the temporality of imagined 
events in EFT, it is important to refer to the original patient study on imagination of 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, and  Maguire (2007). These authors reported on five 
memory-impaired patients with a bilateral hippocampus damage having troubles in 
constructing novel events. Their imagined experiences were deficient in spatial 
coherence, relative to controls, resulting in their constructions being fragmented and 
lacking in richness. Hassabis et al. (2007) tested patients and controls on both 
episodic future thinking scenarios (e.g., imagining a possible Christmas event) and a-
temporal imagined scenarios (e.g., “Imagine you are standing in the middle of a 
bustling street market”). No difference in descriptions was found (so the results were 
presented collapsed across scenario type. This result suggests that a-temporal and 
future imagined events may be represented in a very similar way. The opinion of 
Hassabis and Maguire (2007; 2009) is that the time-stamp of an event, imagined or 
remembered, should not be elevated to the status of a key property of recollection 
and prospection, as some have suggested (e.g., Buckner & Carrol 2007;  Tulving, 
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2002), but it should rather be considered as a piece of semantic knowledge that might 
or might not be included or logically deduced at the point an event is remembered or 
imagined. This view is surely quite radical but, nevertheless, it draws attention to the 
need to clarify the status of the temporal nature of mental representations of events.  
 
Concerning the contribution of self-relevance to EFT, in a neuroimaging study 
(Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007) the core brain network common to past and 
future thinking was found to show greater activation when participants envisioned 
their personal future (or recollected their past) as compared with a control task 
requiring participants to imagine a familiar individual participating in life-like events 
with no explicit temporal reference (Bill Clinton at his birthday). This result thus 
highlights a neural differentiation between envisioning a personal future experience 
and imagining the experience of someone else. However, given that the two types of 
mental representations included in Szpunar et al.’s(2007) study differed also with 
respect to the temporality of the imagined events, the unique and specific 
contribution of selfness to EFT still remains to be defined.  
 
As for the role played by the familiarity of setting in EFT, it is clear that humans can 
mentally simulate virtually infinite future possibilities, up to the extreme situation of 
imagining or even daydreaming about unlikely events. However, as noted by 
Szpunar (2010), episodic future thoughts generally  revolve around the short-term 
concerns of participants (D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011; Spreng & 
Levine, 2006). Accordingly, the contents of episodic future thoughts are typically 
characterized by familiar contextual information (see Chapter 5). When participants 
are prompted by the experimenter to imagine autobiographical future events 
occurring in unfamiliar settings (e.g., Jungle, North Pole, Great Wall of China), their 
representations are rated as containing less sensorial details, as occurring in a less 
clear context, and as having a weaker subjective experience as compared to when 
they engage in episodic future thought occurring in familiar contexts (e.g., home, 
friend’s apartment, pub; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). It has also been shown that 
the regions within the posteromedial parietal cortex and the medial temporal lobes, 
typically engaged when individuals imagine themselves in familiar contexts (or 
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retrieve personal memories; e.g., Szpunar et al., 2007), exhibit relatively little neural 
activity when participants generate personal future episodes occurring in unfamiliar 
contexts (Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott; 2009). These findings thus indicate that the 
familiarity of setting can modulates the characteristics of EFT and substantiate the 
prominent claim that past and future thoughts both involve the reinstatement of 
familiar context from memory (e.g., Schacter et al., 2008).  
 
In the present study we aimed at further investigatin  on the specific contribution 
that the temporality of imagined events (i.e. whether an imagined event is considered 
to occur in the future or it is timeless), the self-r evance of imagined events (i.e., 
whether imagined events involve ourselves of familiar others) and familiarity of 
settings (i.e. whether an imagined event occur in a familiar or in an unfamiliar 
setting) makes to EFT over and above scene construction. To this purpose we 
conducted 2 behavioural studies in which phenomenal as well as other characteristics 
of imagined events differing with respect to the temporality of imagined events, self-
relevance and familiarity of settings were analyzed. As stated earlier, although 
episodic future thoughts are, in theory, orthogonal to whether the setting is familiar 
or unfamiliar, empirical evidences indicate that individuals tend to imagine 
themselves in the context of familiar settings. Accordingly, we decided to consider 
the representations of autobiographical future events occurring in familiar settings as 
the index of EFT against which to compare the other experimental conditions 
included in our Experiments differing from the episodic future thoughts with respect 
to their temporality, self-relevance and familiarity of settings. 
 
6.2 Experiment 1 
 
In this Experiment, participants were asked (a) to imagine themselves carrying out an 
activity in the future in familiar settings (this condition corresponds to EFT), (b) to 
imagine themselves carrying out an activity in the future in unfamiliar settings, and 
(c) to imagine themselves carrying out an activity in familiar settings with no 
reference to any specific time. In this Experiment, self-relevance was maintained 
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constant. The comparison between the first two conditi s was thought to assess the 
role of familiarity of settings in EFT, whereas the comparison between the first and 
the third condition intended to assess the role of temporality of imagined events in 
EFT. On the basis of earlier findings (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) we expect the 
images of future events occurring in familiar settings to be more clearly represented 
than images of future events occurring in unfamiliar settings. Furthermore, to the 
extent that the temporality is a specific component of EFT over and above scene 
construction, as it is the case for episodic memory, imagined future autobiographical 
events should significantly differ (as having either igher or lower  subjective and 






Thirty young adults (18 females) from Suor Orsola Benincasa University participated 
in this experiment as volunteers. The average age and education were 31.34 (SD = 
4.61) and 17.13 (SD = 2.18) years, respectively. All participants had no history of 




A pilot study was conducted in order to select appro riate familiar and unfamiliar 
settings. A list with 40 familiar settings belongin to common everyday experiences 
(e.g., home, friend’s apartment, pub, shop) and 40 unfamiliar settings belonging to 
unlikely experienced events (e.g., jungle, North Pole, Great Wall of China) were 
presented to 40 young adults (mean age = 30.35; SD = 2.62), who did not participate 
in Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to rate each setting on a 5-point scale 
(1= not familiar at all; 5 = very familiar).  Then, 14 scenarios chosen by the 
participants as being highly familiar (Home, School, Lecture Hall, Beach, Kitchen, 
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Friends’ Home, Supermarket, Living Room, Restaurant, Cinema, Mall, Church, Pub, 
Relatives’ Home) and 14 chosen as being no familiar at all (Cuba, Thailand, Hawaii, 
Polynesia, Madagascar, Nile, Brazil, Savannah, Japan, Kenya, The Great Wall of 
China, North Pole, Mount Everest, South Pole) were s l cted for proper testing. The 
selected familiar and unfamiliar settings reported a mean score of 3.8 and 1.8, 





Participants imagined two future events occurring i familiar settings, two future 
events occurring in unfamiliar settings, and two a-temporal events occurring in 
familiar settings in response to short verbal cues. Precisely, participants were 
presented with 6 sheets of paper, each displaying the instruction to imagine an event 
occurring in a specific setting (familiar or unfamiliar). For future events, the 
instruction also indicated the time period (next year). An example of the three 
conditions included in this Experiment is as follows: (a) future familiar setting: 
“Imagine to walk in a sunny garden next year”; (b) future unfamiliar setting: 
“Imagine to walk in a tropical jungle next year”; (c) a-temporal familiar setting: 
“Imagine sitting in your preferred coffee shop”. Participants were instructed to 
imagine temporally and contextually specific events. Future  and a-temporal events 
had also to be plausible and novel, that is, not previously experienced by the 
participants. The experimenter further explained that e events had to be  imagined 
in as much detail as possible. The order of presentatio  of experimental conditions 
was fully counterbalanced across participants.  
 
Once an event had been imagined (there was no time limit for imagining an event), 
participants were asked to verbally describe the event (responses were recorded using 
a digital audio-recorder for later transcription). Then, participants rated on 7-point 
scales the characteristics of the mental representatio  they had just formed (Szpunar 
& McDermott, 2008). Specifically, each event was rated on three measures that were 
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summed to form a sensorial details index (visual details, sounds, smell/taste; 1 = 
none, 7 = a lot), three measures that were summed to form a clarity of context index 
(clarity of location, clarity of spatial arrangement of objects, clarity of spatial 
arrangement of people; 1 = vague, 7 = very clear), and an index of the subjective 
experience associated with the mental image (feeling of experiencing the event, 1 = 
none, 7 = a lot). Furthermore, participants also indicated the novelty of each 
imagined event by rating how often they experienced in the past the same or a very 
similar event (1 = never; 7 = very often). This question was aimed at assessing 
whether participants retrieved an event that had already taken place and adjusted it to 
fit in with the test requirements, rather than imagining truly novel scenarios (see 
Chapter 5).  
  
The quality of imagined events was estimated using the standardized scoring 
procedure developed by Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and Moscovitch (2002) in 
the Autobiographical Interview. More precisely, for each event produced by 
participants, the central event was first identified. Then, the transcription was 
segmented into (a) internal details, i.e. episodic informational bits indicating 
happenings, places, time, perceptual details, emotions/ houghts pertaining directly to 
the main event, and (b) external details, i.e., non-episodic informational bits that 
were not uniquely specific to the main memory event being described and not 
anchored to the time and place of the main event, such as general facts/knowledge 
related to the context of the event, details concerning unrelated events, and  
metacognitive statements. The detail subtypes within each category were summed to 
form, for each event, an internal and an external detail composite score, which were 
the primary measures of interest. The transcriptions were segmented into internal and 
external details by a single trained rater, who was blind to the hypotheses of the 
study. This rater scored events in a manner that was highly reliable with the ratings 
provided by the experimenter. The inter-rater reliability (r), calculated on a subset of 





6.2.1.4 Statistical analysis  
 
Mean rating on sensorial details, clarity of context and feeling of experiencing 
indexes, as well as the number of internal and external details were analysed by 
means of separate one-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with 
Type of Imagined Event (future familiar setting, future unfamiliar setting, a-temporal 
familiar setting) as the dependent variable. After each ANOVA planned comparison 
contrasted future events occurring in familiar setting to future events occurring in 
unfamiliar setting and to a-temporal events occurring in familiar setting in order to 
assess, respectively, the role of familiarity of settings and the role of temporality of 
imagined events in EFT. In order to correct for multiple comparisons, significance 
was set at α=0.02. With respect to the novelty of imagined events, both future events 
occurring in unfamiliar settings were rated as never occurred before. Therefore, only 
the ratings of frequency of occurrence for future and -temporal events occurring in 
familiar settings were analyzed by means of a t-test for related measures. 
 
6.2.2 Results  
 
6.2.2.1 Ratings for phenomenal characteristics  
 
The mean ratings on sensorial details, clarity of context, feeling of experiencing and 
novelty of imagined events indexes are presented in Table 6.1. With respect to the 
number of sensorial details, clarity of context and feeling of experiencing results 
showed main effects of Type of Imagined Event, Fs (2, 58) > 5.9, ps < .01, η
 ̂2 p  s > .17. 
Planned comparisons indicated that future events occurring in familiar settings were 
rated as containing more sensorial details, t (29) = 2.92, p < .01, η^ 2 = .23, as being 
more clearly represented, t (29) = 3.57, p < .01, η^ 2 = .16, and as being associated to a 
stronger feeling of experiencing t(29) = 3.01, p <.005, η^ 2 = .24 than future events 
occurring in unfamiliar settings. However, future events occurring in familiar 
settings were indistinguishable from a-temporal events occurring in familiar settings 
with respect to all these indexes (sensorial details, t (29) = 0.81;  clarity of context t 
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(29) = 1.06; feeling of experiencing, t (29) = 0.98). With respect to the novelty of 
imagined events, in the previous Chapter (5) it washypothesized that, to the extent 
that participants envision truly novel scenarios, the novelty of their representations 
should be rated as high, that is, envisaged events should be rated as never having 
happened before. As can be seen in Table 6.1, and not surprisingly, future events 
occurring in unfamiliar settings were rated as never occurred before. The rating of 
frequency of occurrence for future and a-temporal events occurring in familiar 
settings were generally very low and not significantly different from each other, t 
(29) = 1.0.  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
         Sensorial           Clarity of           Feeling of                 
           Detaila             Contexta         Experiencinga                Novelty 
_______________________________________________________________ 
FFS  5.5 (.23)            5.3 (.26)          5.6 (.32)                      2.0 (.28) 
FUS  3.8 (.27)              4.4 (.36)              4.5(.39)                      1.0 (.00) 
AFS  4.4 (.26)              5.1 (.30)              5.8(.28)                     1.6 (.20) 
 
Table 6.1 - Means (and standard errors) of ratings for phenomenal 
characteristics of imagined events in Experiment 1, for the FFS (Future 
Familiar Setting), FUS (Future Unfamiliar Setting) and AFS (A-Temporal 
Familiar Setting). Note: Novelty decreases proportionately as frequency of 
occurrence increases, i.e., the lower the rating, the higher the novelty. 
a Significant contrasts between future events occurring in familiar settings and  






6.2.2.2 Number of internal and external details  
 
The mean number of internal and external details is pre ented in Figure 6.1. With 
respect to internal details, results showed a margin lly significant effects of Type of 
Imagined Event, F (2, 58) = 2.7, p =.07, η ̂2 p   =  .10. Planned comparisons showed that 
future events occurring in familiar settings contaied more internal details than future 
events occurring in unfamiliar settings, t(29) = 2.8, p <.01, η^ 2 = .21, but that they 
were indistinguishable from a-temporal events occurring in familiar settings, t(29) = 
1.2. As regards external details, results showed a marginally significant effects of 
Type of Imagined Event, F (2, 58) = 2.9, p =.06, η ̂2 p   =  .10. Future events occurring in 
familiar and in unfamiliar settings did not differ from each other, t (29) = 1.14. 
However, future events occurring in familiar settings contained less external details 
than a-temporal events occurring in familiar settings, t (29) = 2.54, p < .01,  η^ 2 = .18. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Mean number of internal and external details for future events 
occurring in familiar and unfamiliar setting and a-temporal events produced in 




































The results of this Experiment indicate, in line with earlier findings (Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008), that imagined future events occurring in familiar settings were 
rated as being more vivid (as indicated by higher rating on sensorial detail and clarity 
of context indexes) and as being associated to a stronger feeling of experiencing than 
imagined future events occurring in unfamiliar setting. Imagined future events 
occurring in familiar settings also contained more int rnal details than future events 
occurring in unfamiliar setting. Furthermore, our results show that imagined future 
events occurring in familiar settings are completely indistinguishable, with respect to 
the rating on sensorial details, clarity of context and feeling of experiencing indexes, 
as well as the number of internal details, from a-temporal events occurring in 
familiar settings.  These findings are open to different interpretations. First, the lack 
of differences between future and a-temporal events may have arisen because 
participants’ future and a-temporal representations reproduced memories of events 
that had already taken place, rather than being true simulations of novel events. This 
may occasionally occur in experimental settings, as indicated in Chapter 5. However, 
the results concerning the novelty of imagined events i dicated that all participants 
constructed novel experiences. Second, one may hypot esize that participants 
envisaged future scenarios even when they were asked to imagine experiences that 
were not explicitly temporal in nature. To this resp ct, it is important to note that the 
short verbal sentences used to cue participants to imagine a-temporal events were 
equivalent to those used to cue future events with no temporal reference. It may, 
therefore, be the case that cueing a person to “imagine to sit in his/her preferred 
coffee shop” or “to imagine to walk in a big sunny garden next year” does not make 
any difference in terms of mental time travel in the future, i.e., the inclusion of a time 
period in the cue sentence does not seem crucial to trigger prospection. It may occur 
that, as far as a person is engaged in imagining doing something plausible in a 
familiar context, he/she spontaneously projects into his/her personal future.  
 
Interestingly, Moulton and Kosslyn (2009) recently argued that the primary function 
of all imagery, even of the most trivial form of imagery, i.e., object imagery, is to 
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allow us to predict the imminent or distant future. Alternatively, it may have 
occurred that, in the present Experiment, participants failed to project into the future 
even if they were deliberately instructed to do so. In order to assess whether future 
and a-temporal events imagined in the present Experiment were both characterized 
by self-projection in the future, we analyzed whether their descriptions differed  in 
terms of mean number of temporal statements (such as “I will be”, “I plan to” and 
“I’m going to” and presence of future tense; see Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 
2007 for a similar procedure). Results of a Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test indicated 
that the descriptions of future events contained significantly more temporal 
statements (M = 2.9, SD = 2.3) than the descriptions f a-temporal events (M  = 0.1; 
SD = 0.3),  T = 4.5, p < 0001. The implications of the results concerning the 
equivalence between future and a-temporal events will be considered in the General 
Discussion. 
 
6.3 Experiment 2 
 
In this Experiment, participants were asked (a) to imagine themselves carrying out an 
activity in the future (this condition corresponds, a  in Experiment 1, to EFT), (b) to 
imagine familiar others (i.e., self-irrelevant) carrying out an activity in the future, and 
(c) to imagine themselves carrying out an activity with no temporal reference. In this 
Experiment, the familiarity of settings was maintaied constant. The comparison 
between the first two conditions was thought to asses  the role of self-relevance in 
EFT, whereas the comparison between the first and the third condition was intended, 
as in Experiment 1, to assess the role of temporality of imagined events in EFT. 
When individual envision future autobiographical events they are, most likely, 
guided by self-referential processes strictly connected to the content of their memory 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Therefore, if self-relevance is a specific component of 
EFT over and above scene construction, and if EFT is based upon the contents of 
memory, as suggested by the  constructive episodic simulation theory (e.g., Schacter 
et al., 2008), then future autobiographical events should be expected to be more 
richly imagined (as indicated by higher subjective and objective details ratings) that 
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future events involving familiar others. As for the results concerning the comparison 
between  future and a-temporal events, our expectations are as indicated in 
Experiment 1: to the extent that the temporality is a specific components of EFT over 
and above scene construction, imagined future autobiographical events should 
clearly differ (as having either higher or lower  subjective and objective details 






Twenty-six young adults (17 females) from Suor Orsola Benincasa University 
participated in this experiment as volunteers. The av rage age and education were 
27.46 (SD = 5.05) and 16.46 (SD = 2.26) years, respectively. All participants had no 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
 
6.3.1.2 Materials   
 
A pilot study was conducted in order to select appro riate familiar individuals to cue 
participants to imagine self-irrelevant events. A list of 80 famous individuals from 
the current political national and international context and from the cultural Italian 
environment (literature, TV, cinema) were presented to 40 young adults (mean age = 
30.35; SD = 2.62), who did not participate in either Experiment 1 or 2. Participants 
were instructed to rate the popularity of each individual on a 5-point scale. Then, 8 
famous individuals chosen by the participants as being highly familiar (Silvio 
Berlusconi, Paolo Bonolis, Bill Clinton, Dario Fo, Madonna, Barack Obama, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Roberto Saviano) were selected for proper testing. The selected famous 
individuals reported a mean score of 3.8. The eight selected famous individuals were 
used equally often across participants. Note that in Experiment 2 participants were 
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cued to imagine events occurring in familiar settings. The familiar settings were the 




Participants imagined two future self-relevant events, two future self-irrelevant 
events, and two a-temporal self-relevant events in response to short verbal cues. 
Precisely, as in Experiment 1, participants were presented with six sheets of paper, 
each displaying the instruction to imagine an event (self-relevant or self-irrelevant) 
occurring in a specific setting. For future events the instruction also indicated the 
time period (next year). An example of the three conditions included in this 
Experiment is as follows: (a) future self-relevant: “Imagine to walk in a big, sunny 
garden next year”; (b) future self-irrelevant: “Imagine that Silvio Berlusconi will 
walk on the beach next year”; (c) a-temporal self-rlevant: “Imagine to lie on a 
sunny, crowded beach”. The rest of the procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as 
in Experiment 1. With respect to the number of inter al and external details, the 
inter-rater reliability (raters were the same as in Experiment 1), calculated on a 
subset of 30 randomly selected events, was .79 and .71 for internal and external 
details, respectively.  
 
6.3.1.4 Statistical analysis  
 
Mean rating on sensorial details, clarity of context and feeling of experiencing 
indexes, as well as the number of internal and external details were analysed as in 
Experiment 1. With respect to the novelty of imagined events, future events not 
relevant for the self were rated as never occurred before. Therefore, only the rating of 
frequency of occurrence for future and a-temporal self-relevant events were analyzed 
by means of a t-test for related measures. After each ANOVA, planned comparisons 
contrasted future self-relevant events to future self-irr levant events and future self-
relevant events to a-temporal self-relevant events in order to assess the role of self-
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relevance and of role of temporality of imagined events in EFT. In order to correct 
for multiple comparisons, significance was set at α=0.02.  
 
6.3.2 Results  
 
6.3.2.1 Ratings for phenomenal characteristics 
 
The mean rating on sensorial details, clarity of context, feeling of experiencing and 
novelty of imagined events indexes are presented in Table 6.2.  
 
Whit respect to the number of sensorial details and clarity of location, the effect of 
Type of Imagined Event was not significant, Fs (2,58) < 3.2, indicating that future 
self-relevant events were indistinguishable from both self-irrelevant future events, t 
(29) = 2.1, and self-relevant a-temporal events t (29) = 1.5. Concerning the 
subjective experience associated with imagining the ev nts, results showed a main 
effect of Type of Imagined Event, F (2,58) = 22.8, p <.0001, η ̂ 2 p   = .48. Planned 
comparisons showed that self-relevant future events were associated to stronger 
feelings of experiencing than self irrelevant future events, t (29) = 6.90, p < .0001,  η^ 
2
 = .69. Self-relevant future events were however indistinguishable from self-relevant 
a-temporal events t(29) = 1.53. With respect to the novelty of imagined events, as 
indicated in Table 6.2, future events not relevant for the self were rated as never 
occurred before. The rating of frequency of occurrence for self-relevant future and a-
temporal events were generally very low and not significantly different from each 










     Sensorial            Clarity of              Feeling of                 
        Detail               Context              Experiencinga           Novelty  
______________________________________________________________ 
FSR  4.9 (.23)              5.4 (.30)      6.0 (.21)                 1.6 (.2) 
FSI  4.3 (.26)              4.8 (.33)           3.0 (.42)                   1.0 (.00) 
ASR  4.6 (.21)              5.3 (.21)           5.3 (.20)                   2.1 (.30) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.2 - Means (and standard errors) of ratings for phenomenal 
characteristics of imagined events in Experiment 2, for FSR (Future Self-
Relevant), FSI (Future Self-Irrelevant) and ASR (A-Temporal Self-Relevant) 
events. Note: Novelty decreases proportionately as frequency of occurrence 
increases, i.e., the lower the rating, the higher the novelty. 
a Significant contrast between self-relevant future events and self irrelevant 
future events, p < 0.0001. 
 
6.3.2.2 Number of internal and external details 
 
The mean number of internal and external details is pre ented in Figure 6.2. With 
respect to internal details, results showed significant effects of Type of Imagined 
Event, F (2, 58) = 19.3, p <.0001, η ̂ 2 p  = .43. Self-relevant future events contained 
more internal details than self-irrelevant future ev nts, t (29) = 5.2, p < .0001,  η^ 2= .47. 
Self-relevant future events were however indistingushable from self-relevant a-
temporal events, t (29) = 1.35.  As external details is concerned, self-relevant future 
events, self-irrelevant future events and self-relevant a-temporal events did not 





Figure 6.2 - Mean number of internal and external details for self-relevant and 
self-irrelevant future events and a-temporal events  produced in Experiment 2. 




The results of Experiment 2 indicated that future self-relevant and self-irrelevant 
events were indistinguishable with respect to sensorial details and clarity of context 
indexes. This is not an unlikely result if we consider that the events contained in both 
mental images occurred in familiar settings. Participants may have therefore 
experienced equivalent feelings of contextual vividness when they were imagining 
themselves as well as when they were imagining famili r others doing something in a 
familiar context. Conversely, as it was likely to exp ct, self-relevant future events 
were associated to stronger feelings of experiencing than self-irrelevant future 
events. The number of internal details was also significantly larger for self-relevant 
than for self-irrelevant future events. The results of Experiment 2 replicated results of 
Experiment 1 indicating that imagined self-relevant future events and self-relevant a-
temporal events were completely indistinguishable with respect to the rating on 
sensorial details, clarity of context and feeling of experiencing indexes, as well as the 
number of internal details. Furthermore, as in Experim nt 1,  the descriptions of 

































than the descriptions of a-temporal events (M  = 0.05; SD = 0.2),  T = 2.0, p < 01. 
The implications of the results concerning the equivalence between future and a-
temporal events will be considered in the General Discussion. 
 
6.5 General discussion  
 
Episodic future thinking has always been conceptualised as the process that allows 
individuals to  imaginatively place themselves into specific settings that are temporal 
in nature. So far, however, only few studies have considered the specific contribution 
that self-projection in time and self-relevance provides to EFT. The main purpose of 
this study was, therefore, to assess whether EFT differs from imagined future events 
involving familiar others and from imagined a-temporal events. In addition, we 
assessed the role played by familiarity of settings in envisioning autobiographical 
future events by comparing autobiographical future ev nts supposed to occur in 
familiar settings to autobiographical future events supposed to occur in unfamiliar 
settings. As stated in the Introduction, familiarity of setting is not considered as a 
measure that discriminates between EFT and scene construction. In fact, the original 
definition of EFT refers to the ability of pre-experiencing a personal future event 
and, as such, it is orthogonal to whether the setting is familiar or unfamiliar. 
However, episodic future thoughts are typically characterized by familiar contextual 
information and some empirical evidence indicates that familiarity of setting is 
indeed an important modulator of the characteristics of EFT. 
 
With respect to familiarity of setting and self-relevance, the results of our 
Experiments are quite straightforward. The images of future events occurring in 
familiar settings are “richer” than the images of future events occurring in unfamiliar 
settings: they are perceived as more vivid  (as indicated by higher rating on sensorial 
detail and clarity of context indexes) and as being associated to a stronger feeling of 
experiencing (for similar results, see Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), and the verbal 
protocols provided by participants to describe them are richer of episodic details. 
Similarly, the images of future events involving ourselves are, overall, “richer” than 
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the images of future events involving familiar others: they are perceived as being 
associated to a stronger feeling of experiencing and the verbal protocols provided by 
participants to describe them are richer of episodic details. Two theories account for 
these results: the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007), which states that future events are generated by reassembling and flexibly 
recombining stored event details, and the reality monitoring theory (e.g., Johnson, 
Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), which posits that the mental images based on 
personal experience are more vivid that the mental im ges based on imagination.  It 
is, therefore, plausible that mental representations f future events created by 
sampling from past experiences are perceived as more vivid than mental 
representations of future events based on imaginatio .  
 
The comparison between future and a-temporal events r vealed however that future 
autobiographical events are completely indistinguishable from a-temporal 
autobiographical events with respect to the rating o  sensorial details, clarity of 
context and feeling of experiencing indexes, as well as the number of internal details. 
The possibility that participants reproduced memories of events that had already 
taken place rather than simulating novel events is not a factor of concern in the 
interpretation of this result. The results concerning the novelty of imagined events 
indicated that all participants indeed constructed novel experiences. One may 
therefore hypothesize that either participants envisaged future scenarios even when 
they were asked to imagine experiences that were not explicitly temporal in nature 
or, alternatively, they failed to project themselves into the future even if they were 
deliberately instructed to do so. However, these possibilities seem unlikely for two 
reasons. First, Experiment 1 and 2 involved different participants but nevertheless we 
obtained the same pattern of results in both Experiments. It is therefore unlikely that 
both groups of participants did not accomplish task requirements. Second, the 
descriptions of future events contained significantly more temporal statements than 
the descriptions of a-temporal events, suggesting that participants engaged in mental 




Thus, our results suggest, in accordance with Hassabis and Maguire’s (2007; 2009) 
opinion, that future and a-temporal events, as long as they are plausible (as in the 
present Experiments) are mentally represented in a similar way. There is indeed a 
need for future research to further analyze similarities and differences between 
episodic future thoughts and imagined events timeless in nature from different 
angles. For instance, it could be that the difference between these two kinds of events 
lies in the temporal progression of the activation of different kinds of knowledge 
structures (personal semantic information, general events, specific events) during the 
construction process (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). It may also be of indubitable 
relevance focusing, in future research, on assessing whether there is a neural 
differentiation between future and a-temporal episodic thoughts matched  for both 
subjective and objective details ratings. In a recent neuroimaging study (Nyberg et 
al., 2010), aiming at highlighting the neural correlat s of mental time travel into “non 
present” times (future and past), a set  of regions wa  found to be more active while 
envisioning the future  than while imagining a-temporal events, suggesting that these 
two types of mental representation are indeed distinguishable. In this study, however, 
participants were instructed to imagine doing a simple, discrete action, i.e., taking a 
short walk from point A to point B in a familiar setting, that likely lacked all those 
phenomenal, spatial and temporal details that charaterize more complex 




7. Episodic future thinking in amnesic mild 




As we have seen in the introduction, in recent years, n increasing number of 
cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies have suggested that 
remembering the past and imagining the future rely on common psychological and 
neural processes. For instance, it has been shown that the phenomenal characteristics 
associated with both projecting oneself into the past or into the future are influenced 
by similar factors, such as the temporal distance from the present (D’Argembeau & 
van der Linden, 2004; see also Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; D’Argembeau & van 
der Linden, 2006; Spreng & Levine, 2006). Recent neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated that remembering past events and imagining novel scenarios that might 
happen in the future rely on a common network of neural regions (e.g., Addis, Pan, 
Vu, Laiser &Schacter, 2009; Addis,Wong,& Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; 
Szpunar, Watson &McDermott, 2007). This common network of prefrontal, medial 
temporal lobe, and posterior regions, including the posterior cingulate and 
retrosplenial cortex, is remarkably similar to the network involved in the retrieval of 
episodic memories of past autobiographical events (e.g., Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; 
Maguire, 2001). Most recently, this network of regions has been suggested to belong 
to an anatomically defined brain system (default network) that is activated when 
individuals engage in internally focused tasks including autobiographical memory 
retrieval, envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). There is also evidence that amnesic patients 
highly impaired on retrieving past events may be also impaired in imagining future 
autobiographical events (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein & 
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Loftus, 2002; Tulving, 1985). In light of such findi gs, it has been proposed that the 
constructive nature of episodic memory allows one to draw on the past and to 
flexibly extract and recombine elements of previous experiences (Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007a). This conceptualization 
is often referred to as the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007).  
 
One key outstanding issue that still needs to be clarified concerns the precise 
relationship between future event simulation and episodic memory in patients 
suffering from episodic memory impairments. As mentioned above, in the 
neuropsychological literature, two amnesic patients suffering from total loss of 
episodic memory, K.C. (Tulving, 1985) and D.B. (Klein & Loftus, 2002), were 
described as being highly impaired on both retrieving past and imagining future 
autobiographical events. K.C. suffered from an extensive brain damage, affecting 
medial temporal, prefrontal and other brain regions, while little information was 
provided concerning the location of D.B.’s lesion. Most recently, Hassabis et al. 
(2007) have found that imagined experiences of five patients with amnesia deriving 
from bilateral hippocampal damage were deficient in spatial coherence, relative to 
controls, resulting in their constructions being fragmented and lacking in richness. In 
this study, however, participants were required to construct seven common place 
scenarios and only three episodic future events, hence leaving open the possibility 
that patients with hippocampal damage suffer from a ore general event simulation 
deficit in constructing novel scenes, irrespective of time period (Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2008). Therefore, these studies do not allow one to draw precise 
conclusions concerning the basis for the patients’ fu ure events simulation deficit and 
its relation to their episodic memory problems. The idea that thinking of the future is 
closely related to retrospective memory received strong support by recent evidence 
indicating that healthy older adults (Addis et al.,2008) and patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD; Addis, Sacchetti, Allyc, Budson, &Schacter, 2009) show impairments, 





As far as healthy aging is concerned, studies on autobiographical memory have 
demonstrated that, compared to young people, older a ults tend to recollect fewer 
details about happenings, locations, perceptions, and thoughts, whereas they produce 
an equivalent, or larger, number of semantic details that are not connected to any 
particular time or place (e.g., Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002; 
Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, & Eustache, 2002). These specific age related 
differences in the qualities of autobiographical recollections have been accounted for 
within recent models of autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway, 2001; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Such models distinguish betwe n the episodic component of 
autobiographical memory, providing lower level event specific sensory and 
perceptual episodic information, which is affected by healthy aging, from the 
semantic component of autobiographical memory, containing a more abstract 
autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual self, which is preserved in 
healthy aging. Recently, Addis et al. (2008) demonstrated that the age related 
reduction of episodic specificity, evident for past events, extends also to future 
events. In particular, when probed to generate autobiographical events from the past 
and the future, older adults produced fewer internal episodic details and more 
external non episodic details, as assessed by the scoring procedure of Levine et al.’s 
(2002) Autobiographical Interview. Furthermore, the number of internal event 
specific details and external semantic details were co related across past and future 
events, and the number of internal details for both past and future events correlated 
significantly with a measure of relational memory (paired associate learning) that is 
known to be dependent on the hippocampus (Giovanello, Schnyer, &Verfaellie, 
2004). This pattern of results suggests that both retrieving past and imagining future 
detailed autobiographical events rely on relational memory, i.e., the ability to 
recombine and integrate details from various episodic memories. The pattern of 
decreased internal and increased external details for past and future events likely 
reflects an increased reliance on external semantic de ails when people are unable to 
generate internal episodic details (Addis et al., 2008). 
With respect to AD, in addition to episodic memory problems, which are the 
hallmark and the earliest manifestation of this neurodegenerative disease, there are 
also major semantic memory dysfunctions (e.g., Chertkow & Bub, 1990; Hodges & 
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Patterson, 1995). This conjoined pattern of deficits, which is clearly detectable by 
traditional laboratory and neuropsychological tests, also affects the content of 
autobiographical memory. In general, there have been s veral studies, using a variety 
of methods, showing a deficit in the retrieval of autobiographical memories with a 
shallow temporal gradient indicating more successful retrieval of earlier memories 
(e.g., Hou, Bruce, Kramer, & Kramer, 2005; Ivanoiu, Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 
2006; Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; Nestor, Gaham, Bozeat, Simons, & 
Hodges, 2002; Piolino et al., 2002; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996). As far as the 
integrity of the episodic and semantic components of autobiographical memory is 
concerned, most studies documented some level of impair ent in one or both types 
of memory. However, results of recent studies that used different memory tests, such 
as the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire of Kopelman, Wilson, and Baddeley 
(1990) and the Autobiographical Interview of Levine et al. (2002), converged in 
showing severe deficits in AD patients in both the episodic and semantic component 
of autobiographical memory (e.g., Ivanoiu et al., 2006; Leyhe, Müllera, Miliana, 
Eschweiler, & Saura, 2009). In a very recent study, Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) 
tested the ability of AD patients and age matched controls to generate past and future 
autobiographical events. Results showed that AD patients exhibited deficits in both 
remembering past events and simulating future events, generating fewer internal and 
external episodic details (as estimated by the scoring procedure of the 
Autobiographical Interview) than healthy older contr ls. In line with the results of 
Addis et al. (2008), the internal and external detail scores were strongly correlated 
across past and future events. The authors attributed the semantic autobiographical 
deficit evident in AD (for both past and future events) to the progression of the 
atrophy of the hippocampus, beyond the medial temporal regions to larger portions 
of the neocortex supporting semantic memory (Leyhe et al., 2009). The results of 
Addis, Sacchetti, et al.’s (2009) study therefore suggest a close association between 
future thinking and retrospective memory. However, mild AD patients participating 
in this study may have been impaired on cognitive functions other than episodic 
memory that may have contributed – to some extent – to their future event simulation 
deficits. Neuropsychological testing indeed revealed some impairment in executive 
functioning (as assessed by the Trial Making Test Par B). The supposed symmetry 
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of past and future episodic deficits should be further investigated in populations 
affected by selective memory impairment.  
 
The aim of the current study is to assess the relation between past and future thinking 
in patients suffering from amnesic Mild Cognitive Impairment (aMCI). The term 
MCI has become widely used to describe a condition n old people whose memory 
and/or other cognitive abilities are below the normal level, but who do not meet the 
accepted criteria for dementia. Clinically, different subtypes of MCI have been 
recognized, with the amnesic subtype having an elevated risk of progressing to 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD; rate of conversion to AD is 10–15% per year; Gauthier et 
al., 2006; Petersen & Negash, 2008; Petersen et al., 2001). Amnesic MCI is 
characterized by a selective and isolated impairment of episodic memory, while the 
other cognitive functions and the ability to deal with daily living activities are 
relatively preserved. Patients with aMCI typically show atrophy of the hippocampus 
and other medial temporal lobe regions (e.g., Jack et al., 2000; Killiany et al., 2002). 
The isolated impairment of episodic memory, due to hippocampal malfunctioning, 
renders aMCI a clinical condition particularly suitable for a direct assessment of the 
relation between past and future thinking. If, as suggested by the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis, people use episodic memory to imagine future 
autobiographical events, and as aMCI is considered to be a transitional stage between 
healthy aging and AD, and given that both these extremes of the aging process show 
some form of impairment in autobiographical memory as well as episodic future 
thinking, aMCI patients should show an impairment in autobiographical memory and 
episodic future thinking somehow intermediate to that of normal aging and AD. In 
this respect, it is important to note that there is some evidence showing that 
autobiographical memory is indeed impaired in aMCI. For example, using the 
Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002), Murphy, Troyer, Levine, and 
Moscovitch (2008), found that, although aMCI and healthy controls generated 
protocols of similar length, the aMCI group produced f wer episodic, event specific 
details and an increased number of semantic details in their recollections, as 
compared to controls. This pattern of reduced episodic but elevated semantic 
autobiographical memory in aMCI as compared to healt y controls magnifies finding 
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with healthy older adults relative to younger adults for past events. 
 
The study described in the present Chapter, which for the first time assesses episodic 
future thinking in aMCI, will help track the course of the deficit in past and future 
thinking, thus providing potentially important information on the relation between 






Fourteen old adults affected by aMCI and 14 healthy controls participated in this 
experiment. 
 
The participants with aMCI were selected from a larger panel at the Laboratory of 
Neuropsychology of Aging of the Department of Geriatrics (ASL Napoli 1). The 
diagnosis of aMCI was reached according to the critria proposed by Petersen et al. 
(1999), including (a) exclusion criteria for dementia (DSMIV, APA, 1994); (b) 
memory complaints documented by the patient or by a collateral source; (c) a 
performance of at least 1.5 standard deviations below age and education matched 
controls on at least one of the measures assessing ep sodic memory included in the 
Mental Deterioration Battery (MDB – Carlesimo, Caltagirone, & Gainotti, 1996); (d) 
no evidence of significant deficits in other cognitive domains explored by means of 
the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein,&McHugh, 1975; 
Italian norms in Measso et al., 1993), the MDB (Carlesimo et al., 1996), and the 
Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB – Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000; 
Italian norms in Iavarone et al., 2004); (e) a score f at least 26 on the MMSE; (d) no 
evidence of difficulties in everyday activities; (f) no history of stroke or other 





Healthy older adults were members of different, non academic, local associations. 
Individuals assuming psychoactive pharmacological treatment able to alter normal 
memory skills, with a history of neurological and psychiatric disorders and the 
elderly with a score less than 26 on the MMSE were excluded from the study. 
 
There were no significant differences (all ps > 0.05) between aMCI and controls on 
demographic variables related to age (aMCI, M= 74.7, SD = 7.4; controls, M=  73.5, 
SD = 8.0), education (aMCI, M= 12.8, SD = 5.1; controls, M= 13.0, SD = 2.0), and 
on the MMSE scores (aMCI, M= 24.8, SD = 2.8; controls, M= 26.3, SD = 1.3). 
Elderly with aMCI and controls gave informed written consent prior to the 
commencement of the study and did not receive financial compensation for 
participation.  
 
The study procedure was approved by the local ethical committee and was performed 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
7.2.2 Materials and procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted in one single session. Participants mentally re-
experienced and pre-experienced four autobiographicl episodes (occurred or 
occurring within the past or next year) in response to eight cue words. More 
precisely, two sets of eight words, matched for famili rity, frequency, imageability, 
and concreteness, were selected from Italian norms (Burani, Barca, & Arduino, 
2001). Within each set, the words were randomly cycled through temporal direction 
(remember or imagine). Each participant was then assigned to one of these two lists 
of words. Half participants performed the past task first, followed by the future task, 
the other half received the opposite sequence. The experimental procedure was 
adapted from D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2004) and from Addis et al. (2008). 
Participants were encouraged to retrieve and imagine temporally and contextually 
specific events. Future events also had to be plausible, given the participant’s plans, 
and novel, that is, not previously experienced by the participant. Each cue word was 
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displayed on the computer screen together with taskin tructions concerning the 
temporal direction (remember or imagine) and the time period (last year or next 
year). Once an event had been retrieved or imagined (there was no time limit for 
retrieving or imagining an event), participants were given 60 s to retrieve or imagine 
as many details as possible. Participants then describ d their past and future 
representations (their responses were recorded using a digital audio recorder for later 
transcription) and rated each event, using a 7point scale (Szpunar & McDermott, 
2008), on (a) three measures that were summed to form a sensorial details index 
(visual details, sounds, smell/taste; 1 = none, 7 = a lot), (b) three measures that were 
summed to form a clarity of context index (clarity of location, clarity of spatial 
arrangement of objects, clarity of spatial arrangement of people; 1 = vague, 7 = 
clear), and (c) ameasure of the subjective experience associated with the mental 
image (feeling of experiencing the event, 1 = none, 7 = a lot). Furthermore, 
participants also indicated the novelty of each imagined event by rating how often 
they had experienced in the past the same or a very similar event (1 = never; 7 = very 
often). This question was aimed at ensuring that participants were imagining truly 
novel scenarios rather than retrieving an event that had already taken place and 
adjusting it to fit in with the test requirements (see Chapter 5). 
 
The qualities of the autobiographical recollections and simulations were estimated 
using the standardized scoring procedure developed by Levine et al. (2002). More 
precisely, for each past and future event produced by participants, the central event 
(the event discussed in most detail that occurred over a brief timeframe) was first 
identified. The central event was then segmented into details, i.e., unique 
occurrences, observations, or thoughts (that typically occur as grammatical clauses 
defined by a subject and predicate, such as “I dropped my sandwich”). Details were 
classified as internal or external, internal details being those that were specific to 
time and place, and considered to reflect episodic re-or pre-experiencing, and 
external details being those that pertained to extraneous information that was not 
uniquely specific to the main event being described an  not anchored to the time and 
place. Internal details were divided into further subcategories: (a) event (happenings, 
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people involved, actions, nature of the environment), (b) place (information about 
where the event occurred), (c) time (date, season, or time of day), (d) perceptual 
(sensory information) and (e) emotion/thought relating o the event. External details 
were also subcategorized: (a) event (specific details from other incidents, from all of 
the above categories, external to the main event recalled or imagined), (b) semantic 
(general knowledge or facts, ongoing events, extended states of being), (c) repetition 
(unsolicited repetition of details), and (d) other (meta-cognitive statements, 
editorializing). The transcriptions were segmented into internal and external details 
by a single trained rater, who was blind to the hypotheses of the study. It is relevant 
to note that this rater scored events in a manner that was highly reliable with the 
ratings provided by the experimenter. The inter rater reliability (r) was .82 and .88 




7.3.1  Design of the analyses 
 
Results concerning group differences in the phenomeal characteristics of past and 
future events will be reported first. Then, group differences in the qualities of the 
autobiographical recollections and simulations (i.e., in the number of internal and 
external details) will be examined. Finally, following Addis et al. (2008), the 
correlations between internal and external details of past and future events will be 
reported. 
 
7.3.2. Ratings of phenomenal characteristics 
 
Separate 2 (Group: aMCI vs. controls) × 2 (Temporal Direction: past vs. future) 
mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) were carried out for each phenomenal 
characteristic. The mean ratings are presented in Table 7.1. Results indicated that 
there were no group differences, F(1, 26) = 1.47, or differences between memories 
for past events and representations of future events, F(1, 26) = 0.14, in terms of 
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sensorial details. Analogously, the interaction betwe n Group and Temporal 
Direction was not significant, F(1, 26) = 0.37. As regards clarity of location, there 
were no group differences, F(1, 26) = 0.24. However, results indicated that memories 
for past events were more clearly represented than representations of future events, 
F(1, 26) = 5.13, p < 0.05. A significant Group × Temporal Direction interaction, F(1, 
26) = 4.59, p < 0.05, revealed that the difference between past and future events was 
evident only in the aMCI group.  
 
 Past events Future events 
C aMCI C aMCI 
Sensorial details 4.2 (1.1) 3.6 (1.3) 4.0 (1.3) 3.6 (1.0) 
Clarity of location 5.1 (1.0) 5.7 (0.6) 5.1 (0.9) 4.8 (0.9) 
Feeling of experiencing 6.2 (0.9) 5.1 (1.6) 6.0 (0.9) 4.4 (1.7) 
Frequency of occurrence 
(novelty) 
- - 1.6 (0.9) 4.2 (1.5) 
 
Table 7.1 - Mean ratings (and standard deviations) as a function of event type 
(past, future) and group (aMCI, control). Note: Novelty decreases 
proportionately as frequency of occurrence increases, i.e., the lower the rating, 
the higher the novelty. 
 
Concerning the subjective experience associated with the mental image, the control 
group showed stronger feelings of experiencing the ev nts, F(1, 26) = 12.91, p < 
0.001, than aMCI patients. The main effect of Temporal Direction, F(1, 26) = 2.05, 
and the interaction between Group × Temporal Direction, F(1, 26) = 0.72, were not 
significant. 
 
With respect to the novelty of future representations, in Chapter 5 we hypothesized 
that, to the extent that participants envisage truly novel scenarios, the novelty of their 
representations should be rated as high, that is, envisaged future events should be 
rated as never having happened before. However, an inspection of the frequency 
distribution of ratings (Table 7.2) suggests that tis was the case only for the control 
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group in this study. In fact, less than 30% of future events produced by aMCI 
patients were rated as novel. In contrast, the control group rated 66% of future events 
as novel. Group differences in the mean rating of frequency of occurrence were 
indeed significant, t(26) =−5.48, p < 0.0001.  
 
Ratings aMCI C 
1 28.6 66.1 
2 1.8 26.8 
3 3.6 0.0 
4 12.5 0.0 
5 17.9 5.4 
6 12.5 0.0 
7 23.2 1.8 
 
Table 7.2 - Frequency distribution of ratings concerning the novelty of future 
scenarios in aMCI patients and controls. Note: The numbers indicate the 
percentage of events that received ratings from 1 to 7 (out of 56 near events and 
56 distant events). 
 
7.3.3 Number of internal and external details 
 
A 2 (Group: aMCI vs. controls) × 2 (Details: internal vs. external) × 2 (Temporal 
Direction: past vs. future) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Group as a 
between subjects factor, and Details and Temporal Direction as within subjects 
factors, was conducted on the mean number of details produced by aMCI and 









Figure 7.1 - Mean number of internal and external details per event generated 
for past and future events by aMCI patients and controls. Error bars are 
standard errors of the  mean. 
 
 
Results showed that, overall, aMCI patients (M= 5.33; SD = 3.06) and controls (M= 
5.36; SD = 3.31) produced an equivalent number of details, F(1, 26) = 0.005, 
indicating that both groups produced protocols of similar length. Given that group 
differences in general conversational style may affect the interpretation of the results, 
we further analyzed whether there were group differences in the mean number of 
words used to describe past and future events. Results of a 2 (Group: aMCI vs. 
controls) × 2 (Temporal Direction: past vs. future) mixed ANOVA showed that there 
were no differences between groups Fs(1, 26) < 0.76. The mean numbers of words 
used by controls to describe past and future events were 105.23 (SD = 40.65) and 
103.89 (SD = 34.55) respectively; the mean numbers of words used by aMCI 
patients to describe past and future events were 90.55 (SD = 36.64) and 96.03 (SD = 
51.36) respectively. A total of 12 controls and 11 aMCI patients participat ng in the 
present study were tested with a scene description task. The output of this verbal 
description task could be used to further analyse group differences in conversational 
style. The results show that the number of utterances did not differ significantly 
between the two groups: aMCI patients (M= 47.10; SD = 22.59), controls (M= 64.25; 
SD = 27.02), t(21) = 1.68.  
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The main effect of Details, F(1, 26) = 5.11, p < 0.05, was significant, indicating that, 
overall, participants produced more internal (M= 5.89; SD = 3.15) than external 
details (M= 4.75; SD = 3.12). The interaction between Group and Details, F(1, 26) = 
35.72, p < 0.0001, and between Group and Direction, F(1, 26) = 7.10, p < 0.01 were 
significant. These interactions showed, respectively, that controls produced more 
internal details (M= 7.42;SD = 1.98) than aMCI patients (M= 4.42;SD = 1.87), t(27) 
= 4.11, p < 0.0001, whereas aMCI patients produced more external details (M= 6.31; 
SD = 2.26) than controls (M= 3.23; SD = 1.36), t(27) =−4.37, p < 0.0001, and that 
controls produced more details for past (M= 6.14; SD = 1.80) than for future events 
(M= 4.53; SD = 1.38), t(13) = 3.38, p < 0.005, whereas aMCI patients produced an 
equivalent number of details for past (M= 5.50; SD = 1.85) and for future events (M= 
5.58; SD = 1.60), t(13) =−0.67. The interaction between Details and Temporal 
Direction was also significant, F(1, 26) = 72.71, p < 0.0001, indicating that more 
internal details were produced for past (M= 7.48; SD = 3.0) than for future events 
(M= 4.35; SD = 2.5), t(27) = 6.50, p < .0001, whereas more external details were 
produced for future (M= 5.71; SD = 3.7) than for past events (M= 3.88; SD = 2.0), 
t(27) =−2.77, p < 0.01. Finally, the Group × Details × Temporal Direction interaction 
was also significant, F(1, 26) = 28.13, p < 0.0001. In order to better describe this 
three-way interaction, we conducted two separate follow-up Group × Temporal 
Direction ANOVAs for internal and external details. The results of the ANOVA on 
internal details showed main effects of both Group and of Temporal Direction, Fs(1, 
26) > 16.83, ps < 0.0001, indicating that aMCI patients produced lss internal details 
as compared to controls and that, overall, more intrnal details were produced for 
past than for future events. The difference between th  number of internal details for 
past and future events was equivalent in the two groups of participants, as indicated 
by a non significant Group × Temporal Direction Interaction (see Fig. 7.1). The 
results of the ANOVA on external details showed a min effect of Group and of 
Temporal Direction, Fs(1,26) > 15.57, ps < 0.0001, indicating that aMCI patients 
produced more external details as compared to controls, and that, overall, more 
external details were produced for future than for past events. However, a significant 
Group × Temporal Direction interaction, F(1, 26) = 28.82, p < 0.0001, revealed that 
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the difference between the number of external details for past and future events was 




We computed correlations between internal and external details for past and future 
events across all participants. In line with results reported by Addis et al. (2008), we 
found a significant correlation between past and future internal details (r = .58, p < 
0.001) and a marginally significant correlation betw en past and future external 
details (r = 0.35, p = 0.06). These positive correlations have been accounted for as 
evidence of the striking overlap between the specificity of past and future events 
(Addis et al., 2008). However, we also found a significant negative correlation 
between future internal and external details (r =−.55, p < .01). It is important to note 
that recently Addis, Sacchetti et al. (2009) found a negative correlation between 
future internal and external details, computed using data from healthy old adults and 
AD patients, that approached significance when few covariates (MMSE, phonemic 
and semantic fluency) were controlled for. The authors suggested that their finding 
might indicate that, when controlling for cognitive decline and fluency abilities, 
those subjects who generate more external details also generate fewer internal 
details. In the present study, there were no significant differences between aMCI and 
controls on the MMSE scores. In addition, performance of all aMCI patients in the 
phonemic fluency task (Carlesimo et al., 1995) was ithin the normal range for age 
and education (range = 17–45; M= 28.1; SD = 6.8; data on controls were not 
available). 
 
It seems, therefore, plausible to conclude that, in ge eral, the pattern of decreased 
internal and increased external details for past and future events, commonly observed 
across the aging process, likely reflects an increased reliance on external semantic 
details when unable to generate internal episodic details, as originally suggested by 







In this chapter episodic future thinking in aMCI patients is assessed for the first time. 
 
Results revealed that aMCI patients produced fewer episodic, event specific details, 
and an increased number of semantic details in their recollections and simulation of 
past and future as compared to controls. Furthermore, both groups produced more 
internal details for past than for future events, whereas the number of external details 
was higher for future than past events only for aMCI patients. 
 
Differences between controls and aMCI patients in ge eral conversational style were 
not a factor of concern in the interpretation of these results. In fact, when describing 
past and future events, aMCI patients and controls produced, overall, an equivalent 
number of details and used an equivalent mean number of words. 
 
These novel results fill the gap in the current litera ure concerning the ability to 
simulate future events in patients with episodic memory impairments. On the one 
hand, it is well known that healthy older adults produce fewer episodic and more 
semantic details, as compared to younger adults, for both past (Addis et al., 2008; 
Levine et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2002) and future (Addis et al., 2008) events. On the 
other hand, it has been recently shown that AD patients produce fewer internal and 
external details as compared to healthy older adults for both past (Addis, Sacchetti,  
et al., 2009; Ivanoiu, Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 2006; Leyhe et al., 2009) and 
future (Addis, Sacchetti, et al., 2009) events. Furthermore, there is evidence of 
reduced episodic specificity in autobiographical memory in aMCI patients (Murphy 
et al., 2008). 
 
Recently, Addis, Sacchetti et al. (2009) acknowledged that “while amnesic MCI 
patients exhibit significant declines in memory for internal episodic details, as do AD 
patients, it appears they can still rely on strategies also used by older adults when 
describing past and future events” (p. 2668). The results of the present study extend 
the impaired episodic spared semantic trend to simulating future events in aMCI, 
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placing the performance of aMCI patients at an intermediate position between that of 
healthy elderly and AD patients. We suggest, in line with Addis et al. (2009), that the 
three stages – from healthy aging, through aMCI, to AD – of the impairments 
affecting past and future thinking may reasonably reflect the progress of the 
neuropathological changes associated with these conditions, i.e., from initial 
functional and structural changes that affect the medial temporal area in normal 
aging (Driscoll et al., 2003), encompassing the hippocampus and surrounding 
cortical regions, to a more severe, though selectiv, impairment of the hippocampus 
and other medial temporal lobe regions in aMCI (e.g., Jack et al., 2000; Killiany et 
al., 2002), to a more extensive atrophy beyond the medial temporal regions to larger 
portions of the neocortex (supporting semantic memory) in AD (Leyhe et al., 2009). 
 
Therefore, the results of the present study, in conjunction with the findings of Addis 
et al. (2008), Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) and of Murphy et al. (2008), provide 
evidence for the close linkage between remembering the past and imagining future.  
 
There are, however, some relevant issues that need to be considered. 
 
One issue pertains to the status of the semantic component of autobiographical 
memory in aMCI. In line with results of Murphy et al. (2008), we found a pattern of 
reduced episodic but elevated semantic autobiographic l memory in aMCI, as 
compared to controls. 
 
However, it is important to note that, in a recent study, Leyhe et al. (2009) detected 
an impairment in both the semantic and the episodic components of autobiographical 
memory in aMCI patients. 
 
These different results may be due to differences in the experimental task used to 
assess autobiographical memory. Like Murphy et al. (2008), we used the 
Autobiographical Interview by Levine et al. (2002), which extracts indices of 
semantic and episodic autobiographical information fr m within a single narrative. In 
contrast, Leyhe et al. (2009) used the Autobiographical Memory Interview by 
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Kopelman, Wilson, and Baddeley (1990), which probes episodic and semantic 
memory separately, through the recall of specific past events and names, and 
addresses, respectively, across the lifespan. 
 
It has been argued that these separate measures artificially divide these two forms of 
autobiographical memory, which co-occur and interact in naturalistic 
autobiographical discourse, assessing them with tasks unmatched in sensitivity, 
content, and psychometric characteristics (Murphy et al., 2008).  
 
A further relevant issue pertains to our findings concerning the novelty of imagined 
future events. In the present study, almost all aMCI participants rated their imagined 
future events as already occurred, more or less frequently, in the past. In contrast, 
only a small percentage of events produced by controls were rated as already 
occurred in the past. It is relevant to note that, in Chapter 5 we stated that self-
projection into the future may appear much more difficult than remembering the past 
and may consequently lead the participant to rely, more or less deliberately, on some 
alternative strategies. In line with this hypothesis, we showed that, occasionally, 
people do indeed reproduce events that have already occurred in the past or that are 
very similar to past events, rather than envisioning truly novel events. 
 
Given that, in the present study, aMCI patients tended, more than controls, to 
produce future events that were rather similar to past events, it could be posited that 
they had difficulty constructing scenarios that had never happened and therefore fell 
back (partially) on old episodic memories. If this were the case, this finding would 
cast some doubt on the accrued wisdom that future thinking and remembering 
involve primarily similar processes. One could argue, at least on the basis of this 
observation, that future thinking involves additional cognitive processes which are 
impaired in aMCI. This hypothesis is indirectly supported by results of neuroimaging 
studies. Recently, Addis, Pan, et al. (2009) identifi d, in healthy young adults, two 
subsystems within the network involved in remembering and imagining events, the 
imagining subsystem and the remembering subsystem, consisting, respectively, of 
neural regions that responded more strongly to imaginin  than remembering, and of 
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regions showing the reverse pattern. The authors suggested that the imagining 
subsystem may reflect the increased cognitive demands related to recombining 
episodic details into an imaginary scenario, as opposed to the recasting of an entire 
past event. Future research should therefore focus n identifying the neural correlates 
of remembering and imagining in aMCI patients, as well as in other pathological 
conditions. 
 
This approach, associated with the analyses of subjective and objective detail ratings 
(i.e., according to Levine et al.’s procedure) may significantly improve our 
understanding of patients’ ability to simulate future events. 
 
Finally, another result that is worthy of notice in the present chapter is the number of 
internal and external details produced by controls and aMCI patients. Healthy older 
adults and aMCI patients who participated in earlier studies produced a mean number 
of internal and external details larger than controls and aMCI patients in the present 
study. In Levine et al. (2002), in Murphy et al. (2008), in Addis et al. (2008) and in 
Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) the mean numbers of internal and external details 
produced by older adults during recall of events of the previous year were 
(appreciatively) 19 and 26, 22 and 14, 35 and 28, and 50 and 40. The numbers of 
internal and external details produced by older adults during imagination of future 
events were 27 and 28 in Addis et al. (2008), and 35 and 48 in Addis, Sacchetti, et al. 
(2009). For aMCI patients, in Murphy et al. (2008) the mean numbers of internal and 
external details produced during recall of events of the previous year were 
(appreciatively) 13 and 15.  
 
The differences in the number of details seem not to be related to differences in the 
participants’ selection criteria, as the groups of aMCI patients and controls were 
almost equivalent across the studies with respect to mean age and education. 
 
Therefore, it appears more reasonable that these divergent findings are associated 
with factors inherent to the specific task used in the different studies. For instance, in 
Levine et al. (2002) and in Murphy et al. (2008) participants were asked to choose, in 
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the context of the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002), a personal past 
memory event that happened at a specific time and place for specific life periods. 
These events were presumably the most accessible and, therefore, the most likely to 
yield detailed recollections. On the other hand, in the studies by Addis et al. (2008), 
Addis, Pan, et al. (2009) and Addis, Sacchetti et al. (2009) participants were cued to 
recollect past events (and to simulate future events) by means of single words. This 
procedure is unquestionably more demanding than freely recollecting past 
experiences. However, these authors also used general probes to clarify instructions 
and encouraged further description of details. In the study by Murphy et al. (2008) 
general probes were also given to encourage recall of detailed information, 
particularly if the participant had trouble coming up with a specific detailed memory 
or provided a very brief recollection. 
 
In the present study, a relevant aspect of the procedure was that participants were 
cued to recollect and simulate past and future events by means of single words and 
no general probe was provided. 
 
Apparently, the procedure of the present study provides the participants with the 
lowest support for recollection and simulation of events, and may thus be responsible 
for the overall lower number of details produced by controls and aMCI. 
 
Overall, the analysis of extant results in the litera ure reveals that research in this area 
is still in its infancy and needs to be further informed in the future by advances in 
understanding of both the quantitative and qualitative differences in the ability of 




8. Future thinking in Parkinson’s Disease: 




It has long been posited that an intimate relation underpins episodic past and future 
thoughts: “It may be said that we have no grasp of the future without an equal and 
corresponding outlook over the past” (Bergson, 1913, p. 69-70). Bartlett (1932) 
noticed that remembering is not entirely distinct from imagining or from constructive 
thinking, but it has a close linkage with them. In 1973 it was already “abundantly 
clear that human behaviour is active in character, that it is determined not only by 
past experiences, but also by plans and designs formulating the future” (Luria, 1973, 
p. 13). Therefore, when people with memory disorders cannot completely rely on 
their past, their future remains “hazier, more vague and more confused” (Lidz, 1942, 
p. 596).  
 
Consistent with these early intuitions, the presence of a common core network, 
which underlies autobiographical episodic remembering and future thinking, has 
been recently experimentally supported (for a review see Schacter et al., 2008; 
Szpunar, 2010). Certain cortical areas (specifically the medial prefrontal cortex, 
posterior regions in medial and lateral parietal cortex, lateral temporal cortex, and the 
medial temporal lobe including the hippocampus) have been shown to be associated 
with episodic memory and imagination of the future (e.g., Hassabis et al., 2007; 
Schacter et al., 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009). This evidence has led to the claim 
that we need to access past experiences in order to anticipate future events (Szpunar, 
2010; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
 
                                                
7 de Vito S, Gamboz N, Brandimonte MA, Barone P, Amboni M, and Della Sala S. Future 
thinking in Parkinson’s Disease: an executive function? Neuropsychologia, in press. 
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Patient studies corroborated this hypothesis. It has been noted, for example, that 
amnesic patients (O.S., Lidz, 1942; K.C., Tulving, 1985; D.B., Klein et al., 2002), 
seemed almost mentally locked in a permanent present, ince the preceding events 
were “not available to meet the new” ones (Lidz, 1942, p. 595). The famous patient 
H.M., who became amnesic in 1953 after the bilateral resection of medial temporal 
lobe structures, was interviewed in 1992 by Suzanne Corkin. When asked "What do 
you think you’ll do tomorrow?", he answered "Whatever is beneficial", since he “had 
no database to consult” to respond about his personal future (S. Corkin, personal 
communication, 01/26/11). 
 
Similarly, Hassabis et al. (2007) reported on five m mory-impaired patients with a 
bilateral hippocampus damage, four of whom had difficulty constructing detailed and 
spatially coherent fictitious scenarios. Lastly, patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD; 
Addis et al., 2009) presented impairments in envisaging new experiences. 
 
However, it is as yet unclear which specific cognitive deficits play a fundamental 
role in determining these observed impairments. In particular, it is still debated 
whether episodic memory deficits are indeed the solrelevant factor in determining 
difficulties in imaging own future and whether the ippocampus plays the crucial 
role in the construction of future scenes (Squire et al., 2010). The findings gleaned 
from the literature are controversial. Hassabis et al. (2007) reported that focal 
amnesics had troubles in constructing novel events. Likewise, patients suffering from 
amnestic MCI, a subtype of Mild Cognitive Impairment characterized by a selective 
and isolated deficit of episodic memory (presumably due to hippocampal 
malfunctioning), generated fewer details in a future thinking task than their matched 
controls (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, Squire et al. (2010) obtained different 
results with patients suffering from a well-characterized hippocampal lesion. Despite 
their impairment in recollecting recent personal memories, these patients performed 
similarly to controls when simulating future episodes. The authors concluded that, in 
view of these findings, difficulty in imaging the future is unlikely to be due only to 
pure amnesia if the past-future network of brain areas postulated by Schacter et al. 
(2007) is largely spared (Squire et al., 2010). 
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Indeed, little information regarding the lesion location of some amnesic patients, like 
O.S. and D.B., is provided, and when it is, like in the case of K.C., it indicates 
widespread damage. Even the patients tested by Hassabis et al. (2007) apparently 
suffered from lesions encroaching upon areas other t an the hippocampus (for a 
discussion, see Squire et al., 2010 and ensuing correspondence, Maguire & Hassabis, 
2011; Squire et al., 2011), including areas associated with executive functions (e.g., 
Samarasekera et al., 2007). Equally, AD patients, who show a widespread range of 
neuropathological changes, suffer from dysfunctions involving brain areas other than 
hippocampus. 
 
Moreover, neuroimaging studies have indicated a frontopolar activation during future 
thoughts. Future thinking tasks recruit several additional regions compared to the 
construction of past episodes, such as frontopolar cortex and left ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Addis et al., 2007). Okuda et al. (2003) demonstrated that specific 
frontal polar areas, including Brodmann area 10 (BA10), were more activated when 
imaging the future than when remembering the past. In particular, the activity of the 
right frontopolar cortex (BA 10) positively correlates with the amount of details 
comprising the future events (Addis & Schacter, 2008). Furthermore, damage to the 
prefrontal cortex can impair the conscious awareness of one’s self continued 
experience in a subjective time. This ability, also known as chronestesia, might be 
closely related to the capacity of projecting themslves toward the future (for a 
review see Wheeler et al., 1997; Szpunar, 2011).  
 
Thus, Squire and his colleagues (2010) proposed that different cognitive processes 
unrelated to episodic memory play a crucial role in imagination of the future. 
Specifically, other functions aside from episodic memory itself are likely to underlie 
the episodic future details generation.  
 
According to this idea, some authors noted strong correlations between event-related 
details generation tasks and tasks engaging executiv  functions. Addis, Wong and 
Schacter (2008) observed that the episodic specificity of past recollections and future 
constructions correlates with a standardized measur of executive control, the 
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Backward Digit Span task, known to activate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Hoshi et al., 2000). To test this hypothesis, Addis and colleagues (2010) adopted a 
novel experimental recombination paradigm, which required healthy older and 
younger adults to recombine details when simulating a  event that might occur in 
their future or that might have happened in their past. Interestingly, the authors 
documented that the age-related difficulty in producing episodic details, already 
shown by Addis et al. (2008), extended to a condition nvolving solely the 
recombination of different details into an integrate episode. A new task was also 
designed by Summerfield, Hassabis and Maguire (2010), in order to better 
investigate the process of constructing coherent and vivid scenarios. The participants 
of this study were instructed to begin the trial clearing their imagination. Then, they 
were auditorily presented with single scene elements (from three to six) in a serial 
manner. They had to imagine the first element in a “clean state” (i.e., with no 
context) and, successively, they had to combine each single element together with 
the previous ones to build up naturalistic scenes of increasing complexity. In this 
study, fMRI showed the activation of the different areas of the core network 
(Schacter et al., 2007), being engaged and disengagd, s required during each step. 
The hippocampus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were both significantly 
activated during the oral presentation of the first element. The addition of the second 
element required an increasing activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (maybe 
to allow the maintenance of the two elements in working memory, as the authors 
suggested). However, crucially, in this phase, the hippocampus (together with other 
areas of the core network activated during the first step) down-regulated. With the 
introduction of the third element, the authors observed a greater activity in additional 
regions (i.e., the medial parietal cortex) and once more an up-regulation of many 
areas, like the hippocampus, activated during the first phase, but down-regulated in 
the second phase. Such observations provide us with clues as to the possible 
alternative role played in the scene construction by hippocampus-related memory 
functions and by frontally based executive functions.  
 
Taken together, these lines of evidence suggest that executive functioning plays an 
essential part in the production and recombination of event-related details. Should 
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this be the case, an executive dysfunction ought to cause a significant impairment in 
the episodic simulation of future events, even when episodic memory is spared.  
 
We sought to further our understanding of this issue by testing people with 
Parkinson’s disease (PD). PD is a neurodegenerative disorder that progresses slowly 
and is characterized by degeneration of the dopaminergic system. The main motor 
symptoms are bradykinesia (i.e., slowness when initiating voluntary movements), 
tremor, muscular rigidity and postural instability. A wide range of cognitive 
impairments is often associated with PD, the most prominent of which is a 
dysexecutive syndrome, that resembles the typology of cognitive impairment found 
in frontal lobe patients (Bosboom et al., 2004; Rowe, 2002). The choice of this 
particular population, early non amnesic PD, was directly linked to the question 
posed in our study, i.e. whether people with no overt memory problems, and who 
might have other mild cognitive deficits, could nonetheless present with FT deficits. 
 
The present study assesses for the first time episodic future thinking in PD patients. It 
aims at casting a light on the alternative role played by executive functions in 






Thirty-one old adults affected by PD and 31 healthy controls took part in this 
experiment. 
 
The participants with PD were selected from a larger panel at the Parkinson and 
Movement Disorder Centre, Department of Neurological Sciences (Federico II 
University, Naples). The diagnosis of PD fulfilled the UK Parkinson’s disease 
Society Brain Bank clinical diagnostic criteria (Gibb & Lees, 1988).  All patients 
were under anti-parkinsonian treatment at a stable nd optimized daily dosage during 
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the 4 weeks prior to study entry. Twenty of our PD patients were under a treatment 
comprising both levodopa (Mmg = 477,5; SDmg = 260,3) and other dopamine-agonists 
(Mmg = 297,5; SDmg = 212,42); 6 of them were taking only dopamine-agonists (Mmg 
= 321,66; SDmg = 63,37) and 5 of them were being treated only with  levodopa (Mmg 
= 460; SDmg = 178,18).  
 
Exclusion criteria were: (1) dementia according to clinical diagnostic criteria for 
dementia associated with PD (Emre et al., 2007); (2) major depression according 
DSM-IV criteria for current major depression (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994); (3) clinically significant or unstable medical condition including serious 
cardiovascular or cerebrovascular disease; and (4) anti-cholinergic or neuroleptic 
treatment. 
 
Our patients were selected for being at the very ealy stages of the disease. Their  
magnetic resonance imaging had to be normal. According to Hohen and Yahr’ s 
classification (1967), our PD patients were to be maxi um at the second stage of the 
Parkinson’s disease. More specifically, 16 of them were at the stage 2; 11 of them 
were at the stage 1,5 and 4 of them were at the stag  1.  
 
Furthermore, specific tests were selected from the Mental Deterioration Battery 
(MDB; Carlesimo et al., 1996) in order to recruit solely people with (a) no deficit in 
immediate and delayed recall test (Rey’s 15 word Immediate Recall and Delayed 
Recall; scores, respectively, above 28.53 and 4.69); (b) spared logical reasoning 
(Raven’s Progressive Matrices’47; scores above 18.96); and (c) a fluent language 
(Phonological Verbal Fluency; scores above 17.35). Moreover, the participants 
should have a score of at least 30, i.e., above cut-off, on the Attentional Matrices, 
which assesses attention by means of timed visual search (Della Sala et al., 1992).  
 
There were no significant differences (all ps > 0.05) between PD patients and controls 
on demographic variables such as age (PD, M = 64.4, SD = 6.7; controls, M = 67.9, 
SD = 8.5) and education (PD, M = 11.0, SD = 4.3; controls, M = 11.5, SD = 4.2), or 




The healthy individuals were members of different, non-academic, local associations. 
We did not recruit people under psychoactive pharmacological treatment likely to 
modify normal memory abilities or people with a history of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders.  
 
No honorarium was offered to participants. Before starting the testing session, they 
were asked to sign an informed written consent.  
 
The study procedures were approved by the local ethical committee and were carried 
out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
8.2.2 Materials and experimental procedure 
 
Each testing was carried out in one single session. All participants were tested 
individually and sat facing the same experimenter in a quiet testing environment.  
 
The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB; Dubois et al., 2000) was also administered, 
with the aim of exploring, by the means of six subtests, some skills related to frontal 
lobe functions, in particular conceptualization, mental flexibility, and inhibitory 
control. It should be noted that since the PD patients recruited for the study did not 
present with deficits in verbal fluency, visual search or logical reasoning known to be 
associated with frontal activation (Prabhakaran et al., 1997), the FAB battery was 
meant to identify minor executive disturbances, and we did not expect a large 
subgroup being impaired.  
 
Finally, participants were given the experimental bttery. They were initially briefed 
that they would be required to mentally re-experience and pre-experience twelve 
autobiographical episodes (eight “temporal”, i.e., occurred or occurring within the 
past or next year; four “non temporal”, i.e., that no necessarily are going to occur) in 
response to randomly presented cue words (for the “temporal” events) or short verbal 




Aiming at eliciting the “temporal” (past or future) vents, two sets of eight words, 
matched for familiarity, frequency, imageability, and concreteness, were selected 
from Italian norms (Burani et al., 2001). Within each list, the words were randomly 
assigned to the two temporal directions. Then, each participant was given one of 
these two sets. The experimenter further explained that the events had to be 
remembered or imagined in as much detail as possible. Participants also were 
encouraged to produce temporally and contextually specific events and to vividly 
imagine novel and plausible future episodes, given their current plans. This 
procedure followed those of D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2004) and of Addis 
et al. (2008).  
 
In order to elicit the “non temporal” events, we used ten short sentences, which 
outlined a variety of common-place scenarios (e.g., “Imagine you are standing in a 
open field by the banks of river” or “Imagine you are standing on the deck of a ship 
leaving port on a voyage”). The short descriptions were randomly assigned across 
the participants. Participants were instructed to richly invent new fictitious 
experiences, never occurred before, and not temporal in nature and to describe them 
in as many details as possible. The events had to be contextually specific, but not 
necessarily plausible, neither even possible. The procedure and the short verbal cues 
were adapted from the paradigm devised by Hassabis et al. (2007). 
 
Order of presentation of temporal connotation (past, future, non temporal) was 
counterbalanced. 
 
The cues were displayed, one at a time, on the computer screen with the instructions 
about the temporal direction (remember or imagine in the future or invent fictitious 
experiences). Once an episode had been recalled or imagined, it was recounted by 
each participant. There was no time limit. Participants were allowed to keep on 
verbally illustrating the event until they thought t at nothing else could be added. 
Recollections and simulations were digitally recorded to enable later transcriptions 




After the transcription, a trained  rater, who was blind to the hypothesis of the study, 
used the standardized scoring procedure developed by Levine et al. (2002) to 
systematically parse the details generated in the past and future events. This first 
allowed to segment the main event (i.e., the most talked about, with a brief 
timeframe) into details and then to distinguish between (a) internal details (i.e., 
episodic information pertaining to the main event, specific to time and place) and (b) 
external details (general knowledge related to the event). A second rater, trained for 
this purpose, was also required to score 20 protocols fr m the original participants, 
10 from the PD sample and 10 from the controls.  
 
Internal details were further categorized into: (a)event (happenings, individuals 
present, physical/emotional actions and reactions, weather), (b) place (information 
about the environment where the event occurred), (c) time (date, season, month, day 
of the week, time of day), (d) perceptual (sensory information, body position) and (e) 
emotion (emotional state, thoughts).  
 
External details were categorized into: (a) external event (specific details from other 
incidents, from all of the above categories, external to the main event), (b) semantic 
(general knowledge or facts, ongoing events, extended states of being), (c) repetition 





The entire group of patients presented with a mean on the FAB of 14.14 (+2.04). 
Thirteen patients scored below the cut-off (i.e., below 13.5) and eighteen patients 
scored above the cut-off (i.e., above 13.5). The full o tcome of the FAB is reported 




On the experimental procedure, considering the three conditions together, PD 
patients and controls generated an equivalent number of details (PD, M = 14.5, SD = 
6.4; controls, M = 15.7, SD = 5.8), t(60) = - 0.7, n.s.  
 
PD  C MF MP  STI  IC EA  FAB total 
Total 
(n.31) 
1.7(.7) 2.5(.6) 2.3(.7) 2.7(.7) 1.8(.9) 3(0) 14.1( 2.04) 
Groups 
(FAB) 
       
Exe 
(n.18) 
2.05(.7) 2.8(.42) 2.7(.46) 2.9(.3) 2.05(.9) 3(0) 15.5(1.3) 
Dysex 
(n.13) 
1.4(.6) 2.2(.7) 1.7(.7) 2.5(.9) 1.4(.6) 3(0) 12.3(12) 
Groups 
(FT) 
       
Hi-FT 
(n.24) 
1.91(.7) 2.6(.6) 2.4(.6) 2.9(.2) 1.8(.9) 3(0) 14.6(1.8) 
Po-FT 
(n.7) 
1.3(.7) 2.3(.7) 1.8(.9) 2(1.1) 1.7(.9) 3(0) 12.5(1.9) 
 
Table 8.1 - The table reports the mean (standard deviation) of the results 
obtained at the six subtests of the FAB, i.e., conceptualization (C), mental 
flexibility (MF), motor programming (MP), sensitivi ty to interference (STI), 
inhibitory control (IC), and environmental autonomy (EA), by the whole patient 
group (total); by the subgroup of executive patients (Exe; who scored above the 
cut-off of 13.5 at the FAB) vs. the subgroup of dysexecutive (Dysex; who scored 
below the cut-off of 13.5 at the FAB); and by the subgroups of the 24 patients 




A 2 (Group: PD vs. Controls) x 2 (Details: Internal vs. External) x 3 (Temporal 
Connotation: Past vs. Future vs. Non temporal) mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with Group as a between
Connotation as within
generated by PD and controls (see Figure 
the two raters, who scored the descriptions
 
 
Figure 8.1 - Mean number of internal and external det
future, and non temporal events by PD patients (PD) and controls (C). Error 
bars indicate standard deviations.
 
The results showed a highly significant main effect of Details, 
0.001, η^ 2 p   = 0.73, indicating
internal (M = 11.4, SD = 4.9)
interaction between Details and Groups, 
also significant; post
generated by PD patients (
produced by controls (
that, on the contrary, the number of external details i
SD = 3.3) was greater compared to the quantity of external details recounted by 
controls (M = 2.8, SD = 1.9), 
-subjects factor, and Details and Temporal 
-subjects factors, was conducted on the mean number of details 
8.1). The inter-rater reliability (
, was .94.  
ails produced for past, 
 
F(1, 60) = 165.9, 
 that, on the whole, participants produced more 
 than external details (M = 3.7, SD = 2.8). The 
F(1, 60) = 15.16, p < 0.001, 
-hoc t-tests suggested that the amount of internal details 
M = 9.9, SD = 4.7) was significantly less than that 
M = 12.8, SD = 4.7), t(60) = - 2.4, p < 0.02, 
n PD patients’ reports (
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η
^ 2 = 0.09, and 
M = 4.5, 
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between Details and Temporal Connotation was also significant, F(1, 60) = 6.8,  p < 
0.005, η^ 2 p  = 0.1; post-hoc t-tests indicated that both groups produced more internal 
details when remembering past episodes (M = 12.3, SD = 5.2) than when imagining 
future events (M = 9.4, SD = 5.6),  t(61) = 4.9, p < 0.001, ,  η^ 2 = 0.29, and more 
internal details when inventing non temporal events (M = 12.4, SD = 6.4) than when 
imagining future events (M = 9.4, SD = 5.6), t(61) = - 4.4, p < 0.001, η^ 2 = 0.24. 
Finally, the three-way interaction concerning Groups, Details and Temporal 
Connotation was also significant, F(1, 60) = 6.45,  p < 0.005, η^ 2 p  = 0.9. With the 
aim of better explaining the latter interaction, two different following-up ANOVA 
were carried out for internal and external details. A  regards the internal details, the 
results revealed main effects of both Group, F (1, 60) = 5.9, p < 0.05,  η^ 2 p  = 0.09 
and Temporal Connotation, F (1, 60) = 13.8, p < 0.001, η^ 2 p  = 0.18. These indicate 
that PD patients generated less internal details compared to controls and that, overall, 
more internal details were generated for past (M = 12.3, SD = 5.2) and non temporal 
(M = 12.4, SD = 6.4) events than for future events (M = 9.4, SD = 5.6). It is 
important to note that, overall, an equivalent amount of the subtype of internal details 
previously labelled as “events” (mainly happenings and physical/emotional actions 
and reactions of the individuals present in the episode) was generated in future (M = 
3.8, SD = 2.3) and non temporal (M = 3.4, SD = 1.9) tasks, whereas, overall, more 
“perceptual” internal details (mainly sensory information) were produced in non 
temporal (M = 5.9, SD = 3.6) than in future (M = 2.9, SD = 2.2) tasks, t(61) = - 5.8, p 
< 0.001, η^ 2 = 0.36.  
 
A significant interaction between Group and Temporal Connotation, F(1, 60) = 3.1, p 
< 0.05, η^ 2 p  = 0.5, indicates that PD patients produced fewer internal details 
compared to controls for future events (PD, M = 7.0, SD = 4.1; controls, M = 11.8, 
SD = 5.9), t(60) = - 3.6, p < 0.002, , η^ 2 = 0.18. In particular, the difference between 
the two groups for future events was highly significant for the subtype of internal 
details regarded as “events” (PD, M = 2.9, SD = 1.6; controls, M = 4.8, SD = 2.4), 
t(60) = -3.5, p < 0.002, η^ 2 = 0.17. The mean number of the subcategories of internal 
details produced for past, future and non-temporal events by PD patients and controls 






Figure 8.2 - Mean number of the subcategories (i.e., event, place, time, 
perception and emotion) of internal details produced for past (P), future (F), 
and non temporal (NT) events by PD patients (PD) and controls (C). Error bars 
indicate standard deviations. 
 
The ANOVA conducted on external details showed a main effect of the Group, F(1, 
60) = 6.3, p < 0.02, η^ 2 p  = 0.9, indicating that PD patients generated an increased 
number of external details as compared to controls. The interaction between Group 
and Temporal Connotation was also significant, F(1, 60) = 6.0, p < 0.005, η^ 2 p  = 
0.09, indicating that the group of PD produced more ext rnal details than controls for 
past (PD, M = 4.7, SD = 3.5; controls, M = 2.6, SD = 2.0), t(60) =  3.0,  p < 0.005, η^ 
2 = 0.18, and for future (PD, M = 5.0, SD = 3.6; controls, M = 2.0, SD = 1.4) events, 
t(60) = 4.3,  p < 0.001, η^ 2 = 0.24. 
 
We also ran an ANOVA including only past and future scores. It showed a 
significant Group x Past/Future interaction for inter al details (F(60) = 3.73, p = 
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patients performed significantly better on the past t k (M = 11.08; SD = 4.86) than 
on the future task (M = 7.04; SD = 4.18), t(31) = 6.25, p <0.001. On the other hand, 
controls’ performances in the past condition (M = 13.6; SD = 5.32) and in the future 
condition (M = 11.81; SD = 5.93) did not significantly differ. The control and the PD 
groups produced an equal number of repetitions in all the experimental conditions. 
 
In order to further explore the performance of the PD group, a subgroup of seven 
patients was selected, on the basis of number of internal details recounted in future 
thinking. More specifically, these seven patients clearly performed outwith the range 
of controls in the future task (the lowest mean repo ted in the control group was 3.5), 
reporting a mean of internal details of 2.3 (SD = 1.2). Their performance on future 
task (M = 2.3, SD = 1.2) significantly diverged from the remaining 24 PD (M = 8.4, 
SD = 3.7), t(29) = 4.2, p < 0.001, η^ 2 = 0.23. 
 
Interestingly, the mean score achieved on the FAB by the subgroup of 7 
dysexecutive PD patients (M = 12.5, SD = 1.9) was significantly lower compared to 
the rest of the group (M = 14.6, SD = 1.8), t(29) = 2.6, p < 0.02, , η^ 2 = 0.10.   
 
There were no significant differences (all ps > 0.05) between the two subgroups when 
compared on variables concerning age, education, duration of disease, or the MMSE.  
 
We further dichotomised the data according to the performance on FAB (other than, 
as we have already done, according to the performance o  the key experimental 
variable), dividing the patients in two groups, those presenting with FAB deficits vs. 
those scoring above cut-off. The two groups, dysexecutive (D; n.13) and executive 
(E; n.18) , did not differ on any of the experimental conditions. The group D scored 
significantly worse than the controls  solely in the future condition, t(47) = - 2.86, p 
< 0.01. The same pattern was observed for group E’s performance , t(42) = - 2.78, p 
< 0.01. The two groups (E and D) did not show signif cant differences on the past or 
on the non-temporal task, when compared to controls.  





Finally, an example narrative from one control and two example narratives from two 
different patients are reported: 
 
Imagine an event that might happen to you in the next y ar with the word “table”. 
Control’s response: “We are sitting at a table with a group of people. I have just 
stopped cooking and in this moment I’m serving spaghetti. One of my friends 
appreciates the consistency of the pasta and I rebuke him, because he has tasted 
before everyone is sitting, he replies for fun “Daniele, you are always so fussy!”. We 
are sitting, I uncork the bottle of wine and leave it oxygenating before serving. A 
friend of mine asks for white wine, and I have just ncorked red wine. Another friend 
says that she doesn’t like that type of tomato sauce, she would prefer another sauce 
to dress the spaghetti. My mother enters the kitchen, a friend stands up to say hi, 
another friend also turns towards my mother and, in tur ing her head, throws her 
long hair on the face of the person sitting close to her. This person looks annoyed, 
since he has got glasses, that were about to fall from his face, but my friend turns 
towards him and gently caresses his face, so that he brightens up” 
 
P01’s response: “Ok… so a very simple episode. I’m in pizzeria to eat pizza with my 
relatives and the table is not stable and all the dishes with the pizzas fall and we 
laugh at the end. And we are all around the table” 
 
P02’s response: “If you say table.. I always think of a dining table. So the table in the 
kitchen. We are waiting for the other daughter coming back from the university. She 
is late and so we are waiting for her to eat. The table has already been set, there is the 
other daughter, my wife who’s preparing, the water is boiling, the television is on... 




The main question from which this study originated was whether difficulties in 
future thinking could be observed in the absence of impairments in episodic memory. 
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Patients with Parkinson’s Disease (PD), who did not present with memory deficits, 
performed normally on past memories and non temporal constructive simulations, 
whereas they were impaired on episodic future thinking. That is, the reduction in 
specificity of PD patients’ simulations was limited to future events and did not 
extend to fictitious scenarios. Furthermore, our results showed that, compared to 
controls, PD patients reported fewer internal, event-r lated details in their 
simulations of future events, while they reported more semantic details both when 
recollecting the past and imagining future episodes. General differences in 
conversational, narrative style cannot easily account for these results, as PD patients 
and controls generated overall the same amount of details considering the three 
experimental tasks together (Past, Future, and Non Temporal). In addition, the PD 
patients performed within normal limits on the Phonol gical Verbal Fluency task 
(which evaluates the richness of lexical production). The patients’ emotional state 
could in principle contribute to explain our findings. The reduction in specificity of 
patients’ simulations might suggest that they are imagining less because of clinical 
depression. However, one of the exclusion criteria that we adopted was the presence 
of major depression according DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). Moreover, PD patients uttered less details on y in one of the three conditions. 
This argues against the account that they might have generally spoken (or imagined) 
less because of clinical depression.  
 
Taken together, these data emphasize striking differences not solely between time 
periods (past and future), but also between constructing non-temporal experiences 
and future thinking tasks. 
 
Recently, the possibility of a dissociation between performances concerning past 
memories and future thinking has gained ground. Squire et al. (2010) reported on 
five densely amnesic patients, who had a strikingly preserved capacity to imagine the 
future. In particular, patient G.P., who showed a remarkable deficit in remembering 
remote and recent episodes, was nonetheless fully intact at future envisaging (see 
also Squire et al., 2011). Berryhill et al. (2010) assessed patients with unilateral 
prefrontal lesions, with spared autobiographical memory but who showed a moderate 
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deficit on a constructed experience task. Our results revealed that the seven patients, 
who obtained the poorest scores on the future thinking task (generating less event-
specific details), achieved a significantly lower mean score on the Frontal 
Assessment Battery compared to the rest of the PD group. These seven PD patients 
expressed their own incapability to take distance from their memories in favour of 
the imagination of completely novel scenarios, “Strangely, when I try to imagine the 
restaurant where my granddaughter is going to get married, the restaurant where my 
daughter got married comes up into my mind”, said a patient. And another one 
complained, “Although I do try to imagine something new, I end up with 
remembering a past event. I can’t help it”. Their spared memories are paradoxically 
considered by these patients as an obstacle to overcom  when they aim at performing 
the future thinking task. The difficulty in reshuffling details from different memories 
is translated by one of our patients with the feeling that some scenarios “stay still” in 
mind, as they could not be fragmented into pieces to be differently used. Such a 
feeling reflects the default of mechanisms underlying a flexible search inside 
memory repositoires. This essential role is indeed played by executive functions. 
 
Therefore, the present study documents a dissociatin between spared episodic 
memory and the impaired envisaging future episodes raising the possibility of the 
involvement of executive functions in generating episodic future thinking (see also 
Squire et al., 2010). The PD patients recruited for the current study were, indeed, 
exempt from other cognitive deficits likely to disrupt their performances.  
 
It might be argued that the data should be analysed in terms of patients presenting 
with FAB deficits vs. those scoring above cut-off, rather than, as we have done, to 
dichotomise the data according to the performance o the key experimental variable, 
and then compare their cognitive profiles. But we think that it is debatable which 
dichotomy should come first, and different researche s have used different 
approaches. In this particular case, the approach that we have chosen is preferable as 
the patients were recruited to be extremely mild in their cognitive deficits. Indeed, 
they had no memory problems, and performed well on the verbal fluency task. We 
were not aiming at investigating whether or not patients with executive dysfunctions 
145 
 
performed worse than those without executive dysfunctio s. Rather we were 
interested in investigating whether patients withou memory problems, or better 
without overt memory problems, could still present with future thinking deficits. And 
if so, whether or not those who did differ in any way from those who did not. Hence, 
the analyses based on the dichotomy that we reported a e more pertinent to address 
the question from which the study sprang. 
 
It was also observed a dissociation between past recollections and future simulations. 
This dissociation might be due to the greater neural activity that the ability of 
simulating future events necessitates (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007). Okuda 
et al. (2003) revealed that frontal lobes were activ ted when normal participants 
foresaw. In particular, specific frontal polar regions were more active when 
participants thought and reported their future prosects. In addition, the activity of 
the right frontopolar cortex (BA 10) was found to psitively correlate with the 
number of elements reported in future events (Addis & Schacter, 2008). Recently, 
Anderson et al. (in press) have suggested that future thinking might be considered 
more effortful than past memory. Executive functions underlie both processes by 
monitoring and combining the different details. But whereas past episodes require “a 
search for a unique combination of information; in contrast, a future event can be 
formed from any combination of an infinite array of information within 
autobiographical memory” (Anderson et al., in press, p. 2). Future thinking is 
supposed to place a greater demand on executive functions. And this would explain 
why, in case of executive dysfunction, patients show a severe impairment in future 
imagining, albeit the spared ability to reconstruct their past.  
 
At this point, we should wonder why our patients’ impairment did not encroach upon 
their constructions of non-temporal, fictitious episodes. A possible interpretation of 
the difference between the two tasks (non temporal and future) might be the 
involvement of self-related processes present in the future thoughts but not in the 
non-temporal constructions. A number of studies have shed light on the peculiar part 
played in future tasks, but not in non-temporal tasks, by subjective time, which is 
specifically involved in the ability to mentally time travel. A problem in processing 
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conscious awareness of one’s own “continued existence” (Szpunar, 2011) in a 
subjective time, also labelled “chronesthesia” (Tulving, 2002) or “temporal 
consciousness” (Dalla Barba, 2002), could have been at the root of the difference 
documented in our study, as this deficit could have int rfered solely with the attempt 
to projecting oneself towards the future. However, this would imply that PD patients 
presented with clear disorientation in time which was not detected by the detailed 
clinical interview nor did they confabulated or showed time-based incongruences in 
their reports.  
 
An alternative account could capitalise on the different procedures that hallmark the 
two tasks (future thinking and non-temporal construction). Addis et al. (2007) 
observed that the aforementioned greater activation, shown during future tasks, was 
evident solely during the initial phase of event generation, the so-called construction 
phase. Accordingly, in the non-temporal condition, when a full-sentence descriptor 
was provided, the construction phase might have been facilitated. Basically, the non-
temporal condition required the elaboration of a redy scenario, instead of the 
construction of a complex scenario. The part played by the task used when testing 
non-temporal or future events is still debated. Maguire & Hassabis (2011) 
highlighted, for instance, the bias likely to be caused by using different cues to 
prompt constructive experiences. They claimed that e single-word cues used by 
Squire et al. (2010) would more easily elicit descriptions of episodes based on 
semantics, whereas the full-sentence descriptors adopte  by Hassabis et al. (2007) 
would prompt richer visualization. Accordingly, we contrasted the different cuing 
procedures in our experimental conditions: non-temporal (Hassabis-like) versus 
temporal (Squire-like). We noticed a relevant difference in the performance of PD 
patients on the two tasks; our patients failed specifically the temporal task based on 
single word cueing, showing that at least in these patients the single-word cuing was 
not enough to compensate their future thinking deficits. Overall, the number of 
“internal events”, which describe the core of the ev nt (people present in the scene, 
their actions and reactions, happenings), was equivalent in future and non-temporal 
tasks. The key difference concerned the “perceptual” internal details, which was 
greater in non-temporal than in future performances, as assumed by Maguire and 
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Hassabis (2011). Yet, PD patients found this task, prompted by short verbal 
sentences, easier to accomplish. Of course, since the temporal connotation and the 
type of cue differ, one would need to better disentangle their respective component. 
Furthermore, patients with hippocampal damage (Hassabi  et al., 2007) and with 
medial temporal lobe damage (Race et al., 2011) have been found to be impaired in 
future thinking also using a full-sentence descripto . Nonetheless, it is possible that 
an impairment at constructing scenarios might be det ct d with one type of cue but 
not with a different cue. Patient H.C., for instance, was found to be impaired (Kwan 
et al., 2010) and unimpaired (Hurley et al., 2011) in two independent studies that 
used different methodologies. The discrepancy between these findings led Hurley 
and his colleagues to suggest that H.C.’s difficultes in the former research could 
have been influenced by the specific single word cue (i.e., coffee) adopted by Kwan 
et al. (2010), that might have greatly constrained the patient, making the task more 
challenging. 
 
Our data do show that single-word cues elicit clear future thinking deficits in non-
amnesic PD patients, and that this specific deficit is further exacerbated by the 
presence of executive impairments. This findings do not exclude the possibility that 
people rely on their past to imagine their future. However, we observed that, even 
when past memories are spared and people can reconstruct their past and elaborate a 
complex scenario, they might still have serious difficulties in simulating their future. 
Berryhill et al. (2010) maintained that performing future thinking tasks necessitates a 
widespread range of cognitive functions. Consequently, they raised the possibility 
that lesions to several brain areas might disrupt fture thinking performance for 
different reasons. Our findings empirically demonstrated that this could indeed be the 
case, hence future thinking performance benefits from the orchestrated participation 





9. Executive dysfunction in Parkinson’s 






In the previous chapter we aimed at investigating whether patients without memory 
problems could still present with future thinking deficits. And if so, whether or not 
those who did present with future thinking deficits differ in any way from those who 
did not. To this end, performance on past, future thinking and non temporal 
construction tasks of thirty-one patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and without 
memory deficits, had been analysed. Our findings revealed that on the whole, PD 
patients uttered fewer specific, event-related snippets when imagining future 
episodes compared to controls, while their performances did not diverge from those 
of controls on past and non-temporal construction tasks. We analysed further the 
performance of those patients showing deficits in future imaging. We scored the 
output of each patient in terms of mean number of internal, specific, event-related 
details generated. The poorest scores on future task were observed in a subgroup of 
seven patients. Their future performances fell clearly below the range of controls. An 
investigation of the similarities and differences between this subgroup and the rest of 
the PD group highlighted the following characteristics: 
 
• the subgroup did not differ from the rest of the PDgroup and controls 
on any of the neuropsychological measures available, including 
MMSE, long and short-term memory tests; 
• but, they scored worse in the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB - 




The difference in the FAB scores was the only overt difference between the two 
subgroups, given that our patients were recruited to be exempt from other cognitive 
deficits likely to impair their performances. Therefor , we suggested that the future 
thinking deficit shown by this subgroup of patients could not be accounted for in 
terms of memory problems. Indeed, even when past memori s were spared and they 
were able to reconstruct their past and elaborate a complex scenario, they had 
difficulties simulating personal future.  
 
In the previous chapter we maintained that future thinking does not represent a 
specific feature of amnesia and that factors other an memory contribute to the 
ability of future thinking. Given the executive deficits exhibited by the subgroup with 
the lowest scores on future thinking, we suggested that a flexible searching activity 
of past elements might play a crucial role to construct personal future experiences. 
We concluded, in line with Berryhill et al. (2010), that future thinking benefits from 
the contributions of a range of cognitive functions. Therefore, a deficit impinging 
upon future imaging could conceal different roots, not necessarily involving an 
episodic memory impairment.  
 
Recently Zeman et al. (submitted) studied a group of seven patients suffering from 
amnesia and presenting with severe difficulties both in remembering past episodes 
and in imagining future events. Zeman et al.’s amnesic patients scored significantly 
worse than controls on measures of future thinking, thus replicating previous 
findings. However, they reported also a striking impairment on tasks requiring the 
patients to describe current experiences, both live (e.g., a room in a museum or the 
interior of a church) and through viewing illustrations of famous paintings. The 
authors explained their results positing a possible eff ct of amnesia on narrative 
construction. 
 
However, as the authors themselves acknowledge, the pati nts they recruited were 
rather heterogeneous and were not completely immune from  non memory cognitive 
deficits, including measures of executive functions such as verbal fluency which was 
apparently below cut-off in some of the patients. Therefore, this patient group might 
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also present with impairments out with the domain of memory which might have 
caused the problem of poor description of the present as well as the deficit in future 
thinking. Indeed, patients’ reports were impoverished not only when concerning the 
future, but also, and more interestingly, when concer ing a current context. Thus, the 
researchers concluded that a task, which requires to describe current experiences, 
might represent an important control condition in studies that examine the relations 
between amnesia and future thinking.  
 
We used the same paradigm in the present study. In so doing, we further investigated 
the utterances of those patients who had the worst pe formance in future thinking and 
the lowest scores in the FAB. In this case, the executive dysfunction might have 
caused a general impoverishment of descriptions, likely to compromise abilities over 
and above the future thinking.  
 
Zeman et al. instructed their participants (amnesiacs and healthy controls) to imagine 
new experiences (following the approach reported by Hassabis et al., 2007) and, in a 
second condition, to fully describe two detailed paintings (“The calling of Peter and 
Andrew” by Ghirlandaio and “The banquet in the pine forest”, by Botticelli) and two 
real-life settings (a room in a museum and the interior of a church), while they were 
observing the paintings or while they were physically present in the settings. In 
Zeman et al.’s study the number of uttered elements did not significantly differ 
between the two experimental settings. Thus, we chose t  provide our participants 
solely with one of the two conditions. We required them to describe the testing room 
while physically present in it.  
 
For this experiment we considered the performance of the 5 patients with the poor 
performance on the future thinking task, who also sc red below the cut-off (i.e., 
below 13.5) on FAB, 5 patients with no executive deficits, but otherwise matched for 
neuropsychological profile with the former group of patients, and 5 healthy controls, 






9.2.1 Participants   
 
Two subgroups each of 5 patients (dysexecutive and executive, respectively) and one 
subgroup of 5 healthy volunteers were selected from the sample of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease and from the sample of healthy participants that were recruited 
in the experiment described in the previous chapter.  
 
 Executive (n.5) Dysexecutive (n.5) Controls (n.5) 
Age 68(5.83) 65.4(8.64) 67.4(4.87) 
Education 11.2(3.83) 9.4(4.92) 11(4.47) 
FT scores 8.3(1.02) 2.35(1.18) 13.4(3.75) 
FAB 14.98(0.75) 11.68(1.65) - 
Rey’s 15 word 
Immediate Recall 
38.94(5.84) 36.36(5.62) - 
Rey’s 15 word 
Differite Recall 
8.32(1.64) 8.54(1.11) - 
 
Table 9.1 – Means (standard deviations) of the three subgroups (executive PD 
patients, dysexecutive PD patients and controls) of age and education, and mean 
score (standard deviations) on the future thinking task (FT scores) (see Chapter 
8), on the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB), and on immediate (Rey’s 15 word 
Immediate Recall) and delayed recall (Rey’s 15 word Differite Recall) test.    
 
The characteristics of these three groups are illustrated in Table 9.1. 
 
Separate One-Way ANOVAs were conducted for age, education and future thinking 
scores achieved by the three subgroups. 
The three subgroups did not significantly differ (all ps > 0.05) on age and education. 
The scored obtained on the future thinking task (see Chapter 8) were instead 
significantly different across the subgroups, F(2, 12)= 27.72, p < 0.001. Post-hoc t-
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tests revealed significant differences in the mean number of internal details produced 
by: 
 
• the subgroup of Dysexecutive vs. the subgroup of Executive, t(8) = 8.52, p < 
0.001;  
• the subgroup of Executive vs. Controls, t(8) = -2.92, p = 0.019; 
• and by the subgroup of Dysexecutive vs. Controls t(8) = -6.27, p < 0.001.  
 
Furthermore, the scores obtained on the FAB by the subgroup of Executive and the 
subgroup of Dysexecutive significantly differed, t(8) = 4.06, p < 0.005.  
 
No differences were observed between the performances of the two subgroups 
(Executive and Dysexecutive) on the immediate and delayed recall tests (all ps > 
0.05).   
 
The participants with PD were recruited for being at the very early stages of the 
disease. According to Hohen and Yahr’ s classificaton (1967), patients were to be 
maximum at the second stage of the Parkinson’s disease. Thus, within the Executive 
subgroup, 2 at stage 1.5 and 3 at stage 2. Within the dysexecutive group, 2 patients 
were at stage 1; 1 at stage 1.5 and 2 at stage 2. Their magnetic resonance imaging 
had to be normal.  
 
Patients were selected from a larger panel at the Parkinson and Movement Disorder 
Centre, Department of Neurological Sciences (Federico II University, Naples). The 
diagnosis of PD fulfilled the UK Parkinson’s diseas Society Brain Bank clinical 
diagnostic criteria (Gibb & Lees, 1988). All patients were under anti-parkinsonian 
treatment at a stable and optimized daily dosage during the 4 weeks prior to study 
entry. Exclusion criteria were: (1) dementia according to clinical diagnostic criteria 
for dementia associated with PD (Emre et al., 2007); (2) major depression according 
DSM-IV criteria for current major depression (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994); (3) clinically significant or unstable medical condition including serious 
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cardiovascular or cerebrovascular disease; and (4) anti-cholinergic or neuroleptic 
treatment. 
 
Specific tests were selected from the Mental Deterioration Battery (MDB; Carlesimo 
et al., 1996) in order to recruit only people with (a) no deficit in immediate and 
delayed recall test (Rey’s 15 word Immediate Recall and Delayed Recall; scores, 
respectively, above 28.53 and 4.69); (b) spared logical reasoning (Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices’47; scores above 18.96); and (c) a fluent language 
(Phonological Verbal Fluency; scores above 17.35). Moreover, the participants 
should have a score of at least 30, i.e., above cut-off, on the Attentional Matrices, 
which assesses attention by means of timed visual search (Della Sala et al., 1992).  
 
The healthy individuals were volunteer members of different, non-academic, local 
associations. We did not recruit people under psychoa tive pharmacological 
treatment likely to modify normal memory abilities or people with a history of 
neurological and psychiatric disorders.  
 
Before starting the testing session, they were asked to sign an informed written 
consent. The study procedures were approved by the local ethical committee and 
were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
9.2.2 Materials and experimental procedures 
 
Participants, who sat in front of the experimenter, were required to describe the 
testing room, which was maintained unchanged through t the duration of the 
experiment.  
 
With this task, which we named “Description Task”, we aimed at assessing 
participants’ ability to describe a current experienc  in a real-life context, while they 
were staying in it. Participants were given no time limit and were encouraged to 
provide a fully detailed description of the setting. They were asked to describe the 
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room until they thought that nothing else could be added. Descriptions were digitally 
recorded to enable later transcriptions and consequent scorings. After the 
transcriptions, a trained rater segmented the descriptions in single details. Following 
Zeman et al.’s procedure, a general description score was assigned to each 
description, hence to each participant, on the bases of the sum of the number of 
elements present in each report. Repetitions and irrelevant utterances were not 
included in the sum. Furthermore, each segment was assigned to one of the four 
categories adopted by Hassabis et al. (2007): 1) Entity Presence, i.e., people and 
objects present in the scene; 2) Sensory Description, i.e., the qualifier adjectives 
mentioned to describe the characteristics of people and objects; 3) Spatial Reference, 





In the Description Task, the mean number of elements produced did not significantly 
differ between the three subgroups ( > 0.05). The Executive subgroup generated a 
mean of 10.4 details (SD = 5.2); the Dysexecutive subgroup produced a mean of 7.4 
elements (SD = 3.2) and the Control subgroup produce  a mean of 15 details (SD = 





Fig. 9.1 - Mean number of details per description produced by the three 
subgroups (Executive, Dysexecutive and Controls). Error bars indicate 
standard deviations.   
 
Figure 9.2 shows the number of details assigned to the different categories (entity 
presence, sensory description, spatial reference and thought/emotion/action). 
Repetitions and irrelevant utterances were not included.  
 
Separate One-Way ANOVAs were carried out for each category.  
 
The mean number of entity presences (Executive: M = 5.6; SD = 4.5; Dysexecutive: 
M = 4.4; SD = 2.5; Controls: M = 5.2; SD = 2.7) produced did not differ between the 
three subgroups (p > 0.05).  
 
The mean number of sensory descriptions (Executive: M = 2.8; SD = 1.6; 
Dysexecutive: M = 1.4; SD = 1.1; Controls: M = 6; SD = 2.5) generated was found 













t-tests revealed a significant difference only between the number of sensory 
descriptions uttered by the Dysexecutive group and that generated by Controls, t(8) = 
-3.68, p < 0.01. 
 
The mean number of spatial references (Executive: M = 0.4; SD = 0.54; 
Dysexecutive: M = 0.20; SD = 0.44; Controls: M = 2.2; SD = 3.4) did not 
significantly differ between the three subgroups ( > 0.05). 
 
Finally, the mean number of thoughts/emotions/actions (Executive: M = 1.6; SD = 
1.5; Dysexecutive: M = 1.4; SD = 1.5; Controls: M = 1.6; SD = 2.0) did not 




Fig. 9.2 - Mean number of the details produced by the three subgroups 
(Executive, Dysexecutive and Controls) per each category (Entity Presence, EP; 
Sensory Description, SD; Spatial Reference, SR; Thought/Emotion/Action, 














Three examples of descriptions of the testing room, ne produced by an Executive 
patient (EP01), one by a Dysexecutive patient (DP01) and one by a Control (C01), 
are reported: 
  
Could you please describe this room in as much details as possible? 
EP01’s description: “It’s a pretty much big room. There are a lot of boks. It’s airy 
and, then, there is a very nice view. I mean there is a lot of green and it makes me 
happy”. 
 
DP01’s description: “This room is a library, where you can make studies on 
something. Thus, there are a lot of books. We are sitting at a rectangular table, where 
usually, I suppose, doctors and other people sit to visit and to be visited. There are 
chairs”. 
 
C01’s description: “This is a library. In that point there is a slide-projector, where 
you can project videos. Maybe they give lectures here. There is a desk; then we have 
a copying machine. That is a wheelchair. There are usually a lot of doctors. And 




In the previous chapter, we raised the possibility that damage to structures other than 
hippocampus, not leading to overt memory problems, ight nevertheless contribute 
to future thinking impairments. A recent study (Zeman et al., submitted) noted that 
the same patients who are impaired in future thinking may also show deficits in 
describing current experiences. However, these findings could be taken to task by 
supposing that deficits other than memory were respon ible for the poor performance 
on the “current” condition.  
 
We aimed at investigating the possibility that dysexecutive patients with future 
thinking deficits might also show impairments (relative to controls) in describing 
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current scenes. This was, in fact, not the case of PD patients with executive deficit. 
Our findings revealed that the total elements produce  by the three subgroups 
assessed (i.e., executive, dysexecutive and controls) when describing the testing 
room, did not statistically differ. Therefore, on one hand, we can rule out the 
hypothesis that a general impoverishment of verbal output might have compromised 
the ability of future imaging in our patients. On the other we land support to Zeman 
et al.’s observation that their own amnestic patients might have had a genuine 
problem in describing current experiences, not due to a masked dysexecutive 
problem. However, it has to be considered that, given the low number of participants 
per group in this experiment, the power of the analyses might be low and these 
results might be better considered as trends.  
 
Recently, Gaesser et al. (2011) have showed how older a ults are less prone than 
younger adults to generate internal details across different conditions, comprising 
past, future and description tasks. However, this age variable was irrelevant in our 
studies (the study described in Chapter 8 and the study described in the present 
Chapter), given that, in both cases, the groups were matched for age, other than 
education.  
 
We suggest that the unique significant difference observed in the number of details 
classified as sensory description does not suffice to account for a general reduction in 
specificity of dysexecutive patients. Given that the overall amount of details did not 
statistically differ between executive and dysexecutive patients, and between 
dysexecutive patients and controls, it might be suggested that the lack of sensory 
details is somehow balanced in the reports by other types of internal details. Indeed, 
in line with Zeman et al.’s procedure, we did not included repetitions and irrelevant 
utterances within the sum of the details produced.    
 
Our PD patients performed as well as controls when remembering the past and when 
constructing new experiences (Hassabis et al.’s appro ch – see Chapter 8). Thus, a 
general verbal impoverishment account is unlikely. However, we identified a 
possible bias caused by the type of cue (Maguire and Hassabis, 2011). We used two 
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different cues, namely a short description of a setting to elicit the scene construction 
and a single-word cue representing an object to prom t future episodes. As we had 
previously observed in a study with healthy participants (see Chapter 4), a setting-
cue is more likely to elicit more detailed descriptions than an object-cue. Therefore, a 
more generic cue (the object-cue), which loads on both strategic searching and event 
construction, might make the task more challenging and lead to less detailed 
descriptions. Furthermore, the hypothesis cannot be excluded that in remembering 
the past and in constructing new experiences participants had provided frequently 
retold and retrieved stories (although they were discouraged to do so), which had 
become anecdotal, and “semanticized” to some extent. These two tasks might have 
not shown any impoverishment simply because patients might have retrieved 
episodes already well constructed.  
 
The description procedure proposed by Zeman et al. appears face value to be less 
challenging than a future thinking task. Zeman et al. suggested, with respect to their 
patients, that the process of describing current experience is likely to engage a 
widespread range of functions involving perceptual, attentional, executive, linguistic 
and mnestic abilities. However, the executive dysfunction of our patients did not 
disrupt their overall descriptions of the real-life s tting. 
 
Similar results were observed by Race et al. (2011) in eight amnesic patients with a 
medial temporal lobe damage. In their study participants were presented with 
drawings of common-place scenarios and were required to construct stories about 
what was happening into the scenes. In this particular condition patients showed no 
deficits, whereas they were impaired in remembering the past and imagining the 
future. The authors suggested that a medial temporal lobe damage might not affect 
the narrative construction when the to-be-described el ments are “readily available” 
in a picture (as it happened in our description task) or in a drawing (as in their study). 
This explanation might apply to the description task that we used. Our patients 
resulted unimpaired in narrative construction. Nonetheless, they showed a clear 




The impairment in future thinking, which we observed in PD patients, might have 
been caused by a difficulty in binding known details into a whole story, as observed 
by Rosenbaum et al. (2009). Rosenbaum et al. reported that amnesic patient K.C. 
failed not only in imagining the future, but also in recounting well learned stories 
from the Bible and fairy tales. Our PD patients with an impairment in executive 
functions might exhibit difficulties in flexible searching details from memory and in 
binding them in a coherent whole. However, since thy did not have memory 
deficits, they should not have had any problems in retrieving blocks of details and in 
reporting them, as they were able to see something and fully describe it. The 
difficulties might have arisen when they had to reshuffle and recombine details from 
different memories. It is possible that the task could be easily accomplished, when 
the amount of details is available, physically or in memory, and when participants do 
not have to break down each single snippet in order to use it for another proposition.  
 
In conclusion, we benefited from the task adopted by Zeman et al. It helped us to 
isolate some hypotheses in order to interpret the available data more appropriately. 
We would posit that non-episodic deficits also play a role in eliciting future thinking 
impairments. In particular, an executive dysfunction might disrupt foresight. 
However, in the present study this deficit did not devastate the description of a 
current real-life setting. Therefore, it might underlie future thinking tasks, but not by 
determining a general impoverishment of verbal repots. A dysexecutive problem 
might have more plausibly disrupted the flexible searching through different 
memories, hence the subsequent binding of the various elements into a coherent 







10. Role of the cue in detecting 





‘I barely know where I am. I don’t picture myself in the future. I don’t know what 
I’ll do when I get home. You need a base to build the future’. In these words M.C., a 
27 year-old woman with a selective deficit in episodic memory, expressed her 
persistent difficulties in future thinking (Andelman et al., 2010, p. 431).  
 
M.C. is the most recent  of several published cases of amnesic patients whose ability 
in future thinking has  been experimentally tested. Although the question of whether 
or not envisaging future events depends on episodic memory has been formally 
addressed by a number of neuropsychological reports, the theoretical interpretation 
of the findings is still controversial.  
 
There is a long-standing debate as to whether remembering past experience and 
imagining  events in the future are inextricably intertwined. Furthermore, numerous 
hypotheses accounting for this postulated link have b en proposed. The 
heterogeneity of the results coming from   different studies and sometimes within the 
paradigm (Hassabis et al., 2007; Zeman et al., submitted) makes the conclusions 
problematic and uncertain. Such heterogeneity might partially be due to the fact that 
the amnesic patients themselves present with different patterns of spared and 
impaired abilities and they can hardly be compared with one another (as Tulving 
noticed in 1985). This is due in part to the scant  i formation about the lesion sites 
provided in several of the reported cases (e.g., O.S., Lidz, 1942; D.B., Klein et al., 
2002), or to the widespread extension of the lesion in other cases (e.g., K.C., 
Tulving, 1985; and Hassabis et al.’s patients, 2007), but also to the differences in the 
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experimental procedures (i.e., types of cue, number of p ompts presented to elicit the 
reports) adopted in the various studies.  
 
Future remains misty, blurred and fragmented for O.S. (Lidz, 1942), K.C. (Tulving, 
1985), H.M. (Corkin, personal communication, 01/26/11), GA (Dalla Barba et al., 
1997), D.B. (Klein et al., 2002), the group of patien s, except for P01, tested by 
Hassabis and colleagues (2007), H.C. (when tested by Kwan et al., 2010; different 
findings were observed by Hurley et al., 2011), M.C. (Andelman et al., 2010), eight 
hippocampal amnesiacs (Kurczek et al., 2010), eight amnesiacs with lesions in the 
medial temporal lobe (Race et al., 2011), and six of the seven patients (patient P2 
performed as well as controls) tested by Zeman et al. (submitted). None of these 
patients could rely on their past. Their performance on tasks assessing episodic 
memories paralleled those exhibited in future tasks.  
 
In particular, O.S. could not make future simulations without asking others for 
suggestions and his reports consistently lacked of temporal continuity (Lidz, 1942). 
K.C. failed to hold up  images of his future, which consequently faded away and left 
his mind blank in the attempt to answer the question “What will you be doing 
tomorrow?” (Tulving, 1985). A similar state must have been experienced by H.M., 
who wittily circumvented Corkin’s question concerning his plans for the future 
(“What are you going to do tomorrow?”) promptly responding, “Whatever is 
beneficial” (Corkin, personal communication, 01/26/11). GA exhibited a striking 
discrepancy between her present situation and her pr dictions, which were 
considered unquestionably implausible by the relatives, and, consequently, by the 
experimenters. She showed this impairment in two different tasks. More precisely, 
the 60% of her responses were confabulatory to questions concerning her “lived 
future” (i.e., “What are you going to do in a few minutes/tomorrow/next year?”); and 
she confabulated  50% of the times when the future constructions were elicited by a 
single cue-word (Dalla Barba et al., 1997). Future ceased to exist also for D.B.. No 
less than 50% of his answers regarding his “lived future” were considered in  
contradiction with his plausible future activities and the 30% were “don’t know” 
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responses (Klein et al., 2002). Deficits in future thinking were observed also when a 
neutral single cue-word was provided (Kurczek et al., 2010).  
 
Some patients were found to be impaired at imaginin future events, also when they 
were to adhere to the instruction to depict a common-place scenario, starting from a 
short description (i.e., Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a be utiful 
tropical bay, Hassabis et al., 2007, Zeman et al., submitted; or Imagine catching your 
grandchild getting into trouble twenty years from now, Race et al., 2011), when 
required to generate as much detail as possible, when repeatedly prompted to provide 
a greater amount of snippets (Hassabis et al., 2007), when generally encouraged to 
continue until they had concluded their reports (Zeman et al., submitted), and when 
they were given a specific, standardized probe, asking for further elaboration (Race 
et al., 2011). A mirror pattern in the two temporal directions was reported also by 
H.C., a 20 years-old woman with developmental amnesia, which hampered her 
recollection of personal past experiences. She was similarly impaired at constructing 
future personal events, when elicited by single cue words (Kwan et al., 2010).  
 
These studies presented the intriguing possibility of a tight relationship between the 
ability to remember past episodes and the ability to imagine future events. The 
impairments in future thinking were associated to the impairments of episodic 
memory. Patients unable to remember the past provided vague responses about their 
personal future and who was prone to generate confabulations pertaining his/her past 
also confabulated about his/her future (GA and D.B.). An exception is the case of 
M.C. Whereas her episodic memory deficit affected a circumscribed period of time 
(i.e., the last two years of her life), her future thinking was compromised for an 
undefined temporal period. What these findings might entail, as the authors 
suggested, is that the link between the two processes may not be as strict as it was 
thought.  
 
Another caveat to the hypothesis that the two time-related functions might be closely 
interconnected is that a number of amnesiacs show preserved ability to perform 
constructive tasks.  
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Hassabis et al. (2007) reported on one patient (P01), with a significant loss of 
hippocampal volume (48.8% reduction in the left hippocampus and 46.2% reduction 
in the right hippocampus), whose performance noticeably diverged from the rest of 
the group. P01, in fact, presented with no deficit n the construction of novel 
fictitious scenarios. The researchers postulated an association between such 
surprisingly preserved ability and a residual hippocampal function. This hypothesis 
was corroborated by a separate fMRI study showing a significant activation in 
residual right hippocampal tissue, while P01 encoded n w semantic information. 
Thus, it was speculated that the residual hippocampal tissue might be sufficient also 
to support a successful performance on the construction task. With the aim of further 
disambiguating this uncertain interpretation of such an atypical case, Squire et al. 
(2010) tested five amnesic patients. At odds with previous reports, these patients’ 
performances (at the future task prompted by single word cues) fell within, or even 
above, the control range. Thus, it has been suggested that a selective hippocampal 
damage that preserves the rest of the past-future core network (Schacter et al., 2007) 
does not necessarily compromise future thinking. Similarly, an episodic memory 
deficit which spares all the other cognitive functions might not affect future 
imagining. The cases of Jon (Maguire et al., 2010), P2 (Zeman et al., submitted) and 
a group of twenty-one children (Cooper et al., 2011), tested with the task developed 
by Hassabis et al. (2007), further strengthened this view. Jon, who suffered from a 
developmental amnesia and from 50% bilateral hippocampal volume loss, performed 
as well as control participants at future imaging. P2, suffering from a severe 
anterograde amnesia, could nevertheless imagine detailed future experiences. 
Similarly, the children, despite a bilateral hippocampal damage, consequent to 
neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia, were able to construct novel scenarios. 
 
In light of these findings, it seems doubtful that an episodic memory impairment 
might, in its own right, cause a deficit at future imaging. And this betrays a weaker 
and more arguable link between the two time-related processes. Squire et al.’s 
patients (2010) provided supportive evidence that Jon, P01, P2 and the 21 children 
are not atypical and isolated cases, and that future imagining might be spared in cases 
of hippocampal amnesia. Thus, at odds with what previous independent reports 
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stated, amnesia does not always cause parallel impair ents in future thinking. Ought 
this be the case, there must be factors that preserv  patients’ performances on future 
tasks, even in case of a severe memory impairment.  
 
The contradictory findings emerging in the different studies have led to discussion 
about the nature of these factors. Maguire and Hassabi  (2011) identified as one of 
these factors a possible “semantic bias” originated from the different typologies of 
cues adopted. According to this view, Squire et al.’s participants were wholly 
successful at future imagining, because they did not mentally picture vivid and 
articulate events, but rather described events that were more semantic in nature. And, 
indeed, semantic memory is preserved in a context of hippocampal damage. Maguire 
and Hassabis (2011) postulated that such a bias might have been encouraged by the 
use of a single word cue, rather than the full sentence descriptor adopted by Hassabis 
et al. (2007), which is more likely to cause detaild visualizations. In line with such 
observation, Hurley and his colleagues (2011) tested again  patient H.C., already 
assessed with future imaging tasks by Kwan et al. (2010), with a different 
methodological procedure. The two testing protocols (Kwan et al., 2010 versus 
Hurley et al., 2011) diverged on many features. Kwan et al. (2010) adopted four 
trials (for each of them H.C. had to construct two events) using single word cues and 
capped each H.C.’s description at 5 minutes. On the o r hand, Hurley et al, (2011) 
used ten trials (seven with a sentence descriptor cue and three with non-specific cue), 
gave H.C. free rein in producing whichever additional snippets came to mind, with 
no time limit, and used a probing protocol to encourage further elaborations the 
reports (i.e., they required the patient to better describe the ideas, the objects, or the 
people she had already mentioned). Hurley et al. (2011) did not find any significant 
difference in future imaging between H.C. and contrls, even adopting two different 
scoring procedures (respectively the scoring procedures proposed by Hassabis et al., 
2007 and by Kwan et al., 2010). 
 
In light of these controversial findings, we aimed at ascertaining the  contribution of 
two different types of cue in eliciting more or less detailed reports in two cases of 
patients with amnesia. The main question was which cue encourages a richer 
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visualization avoiding semantic biases, so that a full sentence descriptor cue 
(Hassabis-like) might detect a deficit at future imaging and a single word cue 
(Squire-like) might not. Therefore, we compared amnesic patients’ performances at 




10.2.1 Participants  
 
Two memory-impaired patients participated, M.D and G.C.. They were selected from 
a larger panel at the IDC (Institute of Diagnosis and Treatment) Hermitage 
(Capodimonte, Naples). 
 
M.D. was a 68 years-old right handed man with 17 years education. He worked as a 
lawyer and had no history of psychiatric or neurologic diseases. 
 
On August 14th, 2002 he was admitted to the Intensive Coronary Care Unit because 
of a cardiac arrest. Subsequently, the physicians detected a ventricular fibrillation 
and made a diagnosis of Brugada syndrome, which was tre ted with a implantable 
cardioverter-defibrillator. Consequently, he develop d a severe amnesia, which 
spared his short term memory. In particular, M.D. was tested on two long-term 
verbal memory tests. He scored 1.1 on a story recall task Novelli et al., 1986 (cut-off 
8) and 4 on a Paired-Associated Learning (Novelli et al., 1986; cut-off 6).A PET 
study showed an extensive hypometabolism in fronto-temporal areas.    
 
G.C. was a 42 years-old right handed man with 8 years education. He was 
unemployed, married with a daughter, and had no history of psychiatric or 
neurological diseases. 
 
On May 15th, 2008 he suffered from a pulmonary embolism, that caused, after a few 
days, a coma. Subsequently, he presented a very severe amnesia. He scored 0 on the 
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Story Recall and 0 on the Paired-Associated Learning. Short term memory was 
totally preserved. A PET study showed an overall slightly reduced cortical 
distribution, that was more evident in the temporal mesial regions, in the dorsolateral 
frontal and superior parietal areas and in the superior part of the right and left 
thalamus.       
 
Five healthy volunteers served as controls for the two patients. Controls averaged 
57.2 (+ 8.78) of age and 11.8 (+ 6.53) of education.  
 
The healthy individuals were members of different, non-academic, local associations. 
We did not recruit people under psychoactive pharmacological treatment likely to 
modify normal memory abilities or people with a history of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders. No honorarium was offered to participants. Before starting the 
testing session, they were asked to sign an informed written consent. The study 
procedures were approved by the local ethical committee and were carried out in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
10.2.2 Materials and experimental procedure 
 
The assessment was conducted in one session. All partici nts were tested 
individually following the same procedures; they  sat in front of the same 
experimenter in a peaceful testing environment. Participants were explicitly told that 
they would be asked to mentally pre-experience 8 autobiographical episodes in 
response to different cues (4 randomly presented cue words and 4 short verbal 
descriptors). The cues were displayed, one at a time, on a computer screen and were 
visible on the computer until the participant completed each description. There was 
no time limit. Participants described the event until they considered that nothing else 
might be added. No prompts were provided by the experimenter to the participants 





The performance of the two patients are reported separately, as two single cases.  
 
Squire-like task. The words presented as cues were previously selected from Italian 
norms (Burani et al., 2001) and matched for familiarity, frequency, imageability, and 
concreteness. The experimenter required participants to imagine the events in as 
much detail as possible. Participants were also instructed to generate temporally and 
contextually specific events and to create novel, rich and feasible future episodes, 
given their current plans. This procedure followed those of D’Argembeau and van 
der Linden (2004) and of Addis et al. (2008). 
 
Hassabis-like task. The short verbal descriptors depicted an assortment of common-
place scenarios (e.g., “Imagine you are standing in a open field by the banks of 
river” or “Imagine you are standing on the deck of a ship leaving port on a 
voyage”). The short descriptions were randomly assigned across the participants. 
Once again, participants were required to create novel, contextually specific and 
plausible scenarios, which had never occurred before, and to describe them in as 
many details as possible. The procedure and the short verbal cues were adapted from 
the paradigm formulated by Hassabis et al. (2007). 
 
The experimenter scored the transcriptions, following the procedure devised by 
Levine et al. (2002). Thus, he had to segment the wole transcriptions into different 
snippets, to be further categorized as (a) internal details (i.e., episodic information 
pertaining to the main event, specific to time and place) and (b) external details 
(general knowledge related to the event). 
 
Subsequently, internal details were distinguished into: (a) event (happenings, 
individuals present, physical/emotional actions and reactions, weather), (b) place 
(information about the environment where the event occurred), (c) time (date, 
season, month, day of the week, time of day), (d) perceptual (sensory information, 
body position) and (e) emotion (emotional state, thoughts). And external details were 
classified as: (a) external event (specific details from other incidents, from all of the 
above categories, external to the main event), (b) semantic (general knowledge or 
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facts, ongoing events, extended states of being), (c) repetition (unsolicited repetition 




Case report 1: M.D. 
 
We considered the means of the total number of internal details as scores on future 
tasks. 
 
Aiming at comparing M.D.’s scores with the control sample on the two tasks 
(Squire-like vs. Hassabis-like), we adopted two statistical  programs developed by 
John Crawford and his colleagues at the University of Aberdeen (Crawford et al., 
2010).  
 
First, we used the program Singlims_ES.exe, an upgraded version of the program 
singlims.exe, which assesses whether an individual patient’s performance falls 
significantly below the range of the controls , estimates the extent to which the 
patient’s performance is abnormal (postulating the proportion of the control 
population whose performance would be worse than tht achieved by the case under 
study) and provides the confidence limits around such proportion (the test was 
developed by Crawford and Howell, 1998; Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002; and 
Crawford et al., 2010).  
 
On the Squire-like test, the difference between M.D.’s score (5.5) and the control 
sample (M = 13.1, SD = 1.79) was highly significant, t = -3.86, p < 0.01. The effect 
size for the difference between the case and the controls was -4.246 (-7.200 to -
1.312) and 0.89% was the estimated percentage of normal population falling below 
case's score. Using the same program, we also compared M.D.’s performance 
(scored 4) with that of the control sample (M = 15,SD = 3.9) on the Hassabis-like 
test (t = -2.57, p < 0.05). In this case, the effect size for the difference between the 
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case and the controls was -2.821 (-4.875 to -0.743) and 3.08% was the estimated 
percentage of normal population falling below M.D.’s score (see Figure 10.1). 
 
Moreover, with the aim of analysing the difference between M.D.’s performances on 
the two tasks, we used the upgraded version of the Revised Standardized Difference 
Test (RSDT ES.exe) (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005; Garthwaite & Crawford, 2004; 
and Crawford et al., 2010), that allows a comparison of a single-case difference with 
the difference observed in the controls. The test rvealed no statistically significant 
difference in M.D.’s scores on the Hassabis-like and Squire-like tasks. A t-test 





Figure 10.1 - M.D.’s scores compared with the mean of controls’ scores on the 
two tasks (Hassabis-like and Squire-like). Error bars indicate standard 
deviations.  
 
We also compared, using the Singlims_ES.exe program, the total number of details 
(internal and external) of M.D.’s and the controls. The differences were significant 
both in the Hassabis-like task (M.D.: 4.25; Controls: M = 19.35, SD = 4.8, t = -2.87, 











= -4.63, p < 0.005). M.D.’s total amount of details on the two tasks was not 
significantly different from that of controls. 
 
Case report 2: G.C. 
 
We adopted the same procedure to analyse G.C.’s performance.   
 
The program Singlims_ES.exe r vealed an highly significant difference between 
G.C.’s scores and those of the control sample on the Squire-like task, t = -3.74, p < 
0.01, with an effect size for the difference between G.C. (who scored 5.75) and 
controls (M = 13.1, SD = 1.79) of -4,106 (-6,970 to -1,258) and an estimated 
percentage of normal population falling below G.C.'s score of 0.99%. The difference 
between G.C.’s score (6.5) and controls’ scores (M = 15, SD = 3.9) on the Hassabis-
like task was t = -1.9, p = 0.05, with an effect size for the difference betwen the case 
and controls of -2.179 (-3.850 to -0.464) and an estimated percentage of normal 
population falling below case's score of 5.87% (seeFigure 10.2). 
 
Moreover, the RSDT ED.exe program revealed no differences in G.C.’s scores on 
the two tasks.  
 
We also compared, using the Singlims_ES.exe program, the total number of details 
(internal and external) of G.C.’s and his controls. The differences were significant 
both in Hassabis-like task (G.C.: 7.25; Controls: M = 19.35, SD = 4.8, t = -2.3, p < 
0.05), and in Squire-like task (G.C.: 11; Controls: M = 16.15, SD = 2.05, t = -2.29, p 
< 0.05). G.C.’s total amount of details on the two tasks was not significant different 








Figure 10.2 - G.C.’s scores compared with the mean of controls’ scores on the 
two tasks (Hassabis-like and Squire-like). Error bars indicate standard 
deviations. 
 
Spatial Coherence Index. We also assessed the spatial coherence index (adapted 
from Hassabis et al., 2007), that is “a measure of the contiguousness and spatial 
integrity of the imagined scene” (Hassabis et al., 2007, p. 1728). After each report, 
participants were required to rate on a 7-point scale the spatial clarity of the scene 
(i.e., how clear and integrated the place imagined as scenario of their descriptions 
was in their mind, and how distinct the objects’ arrangement and the individuals’ 
spatial disposition were). Once again we used the program Singlims_ES.exe, to 
analyse the differences between each patient and the controls at the two task.  
 
Squire-like task. We observed that M.D.’s feedback (3.75) significantly differed 
from controls feedback (M = 5.9, SD = 0.4), t = -4,9, p < 0.01. Similarly, the 
difference between controls’ rating and G.C.’s rating (2.8) was significant (t = -7.07, 












Hassabis-like task. M.D.’s self-evaluation (2.5) was significantly lower, if 
compared with controls (M = 5.7, SD = 0.4), t = -7.3, p < 0.002. Likewise, G.C. 
estimated the spatial coherence of his scenarios (3.8) poorer, in comparison with 
controls, t = -4.33, p < 0.02. 
 
We used also RSDT ES.exe to analyse the difference of the single patients’ ratings 
on the two tasks and they did not significantly differ from the difference observed in 
the control sample.  
 
10.4 Discussion  
 
In the previous two chapters we have discussed the possible components, other than 
memory, that might play a part in the construction of future scenarios. However, in 
the present chapter, we focussed our attention on a specific variable which may 
influence performance on the future thinking tests, i.e.  the role of the cue. In Chapter 
4, we have already addressed this issue in healthy volunteers. However, we were still 
interested in assessing the role of the cue in a study with patients.  
 
The fundamental question from which this research stemmed was whether an 
impairment at imaging future thinking could be detected with a type of cue but not 
with another one. The effects of cues have only recently been addressed in studies 
with patients (Hurley et al., 2011). The extent to which a cue can influence patients’ 
performance is still a matter of debate. Therefore, w  investigated the difference 
between the most widely used cues in the literature concerning future thinking, i.e., 
the single word cue and the short description cue. W  decided to take into 
consideration solely these two structured questionnaires, which elicit future thinking 
constructions as they have been  recently discussed in the literature (Squire, 2011; 
Meguire & Hassabis, 2011). Indeed, as Squire et al. (2011) have noticed, the 
informal questionnaire used in the earliest studies investigating future thinking in 
patients are less accurate and precise at evidencing “a failure to construct well-
formed autobiographical narratives” (Squire et al., 2011).  
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Our patients, presenting with dense amnesia, even with different lesion locations and 
aetiologies, exhibited a parallel impairment at future imagining on different tasks, 
reporting fewer event-related details than the control sample. Moreover, the scores 
obtained on the two future tasks did not significantly differ in either of our patients. 
M.D. and G.C. differed from controls also in the total amount of the details (external 
and internal) they produced on each task. Once again, the difference between the two 
tasks was not significant in either of the patients. However, it has to be taken into 
account that these two patients were only tested on memory tasks. Therefore, we 
cannot exclude the involvement of multiple domains, other than memory. In 
particular, we cannot rule out the possibility of an executive dysfunction, which 
could have affected the performances of these patients.   
 
Thus, patients’ reports were definitely poorer than those generated by controls. And 
this deficit was detected, to the same extent and at the same manner, by two tasks 
adopting very different cues.  
 
Taken together, these data offer some contribution o the on-going discussion 
regarding the possibility that particular cues might cause biases, and, consequently, 
affect patients’ performance at future thinking (Maguire & Hassabis, 2011).  
 
The discussion stemmed from the attempt of disentangling the contradictory results 
emerging from independent studies on the ability of future thinking of amnesic 
patients. Beyond Hassabis and his colleagues’ study (2007), case reports of patients 
suffering from a severe amnesia observed analogous impairments at future thinking 
(Lidz, 1942; Tulving, 1985; Corkin, personal communication, 01/26/11; Dalla Barba 
et al., 1997; Klein et al., 2002). Hassabis et al. (2007) reported, for the first time, on 
one patient (P01), who, despite his episodic memory deficit, could imagine fictitious 
scenarios. These results, that initially appeared to be atypical, have been recently 
replicated in the single case of Jon (Maguire et al., 2010), P2 (Zeman et al., 
submitted), in  children (Cooper et al., 2010) and in the five patients tested by Squire 
et al. (2010). The striking contrast raising from the performance of different 
amnesiacs at creating future scenarios undermines the hypothesis of a close linkage 
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between episodic memory and future thinking. If, aiming at imagining personal 
future, individuals are to draw from memory, then peo le who lost the ability to 
remember their past should be unable also to depict their future. And this is not 
unquestionably the case.  
 
However, following different procedures, the same patient can exhibit opposite 
performances. Patient H.C. was found to be impaired (Kwan et al., 2010) and 
unimpaired (Hurley et al., 2011) in two independent studies that used different 
methodologies. The discrepancy between these findings led Hurley and his 
colleagues to suggest that H.C.’s difficulties in the former research could have been 
influenced by the specific single word cue (i.e., coffee) adopted by Kwan et al. 
(2010), which might have greatly constrained the patient, making the task more 
challenging (although participants were told that the events might have also been 
unrelated with the cue itself, and that the cue served solely as tool to facilitate the 
construction task). Kwan et al. (2010) did not rule out this possibility, noticing that 
also H.C.’s scores in autobiographical memories (probed with the single word cue) 
were lower than those exhibited in another study using a different methodology 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2011).  
 
Race et al. (2011) used short descriptions to probe very specific events and, 
consequently, to minimize accounts of frequently retold events, explaining that 
“preferred level of processing in autobiographical memory is at a more general level” 
(p. 10263; see also Conway, 2001) and that amnesiacs with a damage in temporal 
lobe usually rely on non-specific autobiographical information when reporting past 
memories (Thaiss & Petrides, 2008). And, indeed, Maguire and Hassabis (2011) 
objected that a possible reason underlying the lack of impairment observed in Squire 
et al.’s (2010) patients was attributable to the single word cue used, which is likely to 
determine semantic biases. Accordingly, Kwan et al. (2010) reported that H.C.’s 
mother considered many of her daughter’s past memori s (elicited in the same study 
with the single cue word) as “stories that had been retold over the years and may 




In Chapter 8 we reported on patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease (PD) who 
clearly showed a future thinking deficit when the descriptions were prompted with a 
single word cue and found the task prompted by a full-sentence descriptor easier to 
accomplish. In this case, the single word cue used was unlikely to determine 
semantic biases, given that our PD patients revealed severe difficulties in reshuffling 
details from different memories. Thus, they could have been less prone to fill the 
gaps of their accounts with semantic memories.  
 
On the contrary, M.D. and G.C. were completely unable to imagine their future with 
whichever cue we used. Moreover, at the end of eachdescription, we debriefed M.D. 
and G.C. about their feeling of spatial coherence and contiguousness that they might 
have experienced when depicting the scenarios in their mind. And the feedbacks they 
provided were undoubtedly less precise than those provided by the control sample, in 
both tasks. Patients’ imagine experiences lacking in spatial unity and taking place in 
a vague setting. Furthermore, the position and the arrangement of people and objects 
resulted hazy and indistinct.   
 
It is worth noticing that, once they had stopped talking, we solely gave them a single, 
standardized prompt, i.e., “Is there anything else you would like to add?”, to which 
usually they answered “No, there is not”. This can be due to the fact that  amnesic 
syndromes might have relevant effects on narrative construction, that affect future 
thinking as well as their portrayals of present experiences (Zeman et al., submitted). 
The probing protocol used by Hurley et al. (2011) was not as strict as the one we 
adopted. They did not always use the same general probe (e.g., “can you see 
anything else in the scene?”). Sometimes, they asked for further description of a 
concept, of a detail introduced by the participant -“e.g., “can you describe the fishing 
boat in more detail?” in response to the participant saying “I can see a small fishing 
boat gently rocking out in the sea”” (Hurley et al., 2011). Although the examiner was 
not allowed to introduce a new detail, participants were explicitly encouraged to 
enrich and elaborate their accounts. This procedure might be more likely to 
encourage semantic descriptions, than the cue itself. A participant does not need to 
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vividly imagine a “fishing boat” in the future scenario to further describe it, he can 
simply draw on semantic memory.   
 
Therefore, we suggest that the cue might be not as relevant as the quantity and the 
quality of prompts provided. The heterogeneity of the statements used by the 
experimenters to encourage further elaboration might be identified as a plausible 
source of error. Our data support the idea that when t is condition is controlled for, 




11. A case of confabulatory behaviour 
concerning personal future 
 
11.1 Introduction  
 
Confabulation is a memory-related phenomenon, that has been differently referred to 
as “falsification of memory occurring with clear consciousness” (Berlyne, 1972), 
“statements or actions that involve unintentional but obvious distortions of memory” 
(Moscovitch & Melo, 1997), “spontaneous narrative report of events that never 
happened” (Schacter, Normann & Koutstaal, 1998), or “an honest lying” 
(Moscovitch, 1989). Patients, who confabulate, produce verbal statements clearly 
incongruous and inappropriate to their past experiences, background, current context 
and future plans, without being aware of saying falsehoods (Dalla Barba, 1993). 
These false beliefs are often related with substantial conviction, and might lead, in 
certain cases, to act accordingly.  
 
Initially, confabulations were distinguished into mo entary and fantastic 
(Bonhoeffer, 1904; Berlyne, 1972). It was suggested that the former were usually 
autobiographical events miscombined or displaced in time and were produced in 
response to a question to overcome the embarrassment du  to a faulty memory. The 
latter were supposed to be completely distinct from momentary confabulations, as 
they were implausible claims, which appeared withou any provocation.  
 
However, today many investigators of confabulations still adopt another conceptual 
distinction, coined by Kopelman (1987), which differentiated between spontaneous 
and provoked confabulations. Whereas spontaneous confabulations are rare and 
bizarre and occur in case of a superimposition of an amnesic syndrome on a frontal 
dysfunction, provoked confabulations are more common and plausible, and are 
produced in response to questions which would uncover memory gaps.  
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All types of confabulation have some common features that has been highlighted by 
Talland (1965) and Moscovitch (1989). The confabulatory report is based upon a 
false context and might involve details incongruent ven within the false context 
constructed; confabulations are unintentional, since patients are aware neither of their 
memory deficits nor of their confabulations; the fact that patients are unaware of 
confabulating is testified by their acts which typically are compatible with the 
confabulations’ contents. Confabulations have been observed during tasks assessing 
memory, orientation in time and space and, also, personal future planning (Dalla 
Barba, 1993). Dalla Barba (1993) observed that once his amnesic patient, MB, who 
exhibited a confabulatory behaviour, "said that he was looking forward to the end of 
the testing session because he had to go to the general store to buy some new clothes. 
On this occasion the patient actually attempted to leave his hospital room, claiming 
that there was a taxi waiting for him downstairs" (p. 4). Thus, he tried to act upon his 
confabulation with respect to his future plans, obvi usly without being aware of the 
fact that he was confabulating. Another case, report d by Dalla Barba and his 
colleagues (1997), of a patient suffering from an amnesic-confabulatory syndrome 
was GA. GA developed her syndrome in consequence of a subarachnoid 
haemorrhage and ischemia following the rupture of the anterior communicating 
artery and the consequent vasospasm. She produced confabulations encroaching 
upon personal past, orientation in time and space and personal future. GA was 
administered three different tasks: the confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 1993); a 
task involving 10 questions about her lived past and 10 questions about her lived 
future; and a future version of the Crovitz test, uing a single-word cue to elicit past 
and future reports. The confabulatory behaviour wasobserved across the three tasks. 
When assessed on the confabulation battery (Dalla Brba, 1993), she presented with 
33% of confabulatory responses concerning episodic memory and 40% of 
confabulatory responses regarding orientation in time and space. GA confabulated 
60% of the times in response to questions regarding her lived past and 60% of the 
times answering questions concerning her lived future. Finally, the 13% of her 
responses about her personal past, and the 50% of her responses referring to her 
personal future on the Crovitz test were classified as confabulations. GA 
confabulated across past, present and future (e.g.,in response to the questions “What 
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did you do yesterday?; Where are you now?; What are you going to do tomorrow?”), 
but she never produced confabulations in response to question assessing semantic 
memory. The same pattern was observed in D.B. (Klein et al., 2002). D.B. had 
sustained a brain damage consequent to an anoxic encephalopathy. He exhibited a 
severe retrograde and anterograde amnesia. The 30% of his responses to questions 
concerning lived past and the 50% of his responses to questions concerning lived 
future was confabulatory. However, once again, he generated confabulations solely 
when answering questions about his personal past and future. On the contrary, he 
responded accurately and appropriately when asked qu stions regarding known past 
and future. Thus, D.B. showed difficulties at imagining future when asked, “What 
are you going to do tomorrow?”, while he could easily anticipate changes in response 
to the question, “Can you tell me what you think will be some of the most important 
issues facing your community in the next ten years?”. Szpunar (2010) has noticed 
that this difference might reflect the specificity of the impairment at thinking about 
past and future in a personal manner. Both GA and D.B. may be thought of as 
lacking the capacity of being conscious of the subjective time that they experience. 
This ability has been defined temporal (Dalla Barba, 1997) or autonoetic (Tulving, 
1985) consciousness. The two concepts are closely related. Temporal consciousness 
(TC) means “to become aware of something as part of a personal past, present or 
future” (Dalla Barba, 1997, p. 25). This concept stemmed from the consideration that 
time does not exist in the objects. Things per se are not past, present or future. We 
need an “agent”, who recognizes them and attributes a specific meaning, a temporal 
dimension to them, when we look at them in the present, when we recollect them in 
past events or when we use these objects to imagine our future (Dalla Barba, 2000). 
Slightly different is the Tulving’s concept of autonoetic consciousness (AC), which 
emphasizes the “awareness of one’s self existing in a subjective time” rather than 
that of the “subjective time in which one’s self exists” (Szpunar, 2011, p. 410). 
Whereas both TC and AC are inextricably intertwined with episodic memory, a 
different type of consciousness accompanies semantic memory. This type of 
consciousness has been differently defined as knowing consciousness (KC) that is 
the awareness of “something as a meaning or as an element of impersonal knowledge 
or information” (Dalla Barba, 1997, p. 25) or as noetic consciousness (NC) that 
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“allows an organism to be aware of, and to cognitively operate on, objects and 
events, and relations among objects and events, in he absence of these objects and 
events” (Tulving, 1985, p. 3). Thus, it might be possible that in both patients, GA and 
D.B., TC and KC were intact. However, TC, according to Dalla Barba’s model, did 
not interact, as usual, with less stable modifications in long term memory, but with 
the more stable ones. The consequence was that “habits or personal semantic 
information” were “considered in a personal temporal f mework” (Dalla Barba, 
1997, p. 25) and displaced. The present study reports on another amnesic patient, 
T.H., who confabulated when remembering past personal episodes. We aim at testing 
T.H. in three personal conditions (past, future, scene construction) and at assessing 
his self-evaluation of the phenomenological characteristics of his reports. In 
particular, we hypothesize that he might confabulate across the three conditions. 
 
Our goal is to assess whether confabulations only ecompass past and future 
conditions or whether they also extend to a condition requiring the ability to 
construct a scene which is non temporal in nature. W  predict that Dalla Barba’s 
findings will be replicated, hence we will observe confabulations encompassing both 
the past and the future. Moreover, if there is an impairment of the temporal 
consciousness causing confabulations, we might expect to observe lower “feeling of 
experiencing” indexes in T.H., when compared to controls.  
We aim at further exploring the findings of a previous study that we conducted on 
healthy people (see Chapter 6) on this confabulatory patient, hypothesizing that, 
since non temporal events have been shown to be indistinguishable from future 
events, if a patient confabulates in future events, he should confabulates also in non 











11.2.1 Participants  
 
The patient T.H. and five matched controls participated to this study. 
 
The patient T.H. was 68 years old, with 16 years of education. He was diagnosed 
with a subarachnoid haemorrhage, due to the rupture of the anterior communication 
artery, and hydrocephalus.  
 
TH was recruited at the Blackheath Brain Injury Rehabilitation Centre, in London. 
He was administrated three neuropsychological tests, the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination Revised (ACE-R) (Mioshi et al., 2006), a battery for dementia 
screening; the Hayling and Brixton tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), which measure 
executive functions; and the Repeatable Battery forthe Assessment of 
Neuropsychological Status (RBANS) (Randolph et al.,1998), that detects and 
characterizes dementia. He scored 60/100 on the ACE-R (cut-off < 82 gives 84% 
sensitivity and 100% specificity for dementia); he was impaired (scaled score of 1) 
on the Hayling test and exhibited a poor performance (scaled score of 3) on the 
Brixton test; and showed an overall extremely low score on the RBANS (in 
particular, he presented with an extremely low level of functioning in immediate (53) 
and delayed memory; a low average level of functioning in the visuo-
spatial/constructional subtest and in language; and borderline level in the 
attentional sub-task). At the end of the Hayling and Brixton tests, it was observed 
that he was “cooperative during testing, yet was confused and disorientated and 
perseverated on a number of fixed false beliefs”.  
 
T.H. was presented with the confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 1993). He produced 
a 50% of confabulations in response to questions cocerning his episodic memory; a 
40% of incorrect responses regarding the orientation in time and a 20% of incorrect 
responses referring to the orientation in space. Furthermore, he confabulated in a 
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number of situations, in response to specific question  and spontaneously, referring 
to episodic memory and future thinking. For instance, to the question “What did you 
do yesterday?”, he falsely answered that he went to visit his grandchildren. 
Moreover, at the end of an experimental session, he said that he could not come to 
the hospital the day after, since he had planned a trip with his wife. And this was not 
true. 
 
The healthy individuals were members of different, non-academic, local associations. 
We did not recruit people under psychoactive pharmacological treatment likely to 
modify normal memory abilities or people with a history of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders. No honorarium was offered to participants. Before starting the 
testing session, they were asked to sign an informed written consent. The study 
procedures were approved by the local ethical committee and were carried out in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
11.2.2 Materials and experimental procedure 
 
Each testing was implemented in a single session. Participants were assessed 
individually and sat in front of the experimenter in a quite testing room. 
 
First, they were instructed that they had to retrieve or imagine specific events (which 
were to take place at a specific time and in a specific place) that happened to them in 
the past or that might happen to them in the future, in response to a cue word or to a 
short description of a scenario. For the future task nd for the construction of the 
scenario, they were explicitly required not to retrieve memories of past events or any 
part of them, but rather to imagine episodes that could potentially happen to them in 
the future given their current plans and goals. In addition, they were given the 
following example: “If I ask you to imagine any event that might happen to you 
during the next two years, which involves the word «holiday », you should try to 
imagine a particular conversation, a particular meal or a particular moment of your 
potential holiday, that could last from a few minutes up to an hour. The holiday as a 
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whole is not going to be considered a specific event”. Once they were briefed to 
describe the remembered/imagined event in as much detail as possible, including 
aspects referring to the setting of the events, the happening, the people and the 
objects present, any emotion, colour, smell, taste, sound and to try to experience the 
event as vividly as possible.  
 
Then, participants were provided with the experimental battery. Aiming at prompting 
the past and future events, two sets of eight words, matched for familiarity, 
frequency, imageability, and concreteness, were selcted from Italian norms (Burani 
et al., 2001). Within each list, the words were randomly assigned to the two temporal 
directions. Then, each participant was given one of these two sets. They were told 
that the cue word served to facilitate the event costruction (4 past autobiographical 
memories and 4 future events), so it was to consider solely as a tool. They were 
allowed to describe an event unrelated to the cue word. This procedure followed 
those of D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2004) and of Addis et al. (2008).   
 
In order to prompt the construction of scenarios, we used four sentences depicting a 
common-place scenarios (e.g., “Imagine you are standing in a open field by the 
banks of river”; “Imagine you are standing on the deck of a ship leaving port on a 
voyage”; “Imagine sitting in a pub having a drink”; “Imagine standing in the 
impressive main hall of a busy museum”). Participants were asked to richly create 4 
new experiences, plausible, which had never happened before, and again to describe 
them in as many details as possible. The events were to be contextually specific. This 
procedure and the short verbal cues were adapted from the paradigm devised by 
Hassabis et al. (2007).  
 
The cues were displayed, one at a time, on the computer screen. Once an event had 
been recalled or imagined, it was described by each p rticipant. There was no time 
limit for each cue. Participants were allowed to keep on recounting the event until 
they thought that nothing else could be added. Recollecti ns and simulations were 





Following the description of each event, participants were asked to rate the 
phenomenological characteristics of the mental representations they had formed on a 
7-point scale. They had to estimate how many visual details they “saw” in their 
representation (no one/a lot); how many sounds, smell , tastes they “felt” (no one/a 
lot); how distinct was the setting where the representation took place (vague/clear); 
how clear was the spatial arrangement of people and objects (vague/clear); how 
strong was the feeling of experiencing the event (no feeling/strong feeling); how 
often they had experienced in the past the same or a very similar event (never/very 
often). 
 
At the end of the study, we asked a general question concerning participants’ living 




Participants’ answers were scored as “correct” or as “confabulations”. In line with 
Dalla Barba et al. (1997), we considered as correct a response that was congruent 
with information, given by a relative, regarding the past, the present activities and the 
feasible feature of the participants. For what concer s the future, we marked as 
“confabulatory” an answer that showed “a marked discrepancy or a real contradiction 
with what a predicted future action might be, in view of the present situation” (Dalla 
Barba, 1997). To this end, with T.H.’s consent, we asked his wife to listen to his 
recollections and then to answer a YES/NO question (i.e., for the past “as far as you 
know, did this event really happen in the past?” or for the future and for the scene 
construction “might this event really be likely to happen?”) for each of them. So if 
T.H.’s wife thought that the information given in the recollection was consistent with 
information referring to his past, his present and his plausible future plans, then she 
was to sign YES. Otherwise, she was to sign NO and was required to indicate the 




The results are shown in Table 11.1. 
 
 Past Future Scene Construction 
Correct Confab Correct Confab Correct Confab 
T.H. 75 25 50 50 50 50 
C 100 0 100 0 100 0 
  
Table 11.1 - T.H.’s and normal sample’s (C) percentage of correct responses 
(Correct) and confabulations (Confab) in the three tasks concerning past, 
future, scene construction.  
 
Furthermore, T.H. confabulated in response to the last question, asking for his plans 
for the future. He answered that he would go back home to Ireland for good, do the 
treatment by himself and own, and take care of, some horses and greyhounds. 
However, he lived in London, not Ireland, so would not go back to Ireland. His life, 
his house were in London and possibly he would have some involvement with horses 
and greyhounds through friends, but would not own or be too heavily involved, given 
his brain injury. He solely could help out to some degree. 
 
Subjective ratings. The phenomenological characteristics of the mental 
representations were classified in four categories, according to Hassabis et al. (2007): 
sensorial details (given by the mean rate of the vividness of visual details, sounds, 
smells, tastes), spatial index score (obtained by the mean rate of the clarity of the 
setting and spatial arrangement of people and objects), feeling of experiencing the 
event and novelty of the event (i.e., how often they ave experienced the episode in 
the past, see Chapter 5). The differences between T.H. and controls were analysed 
with the program Singlims_ES.exe (developed by Crawford and Howell, 1998; 
Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002; and Crawford et al., 2010). When compared to 
controls, T.H.’s subjective ratings of sensorial details (t = -3.16, p < 0.02), spatial 
index (t = -2.55, p < 0.05) and feeling of experiencing (t = -4.42, p < 0.01) the event 
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were significantly poorer solely for past events. He rated 3.18 the vividness of 
sensorial details (Controls: M = 6.27, SD =  0.89); 3.66 the clarity of the setting and 
of the spatial arrangements of the entity present (Controls: M = 6.4; SD = 0.98); and 
1.75 the feeling of experiencing the event (Controls: M = 6.35; SD = 0.95). 
Moreover, T.H. experienced very differently the vividness of sensorial details in past 
events (3.18; Controls: M = 6.27, SD =  0.89) and in future events (5.12; Controls: M 
= 5.22; SD = 0.52), t = 6.14, p < 0.005. Also, solely for T.H., the perceived spatial 
clarity of the setting and spatial arrangements varied between past (3.66; Controls: M 
= 6.4; SD = 0.98) and future events (5.58; Controls: 5.8; SD = 1.03; t = 2.36, p < 
0.05). Finally, T.H.’s feeling of experiencing mental representations significantly 
differed in past (1.75; Controls: M = 6.35; SD = 0.95) and future (4.75; Controls: M= 
6.45; SD = 1.70) episodes, compared to controls, t = 2.77, p < 0.05 (see table 11.2).  
The phenomenological characteristics of T.H.’s confabulatory reports did not 
significantly differ from those of T.H.’s correct reports in any of the three conditions.   
 
Rating T.H. Controls 
Past Future Past Future 
Sensorial Details 3.18 5.12 6.27(+ 0.89) 5.22(+0.52) 
Spatial Index 3.66 5.58 6.4(+0.98) 5.8(+1.03) 
Feeling of Experiencing 1.75 4.75 6.35(+0.95) 6.45(+1.70) 
 
Table 11.2 – T.H.’s and Controls’ subjective mean rating (+ standard deviation 
for controls) referring to the sensorial details, the spatial index and the feeling of 




This chapter reports on the case of T.H., who, following the rupture of the anterior 
communication artery and a consequent subarachnoid haemorrhage, was suffering 
from an amnesic-confabulatory syndrome. TH was requi d to remember some past 
events and to generate future episodes in response t  single-cue words. In addition, 
he was required to construct non-temporal scenarios, prompted with full-sentence 
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descriptors (Hassabis et al., 2007). Finally, he was asked a question concerning his 
lived future.  
 
With respect to our first hypothesis, Dalla Barba’s findings have been replicated, as 
expected. The 25% of his responses on the past task were confabulatory. And he 
confabulated in half of his reports on the future task. Also the answer at the question 
regarding his lived future was confabulatory.  
 
With respect to our second hypothesis, we observed that T.H also confabulated on 
the construction task. 
 
With respect to our third hypothesis, T.H.’s subjective ratings of sensorial details, 
spatial index and feeling of experiencing the event was poorer for past events, when 
compared to the control sample. In particular, the perceived feeling of experiencing 
the events was always lower than that of controls. This was evident on the past task, 
where the difference between T.H. and controls was significant. However, also in the 
other two tasks he scored lower than controls althoug  the difference was not 
significant. He rated 4.75 his feeling of experiencng the events in the future 
(Controls: 6.45; SD = 1.70) and 3 his feeling of exp riencing the constructed scene 
(Controls: 6.6; SD = 2.70). Furthermore, T.H.’s ratings of the phenomenological 
characteristics of past events were lower than his ratings of future events. On the 
contrary, no differences were reported within the control sample between past and 
future ratings.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that T.H. scored poorly on a number of 
neuropsychological tests. In addition, he was disorientated in time and space and 
generated a number of “fixed false beliefs”.  
 
In this study we aimed at better exploring the relation between future thinking and 




The examples of confabulators have been often report d in support of the 
constructive simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Adis, 2007a). MB, GA and D.B.’s 
performances in the future reflect their performances in the past. This confabulatory 
behaviour that extends in all the temporal dimensions uncovers, according to some 
researchers (see Schacter et al., 2008), parallel difficulties in remembering past and 
imagining future. And the reason of such difficulties has been ascribed to the 
possibility that future thinking relies on personal past. Thus, when a patient is 
impaired at retrieving past episodes, he might experience serious problems also in 
constructing his future. “There appears to be a close relationship between the ability 
to remember the personal past and the ability to imag ne the personal future: in the 
absence of the former, the latter is severely comprised (see also, Tulving, 1985)” 
(Klein et al., 2002, p. 372). “Both past and future event tasks require the retrieval of 
information from memory, thus engaging common memory networks” (Schacter et 
al., 2008, p. 45). However, this interpretation might be fallacious and misleading. 
Why should one rely on his episodic memory to construct an episodic future 
thought? If one wants to imagine an episode that he has never experienced in the 
past, or if one does not remember any of his personal past events, why cannot he rely 
on his semantic memory and construct a plausible scenario? For instance, a person 
can imagine to go to the savannah and look at a giraffe eating acacia shoots, even if 
he cannot rely on his past experience. So why do not amnesiacs rely on their 
semantic memory to describe a plausible future scenario? Studies on confabulators 
offer a precious insight, that might help to answer these questions. They suggest a 
different interpretation of the relation between past nd future thinking. It might be 
possible, for instance, that personal future is not compromised in absence of personal 
past. Personal future and personal past might be related in the sense that each of them 
embodies the manifestation of particular mechanisms, which underlie both 
remembering and foreseeing. One of these mechanisms  represented by the 
autonoetic consciousness (AC). AC enables ‘‘mental time travel in the personal 
subjective way that is the hallmark of retrieval from episodic memory’’ (Wheeler et 
al., 1997, p. 331). It allows to become conscious of the subjective experience 
extending from the past to the future. Thus, it enables also mental time travel in the 
personal subjective way that is the hallmark of the construction of scenes projected in 
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the future. The act of imagining a future personal episode might be thought as a 
function of AC. K.C., the famous amnesic patient described by Tulving (1985), had 
preserved his noetic consciousness (NC), whereas his AC was seriously 
compromised. And indeed he could imagine neither his past nor his future. D.B. 
(Klein et al., 2002) is another case of amnesic patient, who also confabulated when 
required to think about his past and his future in a personal way, i.e., when the task 
required to use AC. On the contrary, he was unimpaired in tasks involving NC.  
 
“Simply thinking that something may happen in the future, without mentally 
preexperiencing a specific episode, is a function of oetic consciousness” (Szpunar, 
2010, p. 145). Thus, as Szpunar (2010) has already noticed, since his NC worked 
properly and AC was compromised, he could think of past and future solely in an 
impersonal manner. Subjective temporality is considere  a fundamental pre-requisite 
to travel back and forward in personal time. According to Dalla Barba’s model 
(1997), temporal consciousness (TC) usually interacs with the more recent, and 
consequently less stable and weaker, modifications of the long-term memory system, 
with the aim of remembering the past, of being orientated in the current time-place 
and elaborating future plans. In some patients, like K.C., TC was impaired, so it 
could not work properly. In other patients, like GA, TC has been retained, but it does 
not accomplish its task of operating “a sort of fine grain search in the long-term 
storage system and use less stable modifications in order to set up a personal 
temporal workspace” (Dalla Barba, 1997, p. 25). In this condition, TC interacts with 
more stable modifications of long-term memory and consequently it uses information 
frequently told and retold over the years and “semanticized” to some extent. When 
required to plan their lived future, confabulators f this type are prone to answer with 
habits that they used to adopt in their life. Therefor , our patient, T.H., lived in 
Ireland many years before our experimental interview and used to take care of a 
number of animals, like horses. When asked about his plans in the next future, he 
proposed a very unlikely scenario, ignoring his current medical, social and practical 
conditions. He did not take into account to have a house in London and to need 
constant assistance, and he answered that he would g  back home to Ireland, do the 
treatment by himself, and take care of some horses and greyhounds. Moreover, he 
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seemed to adhere without doubt to his confabulatory descriptions. Accordingly, there 
was no difference between the perceived phenomenological characteristics of his 
confabulatory and his non-confabulatory reports. However, the feeling of re-
experiencing and pre-experiencing his mental represntation was less strong when 
compared to controls.  
 
This is in line with what suggested by Klein et al. (2002): “semantic memory also 
makes possible a form of mental time travel, albeit one that does not entail awareness 
of the temporal dimension of one’s own experience. Specifically, individuals who 
possess semantic memory are capable of knowing about, ut not re-experiencing, 
previous states of the world and drawing on that generic knowledge to construct 
possible scenarios of the future” (p. 369-370). And it might be possible that an 
impairment of TC is reflected also by a weak subjectiv  feeling of mentally 
experiencing past events.  
 
Furthermore, our results show that imagined future ev nts are impossible to tell 
apart, with respect to the percentage of confabulations produced, from non temporal 
events. Therefore, we replicated with a confabulatory patient the results that we 
obtained on healthy people (see Chapter 6). In Chapter 6, we hypothesized that 
participants envisage future scenarios even when they are asked to imagine 
experiences not explicitly temporal in nature. This might apply also for T.H.. It may 
be the case, in fact, that cueing T.H. “to imagine a  event that might happen to him 
in the next two years, which involves the word holiday” or “to imagine that he is 
standing in an open field by the banks of river” does not make any difference in 
terms of mental time travel in future, i.e., the inclusion of a time period in the cue 
sentence does not seem crucial to trigger prospection. It may occur that, as far as a 
person is engaged in imagining doing something plausible, he spontaneously projects 
into his personal future. Therefore, TC might be involved not only when 
remembering the past and when imagining the future, but also when constructing non 




However, we cannot rule out also a different interpr tation of the present data. 
Moscovitch (1995) has noticed that tasks involving episodic memory place a high 
cognitive demand, especially on executive functions, requiring temporal experience 
and narrative constructions. Consequently, they might nvolve strategic retrieval 
processes. In particular, future thinking tasks have been shown to involve even a 
greater neural activity than the episodic memory tasks (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et 
al., 2007). Okuda et al. (2003) have revealed that frontal lobes are activated when 
normal participants foresaw. In particular, specific frontal polar regions are more 
active when participants think and reports their future prospects. Recently, Anderson 
et al. (in press) have suggested that future thinking might be considered more 
effortful than past memory. Executive functions underlie both processes by 
monitoring and combining the different details. But, whereas past episodes require “a 
search for a unique combination of information; in contrast, a future event can be 
formed from any combination of an infinite array of information within 
autobiographical memory” (p. 2). T.H. showed poor pe formances in many cognitive 
domains, in particular in tests assessing executive functions. These difficulties might 




12. Final Discussion 
 
“All the world’s a stage”, wrote Shakespeare. Sudden orf and Corballis (2007) noted 
that this applies to the mental world as well. Information and material stored in long-
term memory can be mentally manipulated and re-combined to form infinite and 
elaborated simulations of possible upcoming episode. However, our mind does not 
work like a video-camera and we do not have at our disposal full-fledged scenes to 
be performed as in a movie (“The past, like the future, can only be imagined”, de 
Hériz, 2006, p.21). Episodes are constructed by drawing from different snippets and 
by reshuffling them to shape a coherent whole. Therefore, future thinking is far from 
being an encapsulated cognitive function. It, instead, impinges upon a constellation 
of constituent abilities. For this reason, it is a costly process, likely to be disrupted at 
different stages, hence in several diseases, which might be characterised by an 
impairment of one or more of its crucial components. Indeed, the mental construction 
of future experiences requires the activation of much of cortical mass and, 
consequently, it can be impaired by “any kind of cortical brain damage” (Berryhill et 
al., 2010, p. 1391). The ability of forecasting necessitates a greater neural activity 
than that underlying past recollections (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007). When 
healthy participants think and report their future prospects, specific frontal polar 
regions are more active (Okuda et al., 2003). Furthermore, the activity of the right 
frontopolar cortex (BA 10) positively correlate with he amount of details uttered 
(Addis & Schacter, 2008). Also Anderson et al. (in press) noted that future thinking 
might be regarded as more effortful and expansive than past memory. For instance, 
future thinking is thought to place a considerable demand on executive functions, 
which underlie both processes by monitoring and combining various elements. 
However, whereas past episodes require “a search for a unique combination of 
information; in contrast, a future event can be formed from any combination of an 
infinite array of information within autobiographical memory” (Anderson et al., in 
press, p. 2). “Like human language, it [future thinking] is open-ended and generative, 
so there is no end to the number of potential future scenarios one might envisage” 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p. 302).  
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The abilities of foreseeing unique episodes and of acting accordingly provide us with 
an essential selective advantage. The adaptation to the future is facilitated by the 
versatility in facing novel situations and the flexibility to elaborate and use strategic 
plans to achieve personal devised goals (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).      
 
The matter is intriguing and has led to a growing surge of literature during the last 
years, insomuch as Schacter and Addis (2007c) argued that “the future of thinking 
about the future appears to be now” (p. 33). The present thesis stemmed from the 
need of breaking down the whole process into its basic components, aiming at deeply 
investigating this sort of “life simulator” (Brüne  & Brüne-Cohrs, 2007). To this end, 
this research encompassed a number of experiments both on healthy volunteers and 
on different groups of patients.  
 
After presenting the concept of future thinking and reviewed the relevant literature in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the thesis proceeds with the attemp  to select an appropriate cue to 
prompt future episodes (Chapter 4).  
 
The types of cue hitherto adopted in the literature have been highly heterogeneous. 
And this is a key point, which had never been experim ntally addressed before, to 
consider in the interpretation of the results. Some researchers had already noted that 
indeed different cues might lead to different outcomes, as it was observed in the case 
of H.C., who was found to be impaired at future thinking when tested with Kwan et 
al.’s (2010) procedure and unimpaired when assessed with Hurley et al.’s (2011) 
paradigm. Thus, it was suggested that some cues might be more sensitive to detect 
difficulties forecasting, while others might encourage more semantic descriptions. 
However, there is a rather heated debate as to which cue is more likely to minimize 
the dependence on semantic memory. In some studies, cu  indicating a context were 
adopted to enhance the dependence on semantic memory (Hassabis et al., 2007) and 
to make the future task less challenging for patients with brain injury (Hurley et al., 
2011). In others, researchers did the opposite, using cues representing a context to 
avoid participants to report “frequently retrieved vent information” (Race et al., 
2011, p. 10263) and ascribing semantic biases to descriptions prompted by generic 
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object-cues, which did not encourage the construction of vivid scenarios, but the 
production of accounts more semantic in nature (see th  discussion between Maguire 
and Hassabis, 2011 and Squire et al., 2011). Our findings showed that when the cue 
represented a setting, healthy participants uttered more internal-episodic and less 
external-semantic snippets, by comparison with a more generic cue characterizing an 
object. Thus, throughout the thesis we have mainly used object-cues or variations of 
them, to elicit future thinking. This, according to Conway’s model (2001), loads on 
both strategic searching and scene construction, hece allowing to detect an 
impairment at more steps of forecasting.  
 
In the study reported in Chapter 5, it was hypothesized that, given that future 
thinking is a more effortful and costly process than remembering (Anderson et al., in 
press), on some occasions, participants might provide past personal episodes that 
have already occurred, instead of truly constructing novel scenarios. This hypothesis 
was investigated by assessing participants on near futu e (few weeks) and distant 
future (few years) events. In fact, given that thiscould represent a possible caveat in 
our research, we were interested into experimentally scertaining whether our 
concern was founded. We observed, in the delayed recognition tasks of both the 
relevant experiments, that some of the personal future events produced were 
acknowledged as being already occurred in the past or as being very similar to past 
events. Participants were more likely to be relying upon personal memories when 
simulating near future scenarios than distant future scenarios. Thus, we thought that 
it could be more appropriate for the ensuing experim nts to test participants on 
distant future events (i.e., “Imagine an episode that might happen to you next yar” ) 
rather than on near ones, to reduce the possibility that they simply reproduce past 
personal memories, instead of truly imagining future p ospects.   
 
After these two studies, we were interested at better defining what differentiates 
future thinking from the related concept of imaging complex scenes. The specific 
contribution of three essential features of future thinking was therefore explored in 
Chapter 6: familiarity of setting, self-relevance, and self-projection in time. Our main 
purpose was to understand whether future thinking differed from imagined future 
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events involving familiar others and from imagined a-temporal events, and whether 
the familiarity of setting might be a crucial modulator of the characteristics of future 
thought. In two experiments it was observed that constructions of future events 
occurring in familiar settings are perceived as more vivid, are related to a stronger 
feeling of pre-experiencing and are characterized by a greater amount of episodic 
details, by comparison with the images of future events occurring in unfamiliar 
settings. On the contrary, future autobiographical episodes were found to be entirely 
indistinguishable from a-temporal personal events. There were no differences, 
indeed, between the subjective rating on sensorial details (perceived vividness), 
spatial clarity of context and feeling of experiencing indexes, and between the 
number of episodic details in the two conditions. Thus, we suggested that future and 
a-temporal events, as long as they are plausible, are mentally represented in a similar 
way. 
 
These first three studies had the goal of investigatin  at depth the concept of future 
thinking and the possible caveats one is likely to encounter when assessing 
participants on future thinking.  
 
Then, our further purpose was that of dissecting the cognitive architecture of 
foresight. In particular, we aimed at evaluating the parts played by two cognitive 
functions: episodic memory, which is thought to lie at the very core of future thought 
and executive control, which is considered a key comp nent of future thinking 
(Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2007). In addressing this issue, we greatly benefited from 
assessing people with different types of disorders.  
 
Many authors (see e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) have suggested that episodic 
memory helps to pre-experience future episodes, given that it is the type of memory 
that we used to re-experience the past. Hegdè (2007) convincingly objected that this 
implies an unnecessarily limitation, because “if it was strictly true, it would mean 
that one would be able to foresee only those events tha  one has episodic memory of” 
(p. 324). Furthermore, the author extends the formulation of the close relationship 
between episodic memory and future thinking to its logical limits, proposing a 
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conundrum. “To the extent that one can only foresee those future events that one has 
experienced in the past, and to the extent that events never repeat themselves exactly, 
one can never apply the memory of any past event to a future situation” (p. 324).        
     
Therefore, the relationship between remembering the past and imagining the future 
appears to be more subtle than it has been postulated in various studies (see Szpunar, 
2010). We can imagine events never experienced before. In order to imagine to eat 
tiger shark sushi at the Chiharu Japanese Restauran in Singapore, we do not need to 
have done it before. Information about the details of pecific events already occurred 
is not necessarily needed. We can easily generalize nd extrapolate information from 
our general knowledge, adding arbitrary particularities. “Without the ability to 
extrapolate from generalities, the amount of particularities the brain would have to 
store would be subject to a combinatorial explosion. For every prediction of a future 
event, the memory of a corresponding past event would be needed. Conversely, what 
one can predict about the future will be limited by one’s episodic memory” (Hegdè, 
2007, p. 324). This sharp observation implies that different types of memory might 
cooperate with each other and with other cognitive domains to aid forecasting.  
 
Thus, we first analysed the actual dependence of the ability of future thinking on 
episodic memory.  
 
In Chapter 7 the capacity of foreseeing personal future in a group of patients 
diagnosed with aMCI, hence presenting a selective and isolated impairment of 
episodic memory, was assessed. Our findings revealed that these patients produced 
fewer episodic details and a greater amount of semantic details than controls. Thus, 
the existence of a close linkage between remembering the past and imagining the 
future was highlighted.  
 
We were also interested in investigating whether or not difficulties in future thinking 
might be observed also in the absence of episodic memory deficit. Indeed, in Chapter 
8, we reported that patients with Parkinson’s Disease, who did not exhibited 
impairments in memory, were nonetheless impaired in the construction of future 
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scenarios. In particular, seven patients, who reachd t e poorest scores on the future 
thinking task (generating less episodic details), achieved a significantly lower mean 
score on the Frontal Assessment Battery compared to the rest of the group. 
Furthermore, these patients expressed their own incapability to take distance from 
their memories in favour of the imagination of completely novel scenarios. This 
chapter documented a clear dissociation between spared episodic memory and the 
impaired ability of forecasting, suggesting that fuure thinking deficits do not 
represent a specific feature of amnesia and that executive functions might also 
essentially contribute to the construction of future scenarios.   
 
In Chapter 9, we adopted the task developed by Zeman et al. (submitted) to better 
interpret the data that we obtained in Chapter 8. In particular, this Chapter helped us 
to rule out the hypothesis that an executive functio s deficit might have determined a 
general impoverishment of verbal reports of our patients with Parkinson’s Disease. 
Two samples of these patients (one executive and one n -executive) were tested, 
indeed, on a Description Task, requiring to describe a current real-life setting. The 
total amount of specific details produced was equivalent between the three groups, 
executive, non-executive and controls. Therefore, we concluded that the failure in the 
future task performance noted in the previous chapter was more plausibly due to a 
disruption of the flexible searching through different memories and to the subsequent 
binding of the various elements into a coherent narrative, caused by a dysexecutive 
problem. 
 
In Chapter 10, we focussed our attention on the rol of the cue. However, we did not 
address this issue by testing healthy volunteers, as in Chapter 4, but in two patients 
presenting with dense amnesia. We aimed at evaluating the extent to which a cue can 
influence patients’ performance, contrasting the most widely used cues in the 
literature concerning future thinking, i.e., the single word cue and the short 
description cue. It was observed that patients’ reports were definitely poorer than 
those generated by controls. The deficit was detectd, to the same extent and at the 
same manner, by the two tasks adopting very different cues. We suggested that the 
cue might not be as relevant as the quantity and the quality of prompts provided, to 
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encourage the patient to further elaborate his report. Our data supported the idea that 
when this condition is controlled for, the cues might be more sensitive to detect an 
impairment. 
 
The last issue we addressed in the present dissertation was the relation between 
future thinking and the subjective time. We did it in Chapter 11, which reported on 
the case of T.H. suffering from an amnesic-confabultory syndrome. We observed 
that the 25% of his responses on the past task were confabulatory. Furthermore, he 
confabulated in half of his reports on the future task and on the construction task. 
The answer to the question regarding his lived future was also confabulatory. We 
suggested that his difficulties imagining the future were plausibly due to an 
incapability of T.H. to be aware of the temporal dimension of his experience. 
  
In conclusion, we greatly benefited from the studies that we run with healthy 
volunteers. They helped us to investigate at depth some relevant issues concerning 
the human ability to imagine personal future. Moreover, studies on patients offered 
an insight to further explore, and hence offer different interpretations about the 
relations between future thinking and other cognitive functions, like memory, 
executive functions and subjective time.  
 
In Woody Allen’s movie, “Midnight in Paris” (2011), Gil expresses to the artist Man 
Ray his astonishment at being catapulted back and forth in time. Man Ray finds 
entirely normal the idea of living in more temporal dimensions at the same time and 
Gil replies, “It’s easy for you! You’re a surrealist. But I’m a normal guy!”. Thus, 
unless we are surrealists, the ability of mentally travelling forward in time is 
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The modified version of the MCQ questionnaire (see D’Argembeau & van der 
Linden, 2004).  
 
 
Visual details: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7
No one A lot 
Sounds: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
No one A lot 
Smells/Tastes: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7
No one A lot 
Clarity of location: 1     2     3     4     5     6   7 
Vague  Clear  
Clarity of spatial arrangement of objects: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
Vague  Clear  
Clarity of spatial arrangement of people: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
Vague Clear 
Clarity of temporal connotation of the event: 1     2   3     4     5     6     7 
Vague       Clear 
Clarity of the event overall: 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
Vague       Clear 
 
Feeling of experiencing the event: 1     2     3   4   5     6     7 
No one Strong  
How often do you have experienced in the 
past the same or a very similar event? 1     2     3 4     5     6     7 
Never Very often 
 
 
